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CONSUMING IDENTITIES: THE CULTURE AND POLITICS OF FOOD
AMONG THE UYGHUR IN CONTEMPORARY XINJIANG
Maria Cristina Cesar°





This research is a study of food and identity among the Uyghur, a Turkic-speaking
Muslim people who live in the north-western region of Xinjiang (Chinese Central
Asia) and are today one of the largest minorities in the People's Republic of
China. It is based on fieldwork carried out from May 1996 to September 1997
among Uyghur urban intellectuals in Urilmchi, the provincial capital of Xinjiang.
The underlying argument is that food, in all its related practices, is a powerful
form of identity creation and maintenance. Through the preparation, the
exchange, and the consumption of food social relationships are created, rules of
inclusion and exclusion are established, boundaries are negotiated and
maintained. In a context of volatile relations between the Uyghur Muslim
minority and the dominant Han Chinese population, food represents a
fundamental resource available to Uyghur intellectuals, who find themselves at
the vanguard of both assimilation and differentiation and are currently engaged in
a difficult process of negotiation and affirmation of their distinctive identity. In
this context, food becomes a privileged arena for negotiation, providing an
excellent vantage point to explore the dynamic and complex nature of social and
cultural interaction in contemporary Xinjiang. In particular, the same tension
between differentiation and assimilation is at work in the realm of food. If, on
the one hand, a narrative of continuity, tradition, and discrete identities can be
detected in the way Uyghurs talk and write about their food, on the other hand




Journey to the West	 10
Fieldwork in Xinjiang	 15
1. A general introduction to the region, the people, and the field 	 25
1.1. Xinjiang: the region and the people 	 25
1.2. The Uyghur	 38
1 3 Ethnicity and ethnic identity	 43
1.4. Ethnicity and the state in China: Group definition and China's
nationality policies	 48
1.5. The anthropology of food 	 53
1.6. Food and identity among the Uyghur	 57
2. Uyghur identity	 63
2.1. Uyghur identity or oasis identities? 	 63
2.2. "Modern" north vs. "traditional" south	 66
2.3. Tradition, modernity, and the role of education in the shaping of
modern Uyghur identity	 70
2.4. Three Uyghur 'heroes' 	 72
3. Being Uyghur in triimchi	 81
3.1. ertimchi: from beautiful grassland to modern city 	 81
3.2. The "Uyghur town"	 86
3.3. 'We're not Chinese!'	 93
3.4. The Hanzu/Minzu dichotomy	 103
4. Food and ceremony 	 108
4.1. Uyghur hospitality	 109
4.1.1. Being a guest in a Uyghur home 	 109
4.1.2. Dastikhan and mehmandostluq	 111
4.1.3. Variation in hospitality 	 113
4.1.4. The politics of hospitality 	 117
4.2. Food in rituals and ceremonies	 121
4.2.1. Uyghur Weddings	 123
S. The private sphere: food, gender, and the family 	 136
5.1. Food at home and gender relations	 136
5.2. Gender in non-western societies 	 138
5.3. Work and gender in Southern Xinjiang	 139
5.4. Gender relations among urban Uyghurs	 141
5.5. Food and gender among urban Uyghurs	 145
6. Uyghur food: cuisine, diet, and belief 	 153
6.1. Uyghur diet and cuisine	 153
6.1.1. Cuisine	 155
6.1.2. Uyghur cuisine	 156
6.1.3. Uyghur dishes	 161
6.1.4. Uyghur diet	 164
6.2. Chinese foods, Uyghur ways	 166
6.2.1. Chinese food on Uyghur tables? 	 169
6.2.2. Uyghur or Turkic?	 172
6.3. Uyghur notions of qingzhen	 174
6.3.1. Uyghur practical definitions of qingzhen	 178
6.3.2. What is a qingzhen restaurant?	 181
6.4. "We don't eat Chinese!" 	 183
7. Food in public: ethnographic vignettes of eating out 	 186
7.1. Restoran and ashkhana	 187
7.2 The Pink House (hancan): youyi minzu and the you-are-what-you-
eat philosophy	 189
7.3 Lamb, ltighrnlin and Bollywood: being "abroad within China" 	 191
7.4. Hui restaurants: a good compromise? 	 192
7.5. Eating in Erdaoqiao: a place for every taste	 194
7.6. Affordable eating-out: middle-range restoran	 197
7.7.Folklore and business: Uyghur meet Han in an upmarket
restaurant	 200




This account aims at providing the context in which my research started and took
place. My personal involvement with the people and the events that occurred while I
was living in Xinjiang have inevitably affected my fieldwork. As a result, I have often
found myself in the ambiguous position of being at the same time an outsider as well
as an insider, with all the strengths and weaknesses that such ambiguity implies.
I had been studying China for five years as an undergraduate; i.e. China as Han
culture in the People's Republic. I was aware that there were other peoples, different
from the Han, living in the PRC: the "Chinese minorities", as they are usually referred
to. However, at that time China was still a relatively mysterious universe and in the
Italian academic world very little attention, if any, was paid to non-Han as well as to
non-mainland China.
From 1990 to 1991! spent one year at Shandong University studying Mandarin.
It was then that I had my first encounter with the Uyghur. Virtually everywhere in
China one could find Uyghurs selling kebab (yangrouchuan for the Chinese). With
their beards, deep eyes, high noses, and broken Mandarin they were just as exotic as
us laowai ("old foreigners"). There was an unspoken bond which became explicit
every time they asked if! was a Muslim.
Soon I became tired of constantly being an 'anthropological' object and I
decided to challenge the assumption according to which people were divided into 'us'
Chinese - in fact Han - and 'them' foreigners. Every time I was asked the ritual
question "Ni shi no ge guojia de?" (What country do you come from?) - sometimes
even twenty times in a day - I said I was Chinese (Zhongguo ren), waited for the
astonished expression on my interlocutor's face and then specified that I belonged to a
minority from the north-west, the Uyghur. I was encouraged by my local friends and
acquaintances, who were sympathetic and unanimously agreed that I could easily pass
as a Uyghur. This turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy during my fieldwork in
Xinjiang six years later. There the two main reference groups were the Han and the
Uyghur and people often assumed that! was a Uyghur, rather than a laowai.
My first experience in China awoke my interest in the 'Chinese others', these
colourful peoples who sing and dance - as they are usually represented in Chinese
discourse. I also felt the need to take an anthropological approach. I wanted to find out
how they perceived and represented themselves. Therefore,! did an MA at the School
of Oriental and African Studies, where I was able to combine the study of the
discipline - social anthropology - with a specific area - China.
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Xinjiang had been one of the remotest and last accessible regions of the PRC.
In recent years, as a result of major internal and international transformations - namely
the economic reforms in China and the break-up of the Soviet Union which led to the
independence of the Central Asian Republics - Xinjiang has gained a centrality
unknown since the foundation of the PRC in 1949. The Uyghur were no longer
simply one of the 55 colourful minorities within the Chinese state; their identity was
also defined against the other Central Asian Turkic peoples, who now had a state of
their own. Very little material based on fieldwork had been published in the West. On
the other hand, Chinese sources only provided a depoliticised representation of the
Uyghur in terms of folkloristic traits. I wanted to let the Uyghur speak for themselves.
I wanted to find out what it meant to be a Uyghur in Xinjiang at the end of the
twentieth century. That was the question I had in mind when I started my PhD.
The newly acquired strategic importance of Xinjiang within the PRC, was also
accompanied by the harshening of the already volatile relations between the local
people - mainly Uyghur - and the Han population that had moved into Xinjiang,
mostly since the late 1940s early 1950s. Moreover, in the last few years Uyghur
independence movements had become more and more active both in China and abroad.
This meant that my research was potentially very sensitive. The study of Uyghur
identity as defined in relation to the Han, while not being specifically focused on ethnic
relations, certainly implied them as a background. Food provided an interesting and
relatively safe angle to look at my question.
I was aware of the difficulties of doing research in the PRC, and in Xinjiang in
particular. It was a relief when Dr. Cm Yanhu, a member of the Unit for Cultural and
Social Anthropology at the Xinjiang Normal University in Ortimchi, offered to help
organise my fieldwork in Xinjiang. I had corresponded with Dr. Cui for about two
years, since he was a visiting scholar in Cambridge as part of the Mac Arthur project.
He had encouraged my interest in "non-Han groups" in Xinjiang, as he preferred to
call what are normally referred to as national minorities, and was pleased to inform me
about the Unit, newly formed upon his return. Dr. Cui and I agreed that I would
register as a language student at his University for the first two or three months.
While being introduced to the Uyghur language, I would also be able to identify a
suitable fieldwork site. I did not want to be based in eriimchi during the whole period,
between Spring 1996 and Autumn 1997, but it was easier to make arrangements while
in Oriimchi, rather than from England. I arrived in China in May 1996 with a student
visa.
During the fourteen months that I spent in Ortimchi, my attitude to China
radically changed. Though I did not consider Chinese presence in Xinjiang entirely
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legitimate, I was fairly unbiased when I arrived. My previous experience in Shandong
had been very positive, especially in terms of human relations. Six years later, in the
"western region" I encountered a very different China. Living standards had definitely
improved, at least for most of the urban population. But I felt that the quality of life
was much worse compared to what I had experienced before. Money had become the
dominant value and there seemed to be a general dissatisfaction, since the great
majority of the people could not afford the living standards that the socialist market
economy was now proposing. Somehow people in Xinjiang were experiencing the
worst of both socialism - with its bureaucracy and state control over people's lives and
minds - and capitalism - with its insatiable consumerism and lack of welfare. What I
found most striking, however, was the rising Chinese nationalistic sentiment, in fact
Han chauvinism. This reached its climax on July 1st 1997 with the celebration of the
"return of Hong Kong to the motherland" which allowed the Chinese to "wash white
one hundred years of national humiliation", as slogans posted everywhere recited.
While my research interests were mainly focused on the Uyghur, I was equally
open to meet and interact with the Han, as well as with members of any other group
living in Xinjiang. But before long it became evident that once I had entered a Uyghur
network there were not many chances to meet and associate with the Han. It was a
question of 'loyalty', but also of time and opportunities: there is very little overlap
between Uyghur and Han networks and this usually occurs within the working
environment. Since I was spending most of my time in a Uyghur scene, I inevitably
started sympathising and sharing their resentment for the Han 'occupiers'. I tried to be
as objective as possible in my analyses, but I could not help being outraged by every
episode of discrimination or symbolic violence that I witnessed. In eriimchi, along
with coal dust, one could breath tension and hatred. On the other hand I could not
blame those Han who lived in fear of being murdered by a Uyghur. Hatred, violence,
and repression prevented almost any form of dialogue between the two groups and
most Han and Uyghurs could not go beyond a stereotyped representation of each
other.
Young educated Uyghurs, while being proud of their Uyghur identity, felt
helpless and frustrated. From their point of view, in the new Chinese society all the
chances for a good job and success were reserved to the Han. I have hardly met any
.Uyghur student or graduate who was not dreaming, if not actually planning, to go
abroad. I was constantly faced with a very difficult choice, whether to support them or
not. On a personal level, I could perfectly understand their sense of frustration and
wished they could have more chances than wasting the rest of their lives in a dusty
office knitting or reading the newspaper. On the other hand, these were among the
7
brightest and most educated Uyghur youth. I believe that, if there is still a chance for
the Uyghur to survive as a group with their distinctive culture, the battle has to be
fought with pens rather than with bombs. For this reason, I deeply admire those
Uyghur intellectuals who have accepted the challenge of reviving and promoting
Uyghur culture within Xinjiang, despite the immense difficulties and frustrations with
which they are constantly faced.
Many have contributed in various ways to this work. I would like to begin with those
who have helped me to reach the end. I want to thank first of all my family for always
being there. Attilio and Giuliana Cesar° have also contributed their very generous
financial support throughout my PhD and especially during the writing-up. Many
thanks to Anna Lisa Cesaro for 'technical' advice and for her precious help in editing
maps and illustrations. Guilherme Werlang shared some of the worst time of my
writing-up, and always trusted that I would finish. I thank him above all for
convincing me that it was worth. And for a lot more.
I owe Stuart Thompson - who first introduced me to the anthropology of food -
endless gratitude for his generous support and constant encouragement throughout my
Master's and my PhD, which helped me not to give up. Stephan Feuchtwang accepted
the difficult task of reviving my motivation and leading me to the end when it was
most unlikely for me to finish. I am most grateful for his empathic reading and
thoughtful comments, which have helped me to interpret my own work. Many thanks
to Chris Hann, who shared my initial enthusiasm and guided me in the first stages of
my PhD. I am very grateful to Peter Parkes for generously accepting to carry the
burden of my supervision, and for his useful comments and suggestions.
Cui Yan-hu offered his precious help in organising my fieldwork and assisted
me during my initial stay in Xinjiang. My deepest gratitude goes to all the Uyghur
people, who have welcomed me into their homes and into their lives. In particular, I
want to thank my Uyghur teachers and my friends Aziz, Nurnisa, Saniya, Sabi, Alim,
and Eli for sharing pride in their culture, and for taking care of me and making me feel
at home.
At different stages, I have shared my fieldwork experience with other `Uyghur
scholars'. I am most grateful to Rachel Harris, Ildik6 Bellêr-Hann, Arienne Dwyer,
and Gardner Bovingdon for sharing their knowledge and their ideas, and for their
precious help and constant support during the writing-up. I value their friendship even
more than their academic contributions.
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The Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Kent provided funding for
the first three years. Small grants awarded by the British Federation of Women
Graduates and by the Royal Anthropological Institute (Radcliffe-Brown Trust Fund)
also represented an essential contribution.
I cannot conclude without remembering the late Paul Stirling. He deserves my
deepest gratitude, above all for his understanding and sympathetic support, which
made more bearable the difficult post-fieldwork transition. Finally, I would like to
thank all the friends who have kept me sane in the various stages of writing-up; I am




Journey to the Westl
Outside the carriage window there is nothing. Or gebi, as they call it here. A wasteland
of sand and stones. Occasionally a tuft of yellowed grass. It is a totally new feeling
here in China, where it seems impossible even to imagine a place without people, let
alone without any trace of them.
The train left Lanzhou last night at two and entered the Gansu corridor, the main
route for land travel between central China and Xinjiang. We have been travelling for
more than thirty hours now, and have covered only half the distance separating Beijing
from Ortimchi, our final destination. This single rail line was built in the late 1950s
and was a fundamental step in the attempt to integrate the "western regions" into
China. Thanks to this rail line, masses of Han Chinese have moved, and are still
moving, into Xinjiang, to the extent that the proportion of Han population has risen
from about 5% in 1949 to over 38% in 1995. I am told by a fellow passenger that the
construction of a second track on the Lanzhou-Oramchi section is about to be
completed, thus shrinking the distance between Ortimchi and the rest of China. "This
will make the trip much faster", she says.2
Oriimchi - our destination - is the capital and main urban centre of what is
currently known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, one of the five
autonomous regions of the People's Republic of China. However, most people in the
West are probably more familiar with names such as Eastern Turkestan or Chinese
Turkestan. It is the region comprised between Mongolia and Tibet, on a north-south
axis, and the Central Asian Republics and China proper, on a west-east axis. In short,
Chinese Central Asia. If very few people have ever heard of Xinjiang, the "Silk Road"
- which from the Tang capital of Chang'an (today Xi'an) crossed this region and
eventually reached the Mediterranean - and the "Great Game" - played here by the
Russian and British empires at the turn of this century - are definitely more evocative
1 Xiyou Ji (Journey to the West) is the title of a 16th century novel based on the Buddhist monk Xuan
Zang's travel to India through the region today known as Xinjiang (7th century, Tang dynasty). The
best known English translation is Wu Ch'eng-en, Monkey, translated by Arthur Waley, 1942,
Penguin.
2 The second track was completed during the summer 1996. In fact the trip from Beijing to eriimchi
now lasts about four hours less than it used to: sixty-five as opposed to sixty-nine.
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to Western readers. Today, once again, this region has become crucial in Chinese trade
and politics.
After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Soviet influence in Xinjiang had been
growing, reaching its climax in the 1930s during Sheng Shicai's rule. The efforts
made by the Chinese Communist government to (re)orient this region towards Beijing
have been successful, especially after Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated in the late
1950s. For three decades Chinese Central Asia has been isolated from its Soviet
counterpart. Artificial boundaries have cut across peoples who shared language,
history, and traditions, while having hardly anything in common with their Russian
and Chinese dominators (McMillen 1979:8; Paksoy 1994). Today such boundaries
have become much more permeable, as a consequence of more or less radical
transformations in the world's biggest socialist countries. The dissolution of the Soviet
Union in 1991 has led to the creation of five Central Asian independent states, while in
neighbouring China socialism - or its ghost - has so far managed to survive by
transforming itself into "socialist market economy" (shehui zhuyi shichang jingji).
The economic and social impact on Xinjiang of the post-Mao reforms that were
launched in the early eighties has become particularly visible in recent years, especially
in terms of cross-border exchange. Ethnic ties have facilitated border trade between
China and Central Asia, while at the same time being reinforced by renewed and
increasing contact.
Despite the fact that Xinjiang lies almost half way between Europe and Beijing,
the easiest way to get there for a European is still via the Chinese capital. In other
words, travel eight to nine thousand kilometres east, and then nearly four thousand
kilometres back west. One could choose an adventurous shortcut, via Almaty in
Kazakhstan or Islamabad in Pakistan, both connected by air and by road to Xinjiang,
only to find out that it is a lot more complicated (visas, bad connections, etc.) and
considerably more expensive.
I chose to reach Ortimchi from Beijing, and to do so by train rather than by
plane. Not only because of the prohibitive air fare (at that time £220 single, £440
return, double the local price for the privilege of being a foreigner). The route of my
journey was also a metaphor. My interest for Xinjiang and the Uyghur people had
started from (Han) China. I wanted to experience the physical distance of the western
region; to gradually plunge into such a different reality, rather than diving into it on a
plane. To appreciate the continuity, and yet the difference. Three days and three nights
on a train offered such an opportunity. I chose a "hard sleeper" (second class) rather
than "soft sleeper" (first class). Though undeniably less comfortable, I found it much
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more interesting. It is a fair compromise between the hell of "hard-seats", where
nevertheless one encounters a more representative - at least numerically - sample of the
Chinese population, and the ivory tower of "soft-sleepers", where government
officials, business people, and foreigners travel in the padded comfort of a first class
compartment, and where socialising generally occurs only with the other three
occupants of one's compartment and, occasionally, with the train attendant, if it occurs
at all.
I had been planning this trip for months, if not years. Finally, there I was, on
my journey to the West. The friend I stayed with in Beijing - a European working for a
foreign company, who had been to Xinjiang a few times because of his work - could
not believe, let alone understand, how I could possibly want to spend more than a year
in eriimchi, or worse, in a small town in Xinjiang. My Han friends and
acquaintances' reactions covered all the range of stereotypes associated with Xinjiang
and the Uyghur. The most optimistic ones thought it was a very exotic place, inhabited
by very hospitable and good looking people. These were my friends. As to the
acquaintances, the most common reaction was one of concern: Xinjiang is not a safe
place, they told me, and Uyghurs are a backward and violent people. Why should I
bother going there and even learning their language which, unlike Mandarin, is totally
useless? The only genuinely positive and informed comment came from a woman
working at Shandong University. She said that she was from Xinjiang (Xinjiang ren).
She was born and grew up in the Ili region, the daughter of Han settlers who had
moved there in the 1960's. Since she had married and moved to Shandong, some ten
years before, she had never had a chance to go back. When she learned I was going to
Xinjiang, she got excited and started describing in a nostalgic tone the wonderful
landscapes in the Ili and Altai area.
The stereotypes that I had been offered were rather benevolent, compared to
what other foreigners on their way to Xinjiang had been told by immigration officers,
according to a Uyghur friend. "Beware of the Uyghur. They are wild and always carry
their knives. You say a word too many and they won't hesitate to kill you on the
spot." The same friend continued "Someone I know was naive enough to actually keep
away from the Uyghur, until to his surprise he realised that we are really friendly
people." It is not fair, however, to entirely blame individuals for their prejudices when
they obviously reflect the government's ambiguous propaganda: while the walls are
covered with slogans stating the equality and the unity of all the nationalities, the
official target in minorities areas such as Xinjiang has always been one of
"development". Moreover, within the evolutionary approach adopted in the social
sciences, minorities have been regarded as representatives of primitive forms of
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society, as opposed to the more evolved Han (Harrell 1995:15-16). What I find most
disturbing, though, is the patronising tone that underlies every Han discourse on
"their" minorities. But am I not being just as patronising, trying to defend a rather
different image of the Uyghur? The answer comes in the shape of a knife.
Omar shows me his knife. The blade is about four inches long, with an upward
point, the handle is inlaid with coloured stones, or glass. He keeps it in a leather
sheath hanging from his belt. "It's a Uyghur knife, all handmade" he says while
slicing a melon. A couple of Han passengers lean to look at the knife. Before long they
ask him the expected question, "How much does it cost?' "Three hundred yuan [ca
£25 then]" says Omar. One of them, a woman, takes it in her hands and inspects it
carefully. She starts bargaining, as if she was going to buy it. Or perhaps just out of
habit. After they have left, Omar smiles at me maliciously and whispers "In fact I only
paid for it twenty yuan. I bought it in Ortimchi, not even in Kashgar." Then he and his
two Uyghur friends start questioning me, "How do you say knife in Italian? And gun?
Do many people have a gun in Italy? You know, we Uyghurs like to fight." Scars on
their hands, arms, and faces, seem to support this statement. I think they may not be
as violent and aggressive as they try to advertise themselves. What matters, though, is
that they take pride in it. They actually look down on the Han (men) as unmanly and
naive, just as much as the Han look down on the Uyghur as wild and uncivilised. In a
way there is a symmetry in their mutual representation and in its underlying values.
I had met Omar earlier in the morning, as I was going to fill the thermos from
the boiler situated at the end of our carriage. He was sitting in the aisle by the window.
I noticed him because of his non-Chinese look. He probably thought the same of me,
since when I passed he addressed me with a question I had never been asked before:
"What is your ethnicity?" (Ni shi na ge minzu de?). 3 I immediately started to unpack
the assumptions behind his question. First of all, I was expected to have an ethnicity.
Second, he probably thought I belonged to some "Chinese minority". In any case, for
the very first time in China I was not asked "What country do you come from?" (Ni
shi na ge guojia de?).
Omar invites me to sit down and introduces me to his two Uyghur friends, All
and Adil. They are all from Qumul, the easternmost oasis town in Xinjiang, known in
Chinese as Hami. They say they are working in Beijing as kawapchi (kebab sellers)
3 The translation of the term minzu is extremely problematic. In China (i.e. in English-language
material published in China) it is normally translated as "nationality". However, in as much as it
implies ascription to one of the categories identified by the state to classify its citizens, here it is
probably more accurate to translate it with "ethnicity". In this context, "nationality" would rather
imply citizenship of a nation state, i.e. holding that country's passport. On the term "minzu" see also
Harrell (1990), where he chooses not to translate it.
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and as dollarchi (money-changers on the black market). In other words, they are
among those Uyghurs who live in the capital that are normally associated with exotic
food and illegal activities. While we are chatting, Ali disappears only to come back a
few minutes later with a small packet. He hands it to me, inside there is a cake made
with brown sugar and dried fruit (baqali) and some small , mutton dumplings
(pdrmudd). "We don't eat the food they sell on the train because we are Muslim. Even
if it's pork-free, it is still cooked in the same pans (as pork)", he says. Just then the
loudspeaker announces that because some of the passengers belong to Muslim
minorities, the restaurant on the train offers also a ging zhen (Chinese for halal)
service. "I don't trust them. I'd rather eat the food that I've made myself' is Al's
comment.
Ali looks very gentle, especially compared to the other two. In the evening he
comes along with four bottles of beer, the only thing they don't mind buying on the
train, and invites me to drink with him. His Mandarin is pretty good, he says that's
because he has always had a lot of Han friends, since he was a child. Food is not a
problem with them, they usually eat in "qingzhen" restaurants or, if they ever eat in a
Han home, his food would be cooked in a special pan not contaminated by pork.
Apparently, it is a question of trust.
While we are drinking beer and smoking, an older man comes and addresses Ali
in Uyghur. It is his father who had gone to Beijing because he needed medical care,
Ali is escorting him back home. Ali looks embarrassed. After his father has left and
returned to his compartment, he explains "According to our custom, it is not polite to
drink alcohol and smoke in the presence of an older person. This is a Uyghur custom,
the Han they don't care." "So, what does it mean to be a Muslim to you?' I ask. "It's
like that, it's a tradition. In practice, it means going to the mosque on Friday, avoiding
pork, and being clean.., after all, faith is in the heart. If you are a Uyghur you must be
a Muslim, otherwise you're not regarded as a person and nobody wants to have
anything to do with you, you're not part of the community any longer. But we are
different from the Hui, they are basically Chinese who believe in Islam, they don't
have their own language and even the food they eat is different from what the Uyghur
eat. 99
Adil and Omar join us with more bottles of beer. There's no way they are going
to let me buy some beer. I am their guest, they say. Moreover, I am a woman and as
such I am not supposed to pay for the men. I am also not supposed to drink alcohol,
but in this case I am a foreigner. The conversation moves on to football, Italian
football of course. I ask about Uyghur football. "Uyghurs are excellent footballers,
they are excellent at any sport. But the Chinese don't allow us to have our own team,
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they don't want us to be famous abroad. We hope that after you have learnt our
language you will let the world know about the Uyghurs", says Omar. Then All
continues, "our land does not belong to us, we are like American Indians, you know
what I mean? If we were independent, we would be very rich because there's only few
of us and plenty of natural resources. We wouldn't need to travel by train since each of
us would have their personal plane. Xinjiang is extremely rich in oil, somewhere there
is a well that after two hundred years is not exhausted yet. After Saudi Arabia and
Iraq, which are Muslim countries, Xinjiang is the biggest oil producer."
I find the whole situation extremely fascinating. There is plenty of food for
thought here. The train arrives in Qumul the third day, at 6:30 in the morning local
time, two hours later according to Beijing time, which is the official time. I have to
refuse Al's invitation to get off and hang out in Qumul for a couple of days; I am
expected in Oriimchi later in the afternoon. As we say goodbye I think to myself that
not only have I had a pleasant journey in their company, but I have also had a good
introduction to the region and its problems, despite the fact that most of their
statements cannot be taken at face-value and need to be calibrated.
A few hours later, as the train is approaching Oriimchi, the loudspeaker
announces the coming attractions: "Oriimchi is the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region. Among the local Uyghur specialities are kaoyang rouchuan
(mutton kebabs) and latiaozi (hand pulled noodles) ...". Before entering the eriimchi
railway station, the train crosses the south-western end of the city, an area known as
yamanliq shan. The view on either side could not be more contrasting. To the left,
mud barracks and barefoot children playing in the midst of rubbish. In the distance, to
the right, 'modernity' and `progress' exemplified by shining white tiled skyscrapers,
... though it is better not to look too close.
Fieldwork in Xinjiang
While preparing my research proposal, I was aware of the difficulties in doing
fieldwork in the People's Republic of China, and particularly in Xinjiang.4 From other
people's experience, as wel1 as from mine, I knew that keeping a low profile was
probably the most effective way to get things done, though with some obvious
restrictions. There are mainly three ways of doing research in the PRC for an extended
period of time, one is applying for a research permit/visa, the other two are being
4 Cf. Thurston and Pasternak 1983; 'Prologue' in Chan et al. 1992; 'Methodological Notes' in
Whyte and Parish 1984; 'Preface' in Potter and Potter 1990.
15
either a student or a teacher (normally the subject being learnt or taught is a language).
Ideally, one would have a status which corresponds to the actual purpose of one's
stay, i.e. research. In theory, this might also allow certain freedoms which would
otherwise not be permitted to other foreign visitors, such as having access to "closed"
(wei kaifang) areas.
The first problem with an official research permit is that the application tends to
be rather time consuming as well as expensive, since it often implies collaborative
research with local institutions, where the foreign party is required to fund the whole
project. Secondly, the research freedom that one is granted is often deceptive. In fact,
knowing exactly what one's purpose is allows a much stricter control on the part of the
authorities, which can be easily implemented through one's local research partners.
There can be space for negotiation, but this depends almost entirely on one's local
connection; that is, it is a matter of guanxi. Paradoxically, one might enjoy more
research freedom while being a student or a teacher. Since I had to learn the Uyghur
language anyway, I chose to be a student.
When I left for fieldwork in early May 1996, I intended to spend the first couple
of months in ertimchi as a student of Xinjiang Normal University. This would have
enabled me to get started with the language as well as to look around for a suitable
fieldwork site, ideally a smaller town in the region, where I would have moved in the
summer. My arrival in Oriimchi was perfectly timed with the beginning of a "strike
hard" (yanda) campaign, following unrest in southern Xinjiang. I soon realised that I
probably had to revise my plans. First of all, as a student I was only allowed to reside
at the University's guest house and nowhere else. This meant I could not arrange any
form of private accommodation, for instance with a family, let alone reside in a
different town or village. Of course I could have gone through the "back door" (hou
men), as they say in China, but I did not have enough guanxi (connections) nor the
time to build them; moreover I was very concerned that I might get other people into
trouble.
I started considering the idea of moving to a university situated in a different
town, possibly Khotan or Ghulja, only to be discouraged by the staff at Xinjiang
Normal University. There were rumours, I was told in a confidential way, that as a
consequence of recent unrest only universities in Oriimchi and Kashgar would be
entitled to accept foreign students. I was not sure to what extent such advice originated
with the concern of losing 700 US dollars a term (of which less than half was used to
pay the teachers), or whether it was to be understood as a warning not to try and avoid
control. In any case, I got the message and I started experiencing the feeling that I
could not really trust anybody, a feeling that was going to be fed throughout my
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fieldwork. I decided to leave it until the end of the summer. During the holidays I
travelled extensively in Xinjiang, including to KhotAn and to Ghulja where I checked
with the local universities the possibility of studying there. In IChotan they said they
never had foreign students before; therefore I should go through the Regional
Education Committee based in Criimchi. In Ghulja they said there was no problem;
clearly they could not foresee that within a few months that city in northern Xinjiang
would become the centre of Uyghur upheaval.
At the end of the summer, on the ground of my first three months' experience, I
came to the conclusion that while Criimchi was possibly the ugliest place one could
pick to live in, and not the ideal fieldwork site especially in terms of size, it still had a
number of advantages. The most important of these was that as a foreigner I would
have probably enjoyed a greater degree of freedom, or at least a lesser degree of
control, than in other parts of the region. Moreover, I had already established a
network of friends and acquaintances; had I moved somewhere else I would have had
to start from scratch. I decided to stay in Oriimchi and moved to Xinjiang University,
mainly because of its location in the Uyghur part of town, where most of my friends
lived and where I was more likely to practice my Uyghur and to observe Uyghur ways
of life. However, the same rule applied: I had to live in the "foreign students
dormitory".
The other plan I had to give up was the idea of working both with Uyghurs and
with Han. I had always been aware of the problematic inter ethnic relations between
the two groups, but I could not really imagine what this meant in terms of practical
everyday life until I arrived in Xinjiang. Even the most trivial situation, such as going
out for a meal, turned out to be very controversial. Indeed one of the most •
embarrassing situation I can possibly think of is to be 'caught' by a Uyghur friend
while entering a Han restaurant. For in eriimchi, and in Xinjiang in general, Uyghurs
and Han do not mix - except in working places - and they run separate networks. If
and when they do mix, this has a number of implications which are outside
individuals' control. In other words, one is constantly dealing with categories of
people, friends and foes, and it is extremely difficult to relate to someone as to an
individual outside such polarisation. As a consequence, I had to focus only on one
group, namely the Uyghur, not only for a question of loyalty but also because I did
not have the time and the energy to develop and maintain two separate networks. This
does not mean that I did not interact with the Han, as well as with other groups, at all.
However, my network was a Uyghur-centred and Uyghur-compatible one. Interaction
outside such networks was often casual and not as in depth.
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Given such conditions it was unthinkable to carry out 'traditional' fieldwork,
where I would have my neat 'unit' of study that I would objectively observe and
survey. Anyway, that was not what I wanted to do. I wanted to experience as closely
as possible what it means to be a Uyghur in Xinjiang today, being aware that it might
have many different meanings depending on one's age, gender, educational
background, place of origin, etc.. However, I did not try to 'go native'; I have always
been myself and simply tried to make the best out of the situation I was in. I was a
student, therefore I led the life of a student. I was also lucky to be accepted despite, or
perhaps because of, my difference. I often felt that I was perceived as different enough
to be interesting but not enough to be threatening. The fact that I could easily pass for a
Uyghur definitely helped. There are limits beyond which one's identity cannot be
manipulated; in my case I was within those limits and this often resulted in a
fascinating experience, besides making my life a lot easier.
Language, or perhaps time, was a problem. When I arrived in Oriimchi, I
hardly knew half a dozen words of Uyghur. In little more than a year I had to learn a
fairly complex language as well as conducting my research. In fact, I could easily live
in Ortimchi and communicate with almost anybody in Mandarin, whereas the same
could not be said of the Uyghur language. So, as every Han said, why bother? The
answer is that, I was not so much interested in 'interviewing' people, as in
participating in their lives, and in this case language, however badly I spoke it, was a
crucial element. There is a whole range of issues raised by and connected to language
in the specific context of studying contemporary Uyghur culture in Xinjiang (cf.
Dweyer 1998). To me, it is above all a question of respect: if one is a guest in
someone's 'home' - I will not deal here with the political implications of such a
statement, such as the legitimacy of Han people living in Xinjiang - I believe one ought
to make an effort and try to speak the host's language, or at least show a genuine
interest in it. I have the same kind of resentment for those Han who go to Xinjiang and
expect every Uyghur, or Kazakh, or Tajik, etc., to speak Mandarin, as for those
English native speakers who go to Italy and complain because nobody can speak
English. There were also some Uyghurs who could not understand why I needed to
study such a useless language as Uyghur when I could easily communicate in
Mandarin. However, most of them were very pleased that someone was interested in
their language, especially when its very existence is at issue in the contemporary socio-
economic context (I'm referring for instance to the dilemma faced by most Uyghur
parents in Ortimchi as to whether send their children to Han schools or to Uyghur
schools).
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It was not easy to learn Uyghur in Ortimchi, especially while being fluent in
English and Mandarin. Most of the times I had to chose between a meaningful
conversation (i.e. 'research') and an occasion to practice my poor Uyghur. As a result,
I was almost fluent only by the time I had to leave. However, this did not prevent me
from communicating with people for whom Uyghur was the only language we had in
common. Moreover, I saw the process of learning the language as part of the research,
after all my teachers were Uyghur and I spent quite a lot of time with them, often
reading and commenting on material relevant to my research topic.
My initial, as well as subsequent, frustration at an institutional level was
balanced by an excellent entry to the field. I met Abdurehim one week after I had
arrived in Oriimchi.5 He was running the representative office of a foreign company in
Xinjiang, I was given his office number by a friend working for the same company in
Beijing. I knew nothing about him, except that he was not a Han, as one could easily
tell from his Chinese name (Abudereyimu). I phoned him one day and he invited me to
meet for a meal that evening. He spoke excellent English, with an American accent,
and seemed to be very familiar with Western ways. As many other young Uyghurs,
who had a similar educational background and similar aspirations to leave the country,
he was well into the foreigner's - mostly American - network in eriimchi. Four years
before he had graduated in Chinese from Xinjiang University. He had been the best
student in his year and was allocated a job as translator in the Regional Government.
Two years later, tired of wasting his life in an office where most of the time he was
doing nothing but reading the newspaper, he resigned from what was considered to be
the best job one could get in the state sector. He then worked for a year as a waiter in
the Western dining hall of a Hotel. It was not an ideal job, but at least he did not have
to deal with a slimy Uyghur boss who "had sold himself to the Chinese", and he had a
chance to practice his English and meet foreigners. Finally, less than a year before, he
was employed by this company.
Like me, he used to eat most of his meals out, so we began to meet very often
for lunch or dinner and soon developed a friendship. He also introduced me to many
of his (male) friends and before long I was involved in a Uyghur young men's
network, the centre of which was Abdurehim. That was not what I had expected to
happen in a Muslim society, somehow I felt both privileged and frustrated. Privileged
because I was a woman in an entirely male scene, in a society where women do not
have easy access to male networks, and yet I felt accepted and I participated as a peer.
But I was frustrated because of the lack of women in my network. My status, as a
single independent student, did not fit with my age. Women of my age were all
5 All proper names are fictional, except where people are already well-known.
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married with children and had no time and freedom to hang out the way I was doing.
Moreover, women's and men's networks seemed to run parallel so that I did not have
a chance to meet women through Abdurehim's network, not because he did not know
any but because they did not hang out with him and his friends.
The other arena for socialisation was the university. In the beginning, my
expectations of entering a student network were deceived. I was physically segregated
from other students, since I was living in the guest house, basically a hotel that was
empty most of the time, situated across the road from the university campus at the
entrance of the staff housing compound. Moreover, I had one to one language tuition,
usually either in my room or in my teacher's house. Therefore there were not many
chances to meet other students. On the other hand I immediately developed a close
relationship with my two teachers, who were both women.
Things changed over the summer. Abdurehim unexpectedly (for me, but not for
him) left for the United States, and in September I moved to Xinjiang University,
where one month later I met the person who was going to become my closest friend,
Nurqiz. She was in her last year chemistry course and lived in a student dormitory, a
few yards away from the foreign students guest house. A mutual friend introduced us
and it was 'love at first sight'. Nurqiz means "a radiant girl" (nur means "light"), and
this name, though apparently not very trendy anymore, suited her perfectly. Our
friendship meant that I could thoroughly participate in Uyghur life, as I had never been
able before. There was nothing artificial in our interaction, it was the most genuine
relationship that I had during my fieldwork, and this generally applied also to all the
people that I met through her.
In many ways, my fieldwork can be divided into two phases, where moving
from Xinjiang Normal University (Shida) to Xinjiang University (Xinda) may be
taken as the formal watershed. In fact, the most important change was not so tangible;
it was rather a change in mood. In retrospect I regard the first phase as a very positive
period, as opposed to the increasingly negative mood of the second. There are a
number of reasons for this, both internal and external, and I find it difficult to establish
a precise relationship between them; that is, to what extent my mood affected the way I
perceived external events and, vice versa, how external events determined my mood.
My initial optimism was dampened by the growing awareness of being constantly
under control, until I felt as if I was living in an Orwellian nightmare. The metaphor of
the Big Brother is particularly pertinent here, given that sometimes Uyghurs refer to
the Han as "older brothers", parodying the government's patronising claim to the
brotherly relationship among all nationalities. My aim was to keep sane and not to be
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paranoid, and I knew the successful strategy consisted in being always aware that after
all I had nothing to hide.
However, I think the Foucauldian notion of surveillance is one that best
describes the situation I felt in. Like in Bentham's panopticon, I could not see my
surveillors, I only knew that potentially I was constantly under surveillance. Perhaps
my room was bugged and one of my closest friends was a spy; these were not
fantasies but real possibilities. Moreover, it was never clearly stated what were the
boundaries that, as a foreign student, I should not cross. Once, in a police station,
while being threatened to be deported for having supposedly moved to Xinjiang
University against my previous University's instructions, I was shown a pamphlet
containing all the laws regulating foreigners' residence in the PRC. Nevertheless, such
rules are constantly updated by unwritten "rules for internal use" (neibu guiding)
which can be arbitrarily applied at any time. Nothing new: knowledge, or other
people's ignorance, is power. When one does not know where exactly the line that
should not be crossed lies, it is very likely that one will keep well below that line. This
is a strategy which does not apply exclusively to foreign guests in the PRC.
My main concern was not so much about my personal safety, since the worst
that could happen was having to leave the country. More important, there was the risk
that any of the people I knew would get into trouble because of me. In fact this was
beyond my control, since the charge for being arrested or removed from one's
position, if there is a charge at all, can be just an excuse to get rid of an "inconvenient"
person. I was told the story of a group of teachers being removed on the ground of
their anti-government statements, that had been recorded during an informal meeting.
The person who did the recording (a European) was searched when leaving the
country, the tape was found and used to identify the people in question. Whether this
story is based on a fact or is a myth, it tells something about the atmosphere reigning
in Xinjiang during the period I was there.
Given restricted access to information, it is difficult to produce an accurate
estimate of the proportion of unrest in the region between 1996 and 1997. Besides
rumours, there are a number of indicators that can be used as a measure, such as the
level of repression, the display of armed forces, the amount of propaganda on the
"unity of all nationalities" and the "indivisibility of the country" fed to the people, and
the general atmosphere of fear and suspicion among the people themselves - which in
fact is rather a result of repression. On the grounds of such indicators, the situation
was definitely worse than in previous years. The climax was probably reached during
February 1997 with widespread unrest throughout the region and, in particular, with
21
the "Ghulja incidene' and the bombs in eriimchi, followed by the implementation of
martial law.
The tension and unease that characterised the second phase of my fieldwork
were also accompanied by the dreadful Ortimchi winter. By late October the
temperature had dropped below zero and everything was covered with snow, which
soon turned into ice. What was worse, snow and ice were in turn covered by a thick
layer of coal dust, the same coal dust that people breathed until late March, when
finally winter gave way to a short spring before the summer.
Abdurehim and Nurqiz somehow are the central persons that mark respectively
these two phases. Around and besides them there are many other people who have
contributed to my understanding of the Uyghur 'world', as well as of Xinjiang.
Throughout my stay I developed a rather extended network of accumulated friends and
acquaintances with whom I interacted on a more or less regular basis and who
represented my main source of direct experience of local life. While it is impossible to
force such network into an exhaustive classification, three broad groups can be
identified: a group of young people/peers who were students at the university and
generally were not from eriimchi; another group of mainly male peers who were
university graduates and had a job outside the university; and a much less
homogeneous group of 'adults' of various age and profession who generally had in
common a university degree and the fact that they were married and had children (these
were predominantly female). With very few exceptions (including some Uzbek,
Mongol, and Kazakh friends and acquaintances), they were all Uyghur. On the whole
they can be loosely defined as urban intellectuals, in the sense that the great majority of
them had gone through higher education and they were all involved in 'intellectual'
activities in various sectors (education, medicine, judiciary, administrative, etc.). In
other words, they were not farmers, nor factory workers, nor were they in business.
However, this is an a posteriori definition for the purpose of describing the group of
people with whom I worked. Such a group was not intentionally singled out according
to a number of specific characteristics; therefore I believe it is best represented with its
margins blurred.
There are a number of considerations behind the fact that I concentrated on this
group of urban intellectuals. First of all, I do not think that any group or person is
more representative than others. Any 'unit', however it is defined, is arbitrary in as
much- as it is extrapolated from a wider context. Focusing on a network has the
advantage of providing a relatively wide context. Moreover, because of a number of
structural restrictions (political situation, urban context with problems of time and
distance, my status, etc.), such a group was the most accessible for me and I decided
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to make a virtue out of the constraints. This allowed me to approach the study of
Uyghur identity from the angle of what we may call the urban intellectual's paradox.
This approach proved extremely fertile and stimulating, as I hope to show in the
following chapters. Indeed, what makes special the group of intellectuals among
whom I have conducted my research is that they find themselves at the vanguard of
both assimilation and differentiation. Because of their occupation, and because of the
context in which they live (that is, a city where at least eighty percent of the population
is Han), Ortimchi intellectuals are constantly exposed to 'Han ways' which, to some
extent, they inevitably have to adopt - the most blatant example of this being language.
At the same time, they are also confronted with their being different and with the need
to constantly define and affirm such difference. However, I should point out that their
being intellectuals was not the main focus of my interest - unlike Rudelson (1997), for
instance - I was not primarily interested in their intellectual production as much as in
their daily lives. In fact, from a methodological point of view, with this approach I
intend to blur the distinction between grass-root and intellectual.
The choice to look at issues of identity and ethnic relations from a food angle
proved to be very productive once in the field. Food provided an unobtrusive as well
as 'politically correct' (in the sense that it was not perceived as a sensitive topic) focus
for research. People devote a great deal of time to activities related to food (shopping,
cooking, eating at home or in restaurants, etc.) as well as to talking about it. I met
most of the people over a meal and in over two thirds of the time I spent with Uyghur
people food was involved, and not because I was looking for it. Often people would
volunteer useful comments or information without even knowing the topic of my
research. The space occupied by food in Uyghur society is somewhat visually
measurable by the number of restaurants and food stalls lining the streets. Moreover,
food is an arena where Uyghurs draw obvious boundaries between them and the Han.
They regard food as a fundamental aspect of their identity both in terms of categories
of inclusion and exclusion, defined by (the manipulation of) taboos and dietary
prescriptions, and as a distinctive feature of which they are proud. Thereby utmost
hospitality is usually expressed by treating one's guests to what is considered
quintessential Uyghur food.
During my fieldwork, food was an essential facilitator for interaction as well as
the object of it. In fact this is merely an analytical distinction. Similarly, I believe that
the distinction between person and researcher is an arbitrary one. In my case it was
constantly blurred. Given the nature of the relationship I had with 'my' group, most of
my research was informal, consisting of unstructured interviews, usually unplanned. I
wanted to listen to what people had to say rather than having them answer my
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questions. I would direct a conversation towards general topics that were of interest to
me, while leaving its scope open to unpredictable digressions. In other words, I tried
not to force the reality I was observing and experiencing into a grid. Thanks to the
frequency and to the depth of my interactions, I was not too worried about filling in
possible gaps. I used to meet people, individually or in a group, either in my room, or
in their homes, or for a meal out. Most of these meetings involved the sharing of food.
Besides eating, I was also involved in a wider range of activities, ,including
entertainment, shopping, visiting people, etc.
Due to the political atmosphere as well to the unplanned nature of most of my
interactions, I did not use a recorder. I also tended not to take notes while talking with
people, unless these were of a linguistic nature. I found that note-taking would have
interfered with the flow of the conversation by shifting my role to that of an external
observer more than a participant and by creating a sort of inequality in status between
me and my interlocutor/s. Therefore I used to take non-verbatim notes shortly after an
interaction or any other significant experience had taken place. Taking photographs
was a supplementary method to create a kind of visual diary of my fieldwork. I find
this extremely useful as an aide-memoire, an efficient and evocative way of recording
details that would otherwise be lost or require time-consuming note-taking.
I usually did not show an explicit interest in "politics" (as they say there), first of
all because that was not my focus, but rather its context. Moreover, it was not safe and
often counter-productive to express such an interest. I could not always be hundred
percent sure of whom I was talking to, and even when I was sure, I knew that people
did not like to be addressed with political questions (i.e. everything one is not
supposed to talk about) and that they felt uncomfortable and became very suspicious.
This does not mean that people did not talk about politics, they actually did all the time,
and the more I appeared to be not interested the more they tried to convince me that it
was a real issue.
In conclusion, if I had to weigh these fourteen months of fieldwork in Xinjiang
in the balance, I am not sure I would want to go through all this again. For sure, I
would never dream of spending another winter there. However, I do believe it has
been an extraordinary experience which gave me the opportunity to meet some










A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE REGION, THE PEOPLE,
AND THE FIELD.
1.1. Xinjiang: the region and the people
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) lies in the middle of the Eurasian
continent, in the north-western corner of the People's Republic of China. It is the
largest province in the PRC, accounting for one sixth of its total territory. With a
border of 5,400 kilometres, the longest international boundary line in China (XUAR
1989:112), today Xinjiang constitutes a Central Asian crossroads, with inner China
and Mongolia to the east, Russia (Siberia) to the north, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Takkistan to the west, and Tibet, India, Pakistan, and a small section of Afghanistan to
the south.1
Thus Xinjiang, also known as Eastern or Chinese Turkestan, is geographically
part of the ill-defined region of Central Asia (Akiner 1991, Ferdinand 1994), an area
characterised by dramatic landscapes with high mountains, deserts, and grasslands.2
1 For a general introduction to contemporary Xinjiang see Dillon (1995a). Xinjiang is one of the five
Autonomous Regions of the PRC, the other four being Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region,
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Tibet Autonomous Region, and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous
Region.
2 While "Turkestan" is a taboo, if not illegal, worrl in the PRC, the names "Chinese Turkestan" and
"Eastern Turkestan" are still used in world atlases outside China to refer to this geographical area (e.g.
"Chinese Turkestan" in The Times Atlas of the World, 1967; "Turkestan orientale" in Atlante
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In this region we find one of the lowest places on earth, the Turpan depression
(Aydingictil, -154 m), as well as some of the highest peaks, in the Pamir and the
Karakorum mountain ranges. The geography of Xinjiang is summarised in the
Chinese phrase san shan hang peng: three mountain ranges and two basins. In the
north-northeast, the Altai mountains separate Xinjiang from Mongolia, while in the
south the Kunlun range divides it from Tibet. The Tianshanfrangri tagh range cuts
across the region, dividing it into northern and southern Xinjiang, two climatically and
historically different areas, dominated respectively by the Jungar and the Tarim basins.
Only twelve percent of the total surface of the region (200,000 km2 out of
1,640,000) is inhabitable. The Jungar basin, in northern Xinjiang, is a vast grassland,
historically inhabited by pastoral nomadic people. However, between 1901 and 1990
the cultivated area has increased by seventy times, gradually reducing the grazing land
available to Kazakh and Mongol herders who live in the area. Southern Xinjiang is
dominated by the Taldamakan desert, the second biggest desert in the world after the
Sahara. It is a wide oval-shaped desert, 1,000 km long (east to west) and 500 km wide
(north to south). Many erroneously believe that "Taldamalcan" means "if you go in,
you don't come out". Such a phrase in fact refers to the shifting sand dunes and
frequent sand storms which are characteristic of this desert. Popularly, this desert
tends to be equated to the better known Gobi Desert, although "Gobi" originally meant
a type of desert with a gravel rather than sandy surface, which is mostly farther to the
East.3 The economy of southern Xinjiang is traditionally based on trade and
agriculture, mostly fruit, cotton, and wheat. In such a dry area, the people living in the
oases along the rim of the Taldamakan desert rely on the water produced by the
melting snow for irrigation and daily life needs. For over two thousand years the
Taldamakan desert was elliptically skirted by the Silk Road, that complex of roads
which connected China in the East with the Mediterranean in the West, through Persia,
Mesopotamia, and Anatolia. In fact, silk was only one of the items which travelled
through this system, and the name "silk road" was not coined until the 19th century.
Although China claims a continued history in the region, in fact steady control
and integration of what is today Xinjiang did not occur until the communist period,
that is, in the second half of the twentieth century (Fletcher 1968, Mc Millen 1979).4
At times, during the Han (206 BC. - AD. 220) and Tang (618-907) dynasties, the
Chinese empire had extended its military control into Central Asia, and of course
3 Gebi is the Chinese transliteration for "Gobi". It is generally used in Chinese to refer to all pre-
desert areas, rather than to a specific desert. The Xiandai Hanyu Cidian (Contemporary Chinese
Dictionary) entry reads: "This is how the Mongolian call desert areas. Such areas are covered with sand
and stones and are characterised by lack of water and very scarce vegetation.".
4 The Xinjiang - Lanzhou Railroad, which was completed in early 1961, was a fundamental step in
the integration process (McMillen 1979:11).
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China and Central Asia had been unified under the Mongols, notably during the Yuan
dynasty (12341368). In the latter case, however, it was rather a Central Asian empire
that controlled China.5
Chinese historical claim over today's Xinjiang is partly based on the fiction of
the "tributary system" that regulated imperial China's foreign relations, and according
to which foreign states were seen as vassals that sent regular "tributes" to the emperor.
Fletcher (1968) traces the relationship between the Chinese empire and Central Asia
during the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (16441911) dynasties, relying on Chinese
historical records as well as on Persian and other sources. In the early Ming dynasty
Zhu Di, the Yongle Emperor, recognised Timurid supremacy in Central Asia and
addressed Shahrukh Bahadur as a fellow monarch. From 1424, when the Yongle
Emperor's son acceded to the throne, until the end of the Ming dynasty China's
relations with Central Asia were substantially of the "tributary" type (i.e. trade) and
gradually loosened, as Central Asian merchants started carrying out much of their
commerce through the Mongolian "tributary" trade (1968:212,217). By the end of the
Ming dynasty both China and Central Asia were little concerned with each other.
While the Ming court was rather worried about developments north of the Great Wall,
from a Central Asian point of view the Chinese Emperor was only one among other
great rulers, such as the Crimean, the Russian, the Indian Moghul, and the Ottoman.
By the time the Manchu took over in China (Qing dynasty, 1644), the great Central
Asian empires had disintegrated into a number of smaller kingdoms (see also Craig-
Harris 1993:112-13).
Chinese influence in what is today known as Xinjiang was consolidated during
the Qing dynasty (16441911). Historically, the Chinese referred to the eastern part of
Central Asia as Xiyu (the Western Regions). The name Xinjiang, meaning "new
frontier" or "new dominion", was introduced in 1768 by the Qing administration
(McMillen 1979:15, 17). The region was formally incorporated into the Qing empire in
1884, with the suppression of the Muslim insurrection led by Yakub Beg (1878). 6 At
the end of the nineteenth century, Xinjiang was the scene of the 'Great Game' between
the Russian and British empires for control in Central Asia (see Shine and Nightingale
5 Bovingdon (2000) points out that "[u]ntil this century, the state-name "China" (Zhongglio) would
have been unfamiliar to the overwhelming majority of inhabitants of the territory we now know by
that name. Instead, when people referred to the territory, they would use the name of the imperial
house .,. Thus the very application of the name "China" to the polities ruled by the various dynasties
is anachronistic and misleading. But it is not accidental. ... It has been critical to the project of the
CCP leadership to claim a direct lineage from the Han dynasty (206 BCE - 220 CE) to the PRC, so as
to be able to lay claim to the territories, peoples, and histories of all intervening states." (2000:8). For
a history of Central Asia see Grousset (1970).
6 For an historical background see Lattimore (1950), Forbes (1986), Millward (1998). Bovingdon
(2000) provides an account of the debate that accompanied the process of incorporation and the shift
from 'Western Region" to "Xinjiang" in the Chinese name of the region.
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1973, Hopkirk 1990). After the 1911 Chinese revolution a warlord government
controlled the region which, like the rest of China, was plagued by civil war until
1949, when the People's Liberation Army took control of Xinjiang.7 On October 1st
1955 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was established.
Population and migration
The creation of an autonomous region was a way to acknowledge the specificity of
Xinjiang, especially in terms of the composition of its population. Before and in the
first years of the communist take-over in 1949, 95% of the population of Xinjiang was
not Han. Of the 3.7 million people that were registered in 1941, 80% were classified
as Uyghur and just under 9% were Kazakh (Toops 2000:159). 8 Since the communist
take-over the population of Xinjiang has been consistently classified into thirteen
minzu, which are recognised by the government as indigenous to the region. The 1996
Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook provides a breakdown of the population from 1952 to
1995 into fourteen categories: Uyghur, Han, Kazakh, Hui, Kirghiz, Mongol, Sibe,
Russian, Tajik, Uzbek, Tatar, Manchu, Daur, and a generic "other minzu"
(Xinjiang... 1996:47). In 1995 half of these groups numbered less than 40,000 and
only three groups, the Uyghur, the Han, and the Kazakh, had more than one million
(respectively, 7.8 million, 6.3 million, and 1.2 million). Below is a table showing the
change in the ratio of Uyghur and Han population between 1952 and 1995.9
7 Many western travellers, missionaries, and explorers visited and sometimes lived in Xinjiang during
the first half of the nineteenth century. Their accounts constitute a rich literature and provide insightful
descriptions of republican Xinjiang. See, for example, Cable and French (1947), Holgate (1994),
Fleming (1936), Hedin (1931), Stein (1933), von Le Coq (1985), Lattimore (1930). For a Chinese
account see Wu (1940). Hoplcirk (1984) is based on western archaeological campaigns to the "Silk
Road", led by explorers like Stein, Hedin, and von Le Coq.
8 Millward argues that "the ratio of 'outsiders' to natives' at the turn of the nineteenth century was
close to two to three, and not so far from the Uyghur-Han balance that is a political issue in the
1990s" (Millward 2000:123). However, not only, as he himself admits, are such comparisons
somewhat artificial and, I should add, leave unexplained how the Uyghur population increased from
320,000 in 1818 to 2,984,000 in 1941 while the Han population figures for the same years are
155,000 and 187,000, respectively. But the real issue here is the abrupt increase in the Han population
in less than three decades: from 187,000 (5.01% of the total population of Xinjiang) in 1941 to
3,861,200 (39,54%) in 1970. During the same period, the percentage of the Uyghur population
dropped from 80.00% to 47.85%.
9 Although we must bear in mind that figures and statistics cannot be taken at face value, and






1952 4,651,700 3,500,900 75.26% 326,000 7.01%
1957 5,580,100 3,867,100 69.30% 821,500 14.72%
1962 6,989,700 4,004,700 69.30% 2,077,200 29.72%
1970 9,765,800 4,673,300 47.85% 3,861,200 39.54%
1975 11,545,300 5,266,000 45.61% 4,780,100 41.40%
1980 12,832,400 5,764,600 44.92% 5,310,300 41.38%
1990 15,291,600 7,249,500 47.41% 5,746,600 37.58%
1995 16,613,500 7,800,000 46.95% 6,318,100 38.03%
Adapted from Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 1996.
Yuan Qingli has analysed population changes in Xinjiang between 1949 and 1984,
showing a clear link between population growth and migration, as well as between
migration and urbanisation (Yuan 1990). The first point that the author makes is that,
during this period, the average annual growth rate in Xinjiang's population has been
much higher than that of China as a whole, largely owing to inter-provincial migration
(1990:50-51). Yuan then identifies five phases of population development in Xinjiang.
The first phase (1949-1953) corresponds to the period of the communist take-over.
During this first period the government's policy was "to establish control over this
mainly non-Han settlers' area of which more than 90 per cent were Muslim"
(1990:52). Thus the second phase (1953-1961) is characterised by a dramatic increase
in migration: between 1954 and 1958 the explosion of migration to Xinjiang is linked
to the establishment of the Production and Construction Corps, while from 1958 to
1961 migration coincided with the Great Leap Forward and the subsequent famine.
During those bitter years many people from inner China took refuge in Xinjiang,
where the economic situation was still relatively stable. The only year that showed a
decline in population was 1962, which Yuan identifies as a third phase. A number of
factors determined this decline, most notably the "Redundancy Movement" of 1962,
aimed at "persuading" many migrants to return to their original areas, and the Ili-
Tarbagatay uprising when some 70,000 Kazalchs and Uyghurs fled to the Soviet
Union- (1990:52,63). 10 The fourth (1962-1976) and fifth (1976-1984) phase
10 In 1962 Kazalchs and Uyghurs with a Soviet passport attempted to escape China's famine by
fleeing across the border to the Soviet Union. There was a demonstration of those wishing to leave the
PRC (the Ili-Tarbagatay' uprising) and, despite the intervention and repression by the Production and
Construction Corps, several thousands managed to escape, often with their livestock (Seymour
2000:173; see also McMillen 1979:122-23).
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coincided, respectively, with an explosion in the birth-rate and the promotion of
widespread family planning among the Han population, the latter contributing to a
relative normalisation in the population development.
Although since 1977 the number of immigrants into Xinjiang has been limited
by restrictions of the household registration system and improvements in rural life in
other parts of China, subsequent reforms in rural policies have allowed surplus rural
workers to move anywhere without permanent registration. "Xinjiang is one of the
most popular regions, since opportunities for work are good. Temporary migrants
have therefore increased in recent years in Xinjiang. A recent report estimated that such
temporary migration in Xinjiang has reached about 200,000 per year" (Yuan 1990:64).
During the 1990s this kind of immigration to Xinjiang has dramatically increased,
fuelled, among other things, by the growing number of laid-off workers produced by
the economic reforms everywhere in China. It is important to point out that while all
these non-registered people (mostly Han) are not included in the official population
figures, they are nevertheless extremely visible in the streets of Xinjiang cities, above
all eriimchi.
Today it is difficult to estimate the actual ratio of Uyghur and Han populations in
Xinjiang. Regardless of the actual figures, many Uyghurs are convinced that in
Xinjiang there are now far more Han than Uyghurs. In the late 1990s, Han migration
to Xinjiang was a big issue among the Uyghur urban population, one at the origin of
diffuse discontent and resentment or, in some extreme cases, even violence. The
argument, put forward by some Uyghurs, that the Chinese government has been
deliberately 'swamping' the Uyghur with a flood of Han (Millward 2000:122) seems
to be supported by the history of Han migration to Xinjiang since 1949, not only in
terms of figures but also as far as the modes of such migration are concerned. In
considering the effects of migration on Xinjiang, Yuan states that "[t]o strengthen its
control over this region, the government has sent large numbers of cadres and other
personnel of Han stock to Xinjiang. Han immigration has considerably changed the
content of Xinjiang's population". Moreover "[t]his migration has also affected
population distribution in Xinjiang. Historically, southern Xinjiang had always been
the centre of economic activity. ... [T]he increase in population growth in the sixties
and seventies resulted in the north possessing the majority of the population by 1980."
(Yuan 1990:64-5).
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The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
Even a cursory history of Han migration to Xinjiang cannot fail to discuss in some
detail one of its main institutions: the Production and Construction Corps (shengchan
jianshe bingtuan, usually referred to as `bingtuan'). In a recent article Seymour
provides an exhaustive account of the history and current developments of the
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (PCC), and describes it as "a major
institution for the ethnic Han (Chinese) colonisation of Xinjiang". 11 Indeed, Xinjiang
Bingtuan is one of the three main administrative organs of the XUAR, after the
provincial-level government and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Today, its 2.8
million members constitute 14 percent of Xinjiang's total population (Seymour
2000:171).
Xinjiang Bingtuan started effectively in 1954, when over 100,000 PLA officers
and soldiers that were in Xinjiang were transferred to civilian work in the new
Xinjiang PCC. Despite its military origin, the Bingtuan has been primarily an
economic organisation; in the beginning it was mainly a collection of state farms, but
recently its industrial enterprises have been growing significantly. Besides playing an
important role in the defence of the frontier against both internal and external enemies,
throughout the 1950s it was crucial in the agricultural development and colonisation
process, aimed at easing eastern crowding and sinifying the frontier (Seymour
2000:172-73). In fact, loiver time, 'defending' continued to be more a matter of
repressing non-Hans and occupying real estate than bearing arms against foreigners.
And despite its militaristic-sounding name and organisational structure, the Bingtuan
quickly became a largely civilian organisation" (2000:173). However, its workforce
was still considered insufficient, despite the fact that during the mid-1950s many Han
civilians, both peasant and educated, joined the Bingtuan from the eastern provinces of
China, adding to the former-PLA members and the over 100,000 prisoners. 12 Thus
cadres were sent to the east persuading young peasants, students, and workers to join
the frontier movement and move to Xinjiang. Reportedly, by 1967 over a million
youths had moved to Xinjiang from eastern cities. These migrations were crucial in
promoting Xinjiang' s development (2000:174).
After an initial period of 'development', from 1958 to 1966, Xinjiang Bingtuan
started to decline. Not only was it hit particularly hard during the Cultural Revolution,
but also, from the beginning, the central government had made very little contribution
to its economic viability. On the other hand, all the other bingtuan in the country had
11 On the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps see also McMillen (1981).
12 On the Bingtuan's 'Prison Business' see Seymour (2000:186-87) and Seymour and Anderson
(1998).
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not been doing well and were all dissolved between 1972 and 1975. Xinjiang
Bingtuan lasted longer than the others merely because of its frontier-guarding role.
Otherwise it was a failure in all other respects and it was formally dissolved on March
25, 1975. The 'Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Reclamation Bureau' took over
its major land holdings (Seymour 2000:175-80). For Bingtuan members life had never
been easy in Xinjiang, a part of the country which was often considered inhospitable.
Moreover, for the Han who had been persuaded to move from the east, conditions
often fell short of what had been promised. Now they became the first victims of the
Bingtuan's decline. Many seized on any opportunity to return to the East, producing a
sharp decline in the Han population of Xinjiang.
With the worsening of ethnic unrest in Xinjiang in the early 1980s, the abolition
of the Bingtuan was viewed as a mistake. "Whatever economic shortcomings the old
Bingtuan might have had, the central government at least seemed to have more
confidence in it as a bulwark against minority nationalism than it had in the XUAR
government, in which many posts were occupied by Uyghurs". Thus it was formally
re-established at the end of 1981 and, although "keeping Xinjiang Chinese" was
Beijing's priority, "security and economic development seemed to be given equal
weight" (Seymour 2000:181-82). In fact, there was no contradiction, since ethnic
stability was finally understood as closely intertwined with the region's economic
development. After its re-establishment, there have been ups and downs in the
Bingtuan's economic record. However, given its ever more important task of
"defend[ing] China against the forces of central Asian nationalism" it can now rely on
conspicuous subsidies from Beijing, to the point that "in the mid-1990s the Corps was
receiving about nine-tenths of its budget directly from the central government"
(Seymour 2000:1983-86).
This discussion of Xinjiang's population and, in particular, of migration may
appear exceedingly long and redundant, nevertheless it is extremely important in order
to set the background against which the theme of this thesis - the negotiation of
Uyghur identity by urban intellectuals in the realm of food - will be developed. In
order to understand the context in which this process of negotiation unfolds, it is
necessary to bear in mind the dramatic impact that Han migration has had, and still
has, on Xinjiang's population landscape in general and on urban Uyghur's self-
perception in particular. Indeed, in terms of daily life, if the rural population is
relatively unaffected or affected to a much lesser extent, given that rural areas tend to
be ethnically homogeneous, the constant influx of Han immigrants to Oriimchi and
other urban centres is strongly experienced by urban Uyghurs as a threat to the
preservation of their distinctive identity.
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Who are the peoples of Xinjiang?
While any discussion of Xinjiang in general, and its population in particular, almost
inevitably focuses on the Uyghur and the Han components, because these are the
largest groups and because their relationship at present is the most problematic, the
context in which such interaction occurs is far more complex than this simple
dichotomy, to which it often tends to be reduced. The contemporary population of
Xinjiang results from a mix of Iranic, Turkic, Sinic, and Tungusic components. 13 In
the seventh century BC the Tarim basin was populated by Iranic peoples, including the
Saka. It was only after 600AD that the region began to be turkicised, first with the
Western Turks and, in the 800s, with the Uyghur kingdom of Turpan. Once the
turkicisation was complete, the Chingisid Mongols came to control the area in the early
thirteenth century. However, most of the population was still Iranic and Turkic.
During the fifteenth century the peoples of the Tarim and Turpan Basins were unified
in a Turko-Iranic Muslim civilisation. These were joined by the Kazakh Turks, who
came from the north in the sixteenth century. Finally, there was the advent of the Oirat
Mongols in the seventeenth century. When the Qing took over, in 1757, the Mongols
were wiped out of the Ili valley, which was repopulated with Kazakhs from the north,
Uyghurs from the Tarim Basin, Han and Hui from Gansu, and Sibe from Manchuria.
Thus at the turn of the twentieth century the distribution of Xinjiang's population
roughly was: Uyghur in the Tarim Basin, Uyghur and Hui in the Turpan Basin,
Kazakh in the Jungar Basin, Uyghur, Hui, and Kazakh in the Ili valley. The Han were
in ürnmchi, Turpan, Qumul, and in the Ili valley. There were also some smaller
groups, such as the Sibe in the Ili valley, the Mongols on the northern slope of the
Tianshan, the Tajik in the Pamir, the Kirghiz in the southern Tianshan, and the Uzbek
and Tatar in the cities.
As Yuan points out, "[Ole of the chief characteristics of the main non-Han
ethnic groups in Xinjiang is their concentration in this area. According to the 1982
census of the 55 non-Han ethnic groups in China, seven have more than 90 per cent of
their total population in Xinjiang" (1990:58). Moreover, there is a clear distributional
pattern among the ethnic groups in Xinjiang, which has basically remained the same as
at the turn of the twentieth century. In particular, the south is dominated by the Uyghur
(82% of the population), while the Kazakh are mostly concentrated in the north
(especially in the Ili Kazalch Autonomous Prefecture).
13 The following overview is based on Toops (2000:157-59).
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The neat classification of Xinjiang's population into thirteen groups, as
reproduced in the statistics, is largely the result of the Communist classificatory effort
that was carried out in the 1950s (see Fei 1990). However, such classification does
not accurately describe the situation on the ground, where some of the boundaries are
rather fluid and often tend to blur. In other words, the degree of differentiation
between one group and the other may vary substantially, depending on the groups in
question. For instance, in terms of language, religion, and cultural practices smaller
groups like the Uzbek and the Tatar tend to be assimilated to the Uyghur. Moreover,
given the frequency of intermarriage, the classification of a person as, say, either
Uyghur or Uzbek is to some extent arbitrary. On the other hand, while Islam can be
one of the unifying factors among Turkic-speaking Uyghur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tatar,
and Uzbek, as well as Persian-speaking Tajik, the commonality of religious belief is
not sufficient to soften the boundary between these groups and the Hui. Because they
share language and a great deal of cultural practices with the Han, the Hui are often
regarded by these groups as Chinese before being Muslim. Indeed, according to Yuan,
between the 1950s and the 1980s intermarriage between Han and Hui was more
common than among others (1990:57). Mongols, while not being Muslim, share to a
great extent the pastoralist semi-nomadic lifestyle of the Kazakh and the Kirghiz.
Moreover, they tend to identify with the dominated Uyghur and other Turkic groups
vis-à-vis the dominant Han, particularly in an urban context where the degree of inter-
ethnic interaction is high. Vice versa the Sibe, while proudly preserving their
distinctive identity, have a much less problematic relationship with the Han and
intermarriage between the two groups is relatively frequent. In any case, ultimately the
Uyghur and the Han are the two reference groups, being the most numerous ones and
those among whom inter ethnic relations are most conflictual.14
The role of Xinjiang in contemporary China and Central Asia
Despite the low density of its population, Xinjiang occupies an extremely important
position in contemporary China from a number of perspectives. Being a frontier
region, its strategic importance has always been a concern for the Chinese
government. Today, given recent developments on both western and eastern sides of
the border, that is in the PRC and in the former Soviet Union, its strategic role cannot
be overestimated. From an economic point of view, Xinjiang's oil, mineral and other
natural resources represent an essential reservoir for the whole country, although there
14 Hoppe (1998) provides a survey of ethnic groups in Xinjiang.
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are contradicting reports on their actual size (Dorian et al. 1997:469-70). Moreover,
since the economic reforms started in China in the 1980s, foreign trade, especially
with Mongolia, Central Asia, and Pakistan, has become a major economic activity in
the region, reviving the tradition of the Silk Road. Economic control over Xinjiang's
resources is of paramount importance both for Chinese internal development and to
attract foreign investment. As a consequence of China's opening to the outer world
and of the new geopolitical configuration of Central Asia, the role of Xinjiang is
becoming more and more relevant also in terms of communications. Despite the still
underdeveloped state of internal communications, Xinjiang has become an important
gateway to and from China. In particular, the Karakorum highway, linking Gilgit in
Pakistan to Kashgar in Xinjiang through the Kunjerab Pass, is a major trade as well as
tourist route - at least it was until September 2001. The other major connection is with
Kazakhstan, mainly through the Eurasian railway between Ortimchi and Almaty,
through which most of the trade with the former Soviet Union is carried out. Indeed,
"most China-Central Asia trade is between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan, [and] China's
two-way trade with Kazakhstan is greater than Turkey's trade with all five Central
Asian republics" (Dorian et al. 1997:4-5).
At the dawn of the new millennium, Zhao Yueyao looks at Xinjiang from the
twofold perspective of pivot and periphery, describing it as "sitting at the crossroads
of a spatial and temporal pivot" (2001:224). Zhao's article starts with a discussion of
China's regional policies, from the Maoist approach, which emphasised self-
sufficiency more than interregional integration, to the reform era, during which
Chinese leaders have gradually embraced capitalism and the market economy as the
means to achieve rapid development. This second phase started with a coast-oriented
strategy and was characterised by imbalanced regional policies, predicated on the
assumption that the prosperity of the coastal regions would produce diffusion effects.
However, this was clearly not the case and central and western regions were
effectively penalised by such policies. Moreover, increasing regional inequalities also
raised concern about stability and unity in the ethnic areas, such as Xinjiang. This led
in the mid-1990s to a shift toward a more balanced development policy, predicated on
an integrated national market economy. Therefore, Xinjiang's development has
become not only an economic priority but also crucial to ethnic unity and political
stability. Whether Xinjiang can be considered an 'internal colony' or not (Gladney
1998; Sautman 2000), so far its development has been perceived by local non-Han
people rather as mere exploitation of its natural resources. According to Zhao, "[t]
fence off such criticisms effectively, the government needs to strengthen Xinjiang's
resource-processing capabilities and raise the level of welfare for ethnic people"
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(2001:219). The real challenge for the government is how to balance concerns for
equity, security, national unity, and efficiency. While the outcome of this shift in
regional policy is still uncertain, there is no doubt that Xinjiang occupies a pivotal
position in terms of economic and trade relations with Central Asia.
Therefore, the relevance of Xinjiang to China has to be situated within two
wider contexts: the `new' Central Asia and the Islamic world.15 In recent years many
social scientists have analysed the political and economic role of Xinjiang within China
and Central Asia, often by focusing on the interplay between geopolitics, economics,
and transnational ethno-religious identities (Christoffersen 1993, Craig-Harris 1993,
Dorian et al. 1997, Ferdinand 1994, Zhao 2001). Central Asia is one of the new
regions that has re-emerged from the geopolitical earthquake that took place with the
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. As Ferdinand
remarks, "[t]he epithet 'Central Asia' is not an indigenous term, but was imposed on
the region by nineteenth-century Europeans in a vain attempt to establish at least a
territorial identity for this protean, tantalizing stretch of land that had for so long
survived uneasily in the interstices of great empires" (1994:1). Since the independence
in 1992 of the five ex-Soviet Central Asian republics, a more definite Central Asian
identity has started to coalesce, mainly around Muslim and Turkic identities. With the
increase in cross-border trade and communications in general, Turkic peoples in
Xinjiang are forging closer political, economic, and cultural ties with their central
Asian neighbours, thus reinforcing their non-Chinese identity. Despite some three
decades of complete isolation, 16 resumed contact among peoples with a largely shared
historical background has exposed the artificiality of the Sino-Soviet border, which
has arbitrarily cut across linguistic, cultural, and even familial ties. It is therefore not
surprising that, following recent developments on both sides of the border, Uyghurs
and other Turkic peoples of Xinjiang have reoriented their attention westwards.
Recent developments both in Central Asia and in China aroused an increasing
interest and competition among Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan for political,
economic, and spiritual influence in Xinjiang. China is obviously in favour of foreign
investments and deeply interested in selling arms to these countries. Indeed the
Chinese government strategically plays the card of Islam, displaying tolerance toward
the Muslim population, for the sake of good foreign/trade relationships (see Gladney
1992: 7-13). However, it is equally worried by any threat to its control on the region.
15 On 'new' Central Asia see Ferdinand (1994) and Rashid (1994). Hostler (1993) focuses on Turkic
identity, Turkism and Pan-Turkism.
16 Sino-Soviet relations had started deteriorating in 1956 with the debate over Stalinism. In 1960 the
USSR government cancelled 600 contracts with the PRC and withdrew its technicians (Collotti
Pischel 1991:174, 176). The Sino-Soviet border was sealed in the early 1960s.
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This threat could be represented by a too strong and politicised Muslim identity on the
one hand, and by Pan-Turlcism on the other. Thus the Chinese government is engaged
in the difficult task of formulating a well-balanced policy towards the Muslim
nationalities of Xinjiang in order to maintain good relationships with the above-
mentioned countries and, at the same time, to keep control on the region. It is in this
perspective that China has been expanding relations with the Central Asian states, not
only to promote economic and trade relations but, most importantly, to establish
regional security arrangements with Central Asia and Russia. To this end, the leaders
of the so-called 'Shanghai Five' (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, and
Tajikistan) have met in Shanghai in April 1996, inaugurating a series of annual
meetings to discuss security issues. On the agenda of the July 2000 meeting, which
was held in Dushanbe, was the fight against terrorism, separatism, and religious
extremism (Zhao 2001:222-23). Since June 2001, Uzbekistan has become the sixth
member of the group, which has been renamed 'Shanghai Co-operative Organisation'
(Achcar 2001:13). In actual practice, these agreements mean that the PRC government
has secured the support of Central Asian neighbouring countries in its struggle to
suppress any form of real or presumed opposition among the peoples of Xinjiang (in
particular, the Uyghur). Current developments in Central Asia, that is, the American
war in Afghanistan, have brought even more to the fore the strategic role of this
region, including Xinjiang, suggesting a scenario where civil rights of the local
populations will be nonchalantly encroached on by all parties in the name of the fight
against terrorism. In fact, what is at stake is strategic control of Central Asia (including
oil and pipelines): we are watching the latest episode of the "Great Game" between
Russia, China, and the United States. As far as Xinjiang is concerned, the Chinese
government has seized the opportunity of the "global war to terrorism" launched by the
United States after the attack on the Twin Towers. According to a press report, the
Chinese Foreign Secretary Sun Yuxi has asked for international support in the Chinese
government's fight against Uyghur Muslim separatists in Xinjiang, stating that they
have links with international terrorist organisations.17
17 `La Cina chiede sostegno contro gli Uiguri' II manifesto 12 Ottobre 2001, p.4. See also Gilbert
Achcar's essay published on the December 2001 issue of Le Monde Diplomatique, according to
which Chinese leaders have set two conditions for their support to the 'anti-terrorism' campaign: a)
they asked that the response to the September 11 attacks should be carried out within the UN and b)
they demanded reciprocity, that is, support to the Chinese government's fight against "Islamic
terrorism" in Xinjiang and "separatism" in Taiwan (Achcar 2001:13).
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1.2. The Uyghur
The Uyghur are the largest minzu in Xinjiang, numbering almost eight million in
1995, and the largest Turkic-speaking group in China. Their language belongs to the
Eastern, or Chagatay, branch of the Turkic language family and is closely related to
modern Uzbek. 18 The modern Uyghurs adopted, or were ascribed, their ethnonym as
recently as the early twentieth century. Historically, the name Uyghur has been applied
to related peoples of three different periods, namely the ancient Uyghur qaghanate
(8th-9th c.), the medieval Uyghur kingdom of Turfan (late 9th-16th c.), and the
Uyghur minzu of what is today Xinjiang. The modern Uyghur have resulted from the
historical assimilation of the ancient and medieval Uyghur Turks with other Turkic
groups, as well as Turkicised Iranic and Indo-European (the so-called "Tokharian")
populations. 19
The ancient Uyghurs were first mentioned in Chinese records in the 8th c., as
one of the vassal tribes of the Eastern Turkic confederation. Upon the dissolution of
this confederation, in 744, the Uyghur created an independent state which lasted for
about a hundred years, with their capital at Ordubalig - on the upper reaches of the
Orkhon river. In 840 they were attacked and defeated by the Kirghiz tribal
confederation. This event forced the Uyghur and their Turkic subjects to flee
southward, dividing themselves into three main groups. The first settled in the area
comprised between what is today western Inner Mongolia and Gansu. These Uyghurs
eventually assimilated to the other peoples (mostly Mongol and Chinese) who lived
there. A small group fled toward Kashgar, in the west, and finally the third group,
18 For a description of the Uyghur language see Dweyer (1997). Hahn (1991) is a conversation course
in modem Uyghur, while Dillon (1995b) and Dweyer (1994) survey Uyghur language textbooks and
dictionaries published in China. Beller-Hann (1991) discusses script changes in Xinjiang, focusing in
particular on the Uyghur language. On Uyghur literature, see Friederich (1997), Naby (1991), and
Sultan (1993). Beller-Hann (2000) provides a very informed and in-depth discussion of literacy and oral
transmission among the Uyghur. Dweyer (1998) focuses on language policy and the politics of
language in China.
19 History is a very controversial issue in contemporary Xinjiang. For instance, the publication in
1989 of The Uyghur, a book claiming a Uyghur history independent of China, earned its author,
Uyghur historian Turghun Almas, heavy and prolonged public criticism. The book was banned and
Turghun Almas, then in his 60s, was placed under house arrest while his family has suffered
discrimination and police harassment since then. The book was criticised for being "erroneous" on
several counts, including for having "elevated the historical importance of the Uyghurs" and "denied
the harmony of the coexistence of the Chinese and Uyghur people" (XASS 1994: 47-48, cited in AT
1999:12). On the politics of Xinjiang history see Bovingdon (2000). Grousset (1970) is probably the
best source to appreciate the complexity of the history of Central Asia and the peoples who have lived
and met there. Contemporary Chinese sources, that is those published in the PRC (for instance, Ma
1981, 1989; Tian 1991), are biased by the 'unitary-state dogma' which dictates a narrative of
continuity and linear evolution for the Uyghur minzu, thus inscribing their history within Chinese
history by stressing (if not inventing) continuity of contact with China. For a summary of Uyghur
history, though mostly based on Chinese sources, see also Schwarz (1984).
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which was by far the largest, fled to Turfan in the south-west. There they established a
Uyghur kingdom, with their capital at Qarakhoja, which at its height extended from
Kucha in the west to Qumul in the east. These Uyghurs absorbed the Tokharian and
Sogdian groups residing in the area, adopting in turn Buddhism from the former and
Manichaeism and the Sogdian script from the latter. Islam, which was introduced in
the Kashgar region during the 10th century, only spread to these eastemmost areas as
late as the 14th-15th century. Following the adoption of Islam, the Sogdian script was
replaced by the Arabic script.
By that time the Tarim basin, from Kashgar to Turpan and as far as Qumul, was
predominantly inhabited by sedentary Turkic and Turkicised Iranic people. These oasis
dwellers have been ruled, over the centuries, by the Qarakitay, the Mongols, the
Junggars (Western Mongols), and a number of local oasis rulers. In the nineteenth
century, this region came to be seen as the 'pivot of Asia' and was contended among
three large empires - the Russian, the British, and the Chinese - in an attempt to create
a buffer zone in order to prevent the others' expansionist designs. As we have seen,
the Qing court established Chinese control of the region in 1884, when Xinjiang - as it
was then called - was formally incorporated as an imperial province.
Until the early twentieth century, the sedentary population of Eastern
Turkestan/Xinjiang strongly identified with their oases and referred to themselves as
Qumulluq', `Turpanliq',. Qashqdrlik', etc. that is, by place name rather than by
ethnonym (e.g. Uyghur'). As late as the 1930s, western missionaries and travellers
who visited the region usually referred to its sedentary non-Chinese residents as
'FurIci' or Chantow' (see for instance Holgate Lattimore 1994, Cable and French
1947).20 Indeed the ethnonym `Uyghur' was not revived until 1921, when it was
officially sanctioned during a Soviet meeting in Tashkent. In China it was adopted in
the 1950s, as part of the ethnic identification process carried out by the Communists.
As linguist Arienne Dwyer points out, today the modern ethnonym `Uyghur' also
subsumes a number of small groups in the Tarim Basin who were not necessarily
Turkic speakers in origin. These include the Dolan (along the Tarim River), who are
probably Mongol in origin; the Eynu of Khotan and Payziwat and the Paxpu/Shixpu of
Guma and Kakyar, who are both Iranic-speaking in origin; and the Loplik of Lop
Nur.21
Cable and French use `Turki' and `Chantow' indistinctly for those who today would be referred to
as `Uyghur'. For example, they write of "a wealthy Moslem Turki" (1947:221); "chantow bread"
(1947:222); "a business quarter for both Chinese and Tttrki"; `Turki farmers" (1947:223); "the Turki";
'The Chantow"; `Turlci shops"; "the Chantow farmer" (1947:225). We can infer that they are also
familiar with place-names, as in the same page they write "Melon cultivation has been carried by the
Kumulik [Qumulluq] to a tine art" (1947:225).
21 Arienne Dwyer, personal communication.
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Opposition to Chinese rule
Behind the Communist rhetoric on "the unity of all nationalities" and "Xinjiang having
always been part of China", there is justified concern for internal opposition on the
part of local non-Han people, particularly the Uyghur. Chinese rule in the region has
been seriously challenged throughout the twentieth century. Before the Communist
takeover, not only were ethnic relations between Han and `Turki' anything but
peaceful (as we learn from travellers' and missionaries' accounts), but there were two
attempts to create an independent Eastern Turkestan state. In 1933 an Eastern
Turkestan Muslim Republic was established by Uyghurs in southern Xinjiang, with its
headquarters in Kashgar. The Republic was soon suppressed by Sheng Shicai, the
Xinjiang military commander, who subsequently established himself as the local
warlord. As soon as Sheng left Xinjiang in 1944 for a new post in Beijing, the so-
called Ili Rebellion broke out in north-western Xinjiang, leading to the establishment
of the East Turkestan Republic (ETR) on November 12, 1944. The Republic lasted
until 1949, when its leaders all died in a mysterious plane crash, while they were on
their way to Beijing to discuss their autonomy with Mao Zedong.22
After 1949, while the inseparability of Xinjiang from the rest of China has never
been questioned by the central government, Chinese policy in the region has been
oscillating between the two extremes of pluralism and ethnocentric (Han) hegemonic
repression, as discussed elsewhere (1.4.; see also McMillen 1979). After the bitter
years of the Cultural Revolution, the introduction in the 1980s of relatively liberal
policies, including tolerance of important expressions of cultural identity, was
welcome by the non-Han people living in the region. However, there is still a great
deal of friction between the Chinese government and the local people, and between the
Han Chinese and the non-Han Chinese (mostly Uyghur) population of Xinjiang. Not
only are incidents of violence between individuals - such as knifings - very common,
but also broader protests and terrorist incidents have occurred with regularity
throughout the second half of the twentieth century. It is very difficult to obtain
accurate and reliable information on this subject, since in Communist Xinjiang
organised political opposition has necessarily been clandestine. Most information can
either, be inferred from statements of Chinese policy on the suppression of this
opposition, or is provided by émigré supporters (Dillon 1995a:17). Clearly, neither of
22 On the two East Turkestan Republics, political opposition, and ethnic unrest in Republican
Xinjiang see Forbes (1986). On the Ili Rebellion and the ETR see also Benson (1990) and Wang
(1999).
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these sources can be defined as 'independent', but both can provide a relatively
complete picture. In a document compiled for 'internal use' (neibu) by a government-
sponsored research group it is stated that "according to statistics, 19 counts of revolts
and riots and 194 cases of counter-revolutionary separatist activities occurred in the
whole Autonomous Region in the 30 years between March 1951 and May 1981".23
During the 1990s dissent, resistance, and repression in Xinjiang appear to have
been increasing, becoming a major concern both for the Chinese government and for
pro-human rights organisations, most notably Amnesty International. It is hard to
establish to what extent such perceived increase in the activity of separatist and other
dissident organisations may be actually due to a greater 'visibility' and access to
information, following the progressive opening up of Xinjiang to the outer world.
However, in the 1990s all the Uyghurs I have met in Xinjiang agreed that "in the last
four or five years things have been getting worse", and for most of them this was
related to a) the creation of independent Central Asian republics just across the border
of Xinjiang, and b) relentless Han migration from the interior of China to Xinjiang.24
This troubled decade was inaugurated by riots at Baren, in the Kizilsu Kirghiz
Autonomous Prefecture in southern Xinjiang. On April 5 1990 a group of Kirghiz
men, who had gathered at a mosque, began criticising central government policies in
minority areas, including birth control, nuclear weapons testing (at Lop Nor, 800 km
south-east of Ortimchi), and the export of Xinjiang's resources to China proper. Soon
this developed into a mass protest, calling for the driving out of the Han and the
establishment of an East Turkestan independent state in Xinjiang. According to a
neibu document published in 1994 by the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences,
behind the riots was the 'Islamic Party of Enst Turkestan', one of the clandestine
opposition parties that had been formed and crushed over the years (Al 1999:12).
While it is difficult to assess the scale of support for the Baren uprising, it can be seen
23 Zhang Yumo, The Anti-Separatism Struggle and its Historical Lessons since the Liberation of
Xinjiang'. Most interestingly, the document was translated by a group of Uyghur émigrés and posted
on the `uyghur-1' discussion list on 4 February 1998, the first anniversary of the 1997 `Ghulja
uprising', to commemorate "those brave sons and daughters of Uighur who bravely standed [sic] up
against that satanic regime and laid down their young lives for the sake of truth and justice".
24 While incidents have evidently been occurring throughout the 1990s, it is extremely difficult to
know exactly what goes on. The most reliable sources, that is CCP neibu documents, are usually the
least accessible. In general, the BBC Summary of World Broadcast (SWB) is a very useful tool, in that
it provides a wide range of both Chinese and foreign media reports. Other important sources are those
published by the Uyghur emigr6s network, such as the on-line journal Turlcistan Newsletter, or the
electronic newsletter World Uyghur Network News, published by the Fast Turkistan Information
Centel'. Dillon (1995a) devotes a chapter to 'Turkic Opposition and Communist Response", providing
a rather detailed account of events that occurred from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s. As to the second
half of the 1990s, the 1999 Amnesty International report People's Republic of China: Gross
Violations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region includes a very informed
background section, where the 1995 "Khotan incident" and the 1997 "Ghulja incident" and its
aftermath are dealt with in great detail (Al 1999).
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as a watershed in that on that occasion "the issue of an independent East Turkestan
Republic has been brought into the open for the first time since 1949" (Dillon
1995a:22).
Incidents have occurred on a regular basis in the following years, although only
few were reported. In February 1992 there was a bomb attack on a bus in Ortimchi; a
mass protest against the main Chinese nuclear test site at Lop Nor was staged in mid-
March 1993; a bomb went off in Kashgar in June 1993; to mention but some. Another
major incident occurred in the summer 1995, in the predominantly Uyghur town of
Khotan, on the southern rim of the Taldamakan desert. This protest was sparked on
July 7 when Abdul Qayum, the charismatic Imam of the Baytulla Mosque, did not
appear at the Friday prayer and was reported to have been arrested the previous day.
Quoting unofficial sources, Amnesty International reports that "several hundred people
were detained on the spot on 7 July 1995 and many more during the following weeks,
both in and around Khotan. [M]ost of those detained on 7 July 1995 were held
without charge for periods varying from 2 weeks to 3 months" (Al 1999:14).
Expressions of often violent dissent continued throughout 1996. That same year the
government launched a national 'strike hard' (yanda) anti-crime campaign, which in
Xinjiang - where it was aimed primarily at "ethnic splittists" (minzu fenlie zhuyizhe) -
led to large-scale arrests and numerous executions.
This spiral of dissent and repression reached its climax in early February 1997 in
the north-western city of Ghulja (Yining in Chinese), where a demonstration was held
by the local Uyghur population on 5 February, followed by two days of rioting. The
initially peaceful demonstration was repressed with unprecedented brutality by Chinese
security forces. Hundreds of demonstrators and bystanders were arrested and many
people were killed or injured. On 6 February a curfew was imposed and the city was
sealed off for two weeks.25 The protest had originated from the growing discontent of
the local Uyghur population. In 1995 the authorities had banned the mdshrdp, a
traditional form of social gathering which had been revived in 1994 by Uyghurs in
Ghulja as a way to tackle social problems, especially among the youth.26 While these
gatherings reportedly continued secretly, arbitrary arrests increased over the following
eighteen months and Uyghur discontent grew in proportion with repression. The 5
February demonstration was apparently provoked by a series of incidents during the
Holy month of Ramadan - whose conclusion that year coincided with the Chinese
Spring Festival - which was marked that year by a heavy police presence.
25 For a detailed account of the "Ghulja incident", including gory details of the repression, see Al
(1999:17-22).
26 On the `Mlishrdp movement" see also Roberts (1998a).
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The Ghulja incident however was not an isolated event. According to rumours,
in the same period there were 'minor' incidents, such as knifings and attacks against
Han residents, throughout the region. In Onimchi, the climate of fear and repression
that had accompanied the celebration of the Roza festival (end of Ramadan) and the
Chinese New Year culminated with the bombings of 25 February. While the whole
country was mourning Deng Xiaoping's death, three time bombs went off on three
different buses, causing civilian casualties. According to a press report, the bombs
were planted by the "United Revolutionary National Front". 27 The crackdown against
suspected "separatists" and "terrorists" intensified across the region, especially during
the weeks that preceded the Hong Kong handover (1 July 1997). Between January
1997 and April 1999, when the Amnesty International report was published, at least
210 death sentences were recorded in Xinjiang, of which 190 were executed shortly
after sentencing. The vast majority of those sentenced to death and executed were
Uyghurs and had been accused of offences related to clandestine opposition activities,
street protests, violent clashes with the security forces, or terrorist incidents (Al
1999:54).
While only a minority of the Uyghur population of Xinjiang is directly involved
in such extreme forms of opposition and repression, these have a tremendous impact
on most people's daily life. Not only do many Uyghurs share, to some extent, the
feelings of frustration and discontent that lead some - mostly young men - to engage in
an active fight against the Chinese govenunent.28 But, most importantly, this spiral of
repression and dissent affects everyone, if anything because it generates a climate of
widespread fear and suspicion, where everyone feels a potential target and where trust
becomes a luxury that often one cannot afford. It is in such a climate that my research
was carried out and it is against this background that the main theme of this thesis, that
is the negotiation of Uyghur identity in the realm of food, needs to be set.
1.3. Ethnicity and ethnic identity
Terms such as 'ethnicity' and its derivatives have become increasingly popular in the
last two or three decades. These words have been introduced by mostly English-
language academics to help describe and analyse a wide range of contemporary
political and cultural behaviour and events. Today they are also used in popular,
political, and media discourses to describe and explain world events. The use of
27 SWB/FE12855 0/12 28/2/97.
28 On less overt forms of everyday resistance to Han rule see Bovingdon (2002) and Cesaro (2000).
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'ethnic' in British popular discourse to refer to exotic food, music, clothing, etc.,
further adds to the confusion. As a consequence, these terms have ambiguous
referents. Often it is by virtue of this ambiguity that actors with a specific agenda -
such as members of minorities, political parties, governments, the media - use them to
describe their own or others' activities.
As Chapman, McDonald and Tonkin have pointed out in their introduction to
History and Ethnicity, "the term [ethnicity] proves to be of interestingly limited
value. ... It is also a term that invites endless and fruitless definitional argument among
those professional intellectuals who think that they know, or ought to know, what it
means. ... As a term, ethnicity is a product of a long-standing feature of English
sociolinguistics - the tendency to look to Greek, Latin, French, or more generally,
Romance models, when a new word is needed to fancify a plain idea or expression"
(Chapman et al. 1989:1, 11). Interestingly, their analysis of the Greek etymology of
the term and its use by ancient Greek and Roman authors shows how it originally
implied an 'us' and 'them' distinction, where 'them' were the 'ethnic' ones (1989:12-
13). Somehow the use of the term 'ethnicity' and its derivatives has come to a full
circle, at least in popular and media discourses: while being first introduced into the
English language as a 'neutral' analytical term, today 'ethnicity' is something that only
the 'others' have. No matter what word we use, it is always a (politically, culturally,
economically, etc.) dominant majority that defines a minority as 'ethnic'.
The current concern with ethnicity among social anthropologists, and the
consequent ubiquity of this term, reflects both changes in the social world - above all
increased contacts between communities - and changes in the dominant way of
thinking in social anthropology - that is, a shift from regarding 'societies' and
'cultures' as more or less isolated, static and homogeneous units, to an attempt to
render flux and process, ambiguity and complexity. In social anthropology, ethnicity
refers to aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are
regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive.
There is a close but complex relationship between 'ethnicity' and 'nationalism',
which is reflected in the frequent association of the two terms. Like ethnic ideologies,
nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents and, by implication, it draws
boundaries vis-à-vis others, who thereby become outsiders. What distinguishes
nationalism is its relationship to the state, that is, the claim that cultural and political
boundaries should be coterminous. Therefore, the aspiration of an ethnic group to a
state is labelled as nationalistic - although many ethnic groups do not have such a
demand. It is useful, however, to distinguish between two kinds of nationalism, that
is, between the ideology of a majority legitimising an existing nation-state (and
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involving the suppression of the political and often cultural identities of minorities),
and that of a minority within a state aspiring to considerable autonomy, if not to a state
of their own. Chinese and Uyghur nationalism could be taken, respectively, as an
example of these two kinds of nationalism. In other words, 'ethnic' and 'national' are
categories which partly overlap. While they both involve cultural as well as socio-
political aspects, the former tends to be regarded more as a cultural category - often the
bias towards culture has the deliberate effect to devoid it of its political content -
whereas the latter is more often considered as a socio-political category.
From what has been said so far, it would be not only undesirable but also
impossible to define, in a strict sense, what ethnicity is. However, while bearing in
mind that we are dealing with a complex and often ambiguous process, Eriksen's very
general and tentative definition may help to identify the scope of this area of
anthropological inquiry:
Ethnicity is an aspect of social relationships between agents who consider
themselves as culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom
they have a minimum of regular interaction. It can thus also be defined as a
social identity (based on a contrast vis-à-vis others) characterised by
metaphoric or fictive kinship ... Ethnicity refers both to aspects of gain and loss
in interaction, and to aspects of meaning in the creation of identity. In this way
it has a political, organisational aspect as well as a symbolic one. (Eriksen
1993: 12)
Thus, 'ethnicity' subsumes a whole range of very different social phenomena. While
there can be a certain degree of uniformity in the mechanisms of ethnic processes, the
social contexts in which they occur may be very different and the relevance of ethnicity
may vary substantially depending on the society, the individual, and the situation.
Ethnicity, as a social identity, is relational and to some extent situational. It is
one among the many possible identities and statuses available to an individual, and it is
an empirical question when and how ethnic identity becomes the most relevant one.
Given this fluid and ambiguous character, ethnic identity can be seen as being
constantly negotiated, and to a certain degree manipulated, by the actors themselves in
their interaction. It is precisely this view that constitutes the starting point in this
thesis. Drawing in particular on the work of Stevan Harrell (1996), I consider ethnic
groups as resulting from an ongoing process of negotiation.
Most anthropological work on ethnicity has been focusing on the crucial
question: what are the criteria for ethnicity? For a long time, an ethnic group was
considered a category of people who had a 'shared culture'. That is, the criteria for
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ethnicity were held to be identifiable and essentialised cultural traits (language,
religion, customs, economy, etc.). 29 Today, it is hard to maintain such a position: not
only are cultural boundaries anything but clear-cut, nor have they ever been, but they
also do not necessarily coincide with ethnic boundaries. In the social sciences there
seems to be a fairly general agreement in considering ethnicity as an aspect of inter-
group relationships, rather than as the cultural property of a group.
From Leach (1954) onwards, many anthropologists have convincingly argued
that the focus should be on social interaction and social organisation rather than on
'cultural content'. Fredrik Barth is regarded as a pivotal figure in the study of ethnicity
and ethnic relations. His focus is on the boundaries that delimit a group, rather than on
its 'cultural content'. For him, groups are by no means isolated and the maintenance of
ethnic boundaries is far from being unproblematic. The criterion for ethnicity is the
members' sense of belonging, and therefore definition of the group, with the aim of
being socially effective. In this view, ethnic groups are categories of beneficial
interaction where people do not originally share certain characteristics but they may
have advantages by virtue of being members of a group and, as a consequence,
submerge contrasts and differences. In other words, it is not that people belong to a
group because they share the same traits, but rather the other way round. That is,
interaction precedes the creation of cultural distinctiveness (Barth 1969). Abner
Cohen, on the other hand, views culture as a set of resources and argues that ethnic
groups arise in situations of competition over scarce resources, whereby cultural
distinctiveness would mark off a group from the other. Thus ethnicity becomes a
means for competition over scarce resources, based on ideologies of shared culture,
shared origins, and metaphoric kinship. For Abner Cohen 'ethnicity' is essentially
political: he focuses on how groups - especially elites - use their cultural identity to
exclude others and to monopolise certain resources or power (A. Cohen 1974). Both
Barth and Cohen have the merit of contextualising ethnicity by focusing on social
interaction. However, they tend to overemphasise the 'utilitarian' aspects of ethnic
identity, failing to account for a number of situations where belonging to a group is far
from advantageous, and yet ethnicity is a relevant social identity for the members of
that group. For instance, this is evident when we consider the Uyghur of
contemporary Xinjiang, who retain their distinctive identity despite discrimination and,
in some case, even prosecution. Comaroff indeed considers both these approaches
correct but incomplete, and devises a set of propositions for understanding the
29 These were the criteria adopted for the 'ethnic identification' process that was carried out by the
Chinese Communists since the 1950s - the so-called '4 Stalinist criteria': "common language,
territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture" (cited in Fei
1990:17).
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phenomenon. In particular, for him ethnicity originates in the asymmetrical absorption
of groups into a single political economy. In other words, he introduces a notion of
hierarchy, whereby groups remain unequal even within a single political economy
(Comaroff 1987).
Besides the difficulty in defining the criteria for ethnicity, there is a further
problem of translation. According to Tapper, "[e]thnic group, a term brought in from
western sociological discourse, is a poor translation of indigenous categories in Iran,
Afghanistan and elsewhere, and hinders the analysis of their subtleties and
ambiguities" (1988:31). In China the situation is similarly complex: minzu is a sort of
blanket term, usually translated as 'nationality' but is often used to refer to groups that
western scholars would term as 'ethnic'. However, the problems that the translation of
minzu raises also reveal the inadequacy of western theories of ethnicity when dealing
with the Chinese reality. Stevan Harrell, having pointed out this issue, decides not to
translate the term minzu (1990:517).
We may conclude that ethnic groups, like nations, are constructed categories
which stand in a dialectical relationship with the phenomena to which they refer, in the
sense that the latter both determine and are determined by the former. Once a category
is created, it affects the way the phenomenon to which it refers is perceived,
experienced, and even consciously shaped by the relevant actors. These categories can
be analytical as well as political tools. Particularly in this field, there is a close
relationship between academic and political and media discourses, as the events
occurring in many parts of the world have shown in recent years. It is therefore
important to question not only the analytical validity of such universal categories in
describing often very different phenomena, but also the role that they may play in
imposing a discourse in certain areas and on certain events, as well as in legitimating
certain power relations. Moreover, while these categories are predicated on variation
among human groups and the presumed specificity of a particular group, their use may
result in the negation of internal differences within the group itself.
This is the kind of theoretical approach that has inspired my work among the
Uyghur. Far from aiming at a new model and/or definition of ethnicity, my main
concern has been to look at ethnicity in context, on the ground. For, I argue, in this
area of anthropological enquiry models are particularly inadequate; it is only by
considering the specificity of each situation that we may begin to understand and
describe such a complex phenomenon. Within this approach, I have also paid special
attention in trying to give voice to plural perspectives within the group. Hence my
concern to let individual persons speak as much as possible. Indeed, there are many
different ways of being Uyghur. Far from seeing this as a contradiction that questions
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the 'validity' of Uyghur identity (cf. Rudelson's (1997) argument discussed in
Chapter 2), I rather consider it as 'added value' in the negotiation of identity (in terms
of power of negotiation).
Before concluding this cursory discussion of ethnicity and ethnic identity I
would like to add that, while it is useful to consider the status of ethnic group as the
expression of power relations (majority - minority/ies) within the boundaries of a state
(see Comaroff 1987 and Harrell 1990), the analysis of the relations between the
majority and a minority cannot be confined within the boundaries of a single state and
possibly not any state as such. Such relations can be affected and determined in/by a
wider context, as can be the meanings involved in the construction of a particular
identity. In other words, relationality and situationality of ethnic identity is not
confined to reference to any one state, nor to the politics of states, important though
they are for ethnicity. The majority in one state may not be the only significant other.
As we shall see, this is especially true of many minority nationalities (minzu) in
China, and particularly of the Uyghur.
1.4. Ethnicity and the state in China: Group definition and China's
nationality policies
In this section I would like to situate discourses on ethnic identity in a Chinese context,
and subsequently discuss issues of group definition and China's nationality policies.
According to Crossley, in China ethnic consciousness "was a product of imperial
disintegration, ... a corollary of whatever we may understand as China's
modernization" (1990:27). If we accept this view, then the systematic definition of
ethnic groups that was carried out in the 1950s needs to be situated against the
background of the intellectual debates on Chinese identity that took place in China at
the turn of the twentieth century.30
During the nineteenth century, the confrontation with the modern western
nation-states demonstrated the relativity of the Chinese world view based on the
assumption of Chinese cultural superiority. This produced an intellectual debate - at the
end of the nineteenth century - seeking to redefine Chinese identity in order to cope
with such confrontation. Two strands can be singled out of this debate: the redefinition
of "being Chinese" (Cohen 1991), and the creation of a Han majority. These two
processes can be distinguished according to the oppositions they entail. In the first
case, the 'other' is outside China, while in the second it is within China itself. In other
30 On "ethnic identification" in Communist China see Fei (1990).
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words, we have the creation on the one hand of a Chinese national identity - vis-à-vis
other nation-states - and on the other that of a Han (as majority) ethnic identity - vis-à-
vis other ethnic groups. However, in practice such a distinction is blurred and the use
of terms such as "Han" and "Chinese" is often ambiguous.
Indeed the question of terminology is extremely relevant here. The attempt to
translate between terms such as "minzu", "shaoshu nzinzu", "zhongzu", etc., and
"ethnic group", "nationality", "ethnic minority", "race", reveals a great deal of
ambiguity. This is partly because the phenomena and processes these terms refer to are
ambiguous in themselves, and partly because these categories have developed in
different contexts. As David Wu points out, "[in order to create a modern identity to
cope with conditions created by China's confrontation with the Western world, the
Chinese were obliged to deal with foreign concepts, including that of nation, state,
sovereignty, citizenship, and race; more recently, with cultural and ethnic identity"
(1991:159). Once such concepts had been adopted, they were consequently shaped in
the Chinese context, further complicating any translation.
Thus, ideas about a Chinese race and a Chinese nation started to dominate the
intellectual scene in China at the end of the nineteenth century. DilcOtter has described
the "transition from cultural exclusiveness to racial exclusiveness in modern China"
(1990:421; see also 1992), thus framing the intellectual debate on Chinese identity in
terms of race. When the Chinese assumption of their cultural superiority was
relativised in the encounter and confrontation with the West, one of the consequences
was the gradual appearance of a racial consciousness during the second half of the
nineteenth century.
Fitzgerald, on the other hand, tackles the question from a different point of
view, focusing on the idea of China as attached to the ideal of a unitary state (1995).
According to Fitzgerald, the state that survived the death of Confucianism was a
"nationless state", and the slogan "save the country" (jiu guo) raised the question as to
which Chinese people, i.e. what "nation", would be rescued with the state (1995:84-
85). "There is no one word in the Chinese language referring to 'nation', as distinct
from state (guo), and the want of a definitive name has encouraged state-builders to
define the nation in ways consistent with their state-building efforts" (1995:85). A
variety of terms, including "citizen" (guomin, gongmin), "people" (renmin), "race"
(minzu), and the derivatives "Han race" (Hanzu) and "Chinese race" (Zhonghua
minzu), have been used, each implying a different nation.
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The question of Chinese identity has been the object of a number of scholarly
publications in the early 1990s. 31 Continuity in Chinese identity has been sought and
explained in various terms, including Confucianism, ideographic script, unitary state,
orthopraxy in performing rites. Cohen (1991) has focused on the cultural dimension of
Chinese identity. Traditionally, "[c]onsciousness of being a full participant in the total
political, cultural, and social arrangements of the Chinese state and Chinese civilization
was what being Chinese was all about" (1991:125). Like others, Cohen too finds that
the major crisis in self-identification occurred in the nineteenth century, as a
consequence of 'the assault by Western powers'. According to him, "[t]he new
definition of being Chinese is firmly rooted in nationalism, in a conception of China as
a nation-state with interests that must be protected and advanced in competition with
other nation-states" (1991: 126).
Within this debate, David Wu (1991) has looked at the twofold dimension of
Chinese identity as perceived by the Chinese themselves. If, on the one hand, as
zhongguoren they identify with the fate of China as a nation, at the same time, they
also regard themselves as being members of the zhonghua minzu, "the Chinese race"
or "the Chinese people" - a translation that Wu finds close but inadequate (1991:160-
61).
Minzu is the keyword in contemporary discourse on ethnicity in China. This
term was introduced in China at the turn of the century. It was derived from the
Japanese minzoku ("people", or "nation"), and was often associated with nationalistic
writings (minzu zhuyi is translated as "nationalism"). Its shift of meaning in terms of
ethnic group is parallel to the progressive definition of a Han ethnic majority within the
general "Chinese people". Officially, today the term Zhongguo ren ("Chinese") refers
to "the people of China" and includes 56 minzu ("nationalities"), among which the
Hanzu represents the majority. However, as I have already said, in actual practice the
distinction between "Chinese" and "Han" has been, and still is, both linguistically and
conceptually blurred. According to David Wu, in the beginning of the twentieth
century "[the] concept of a 'Chinese people' included four major non-Chinese races ...
the Man (Manchus), the Meng (Mongolians), the Hui (ethnic groups of Islamic faith in
northwestern China) and the Zang (Tibetans)" (1991:162). 32 It was not until the
1960s that a new concept of being Chinese was established by clearly demarcating the
Han and the non-Han (1991:166).
31Among others, Anagnost (1993); Ditter and Kim (1993); Duara (1993b); Waldron (1993); Watson
(1993); and two special issues of the journal Daedalus (Spring 1991 and Spring 1993).
32 Wu's use of terms such as "race", "Chinese", and "ethnic group" gives a measure of the confusion
that reigns about these issues.
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While the notion of "Han person" (Han ren), as descendant of the Han dynasty,
has existed for centuries, the concept of the Han as a unified nationality representing
over ninety percent of the Chinese population became popular under Sun Yat-sen. In
Sun's view the Han not only were one of the five Peoples of China, they were also the
majority: "for the most part, the Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with
common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs - a single
pure race" (Sun 1924:5; cited in Gladney 1991:83).
The nationality policy of communist China was first formulated in the 1930s,
mainly during the Long March. 33 In that situation, self-determination was explicitly
promised to minorities in order to gain their support against the nationalists. However,
• the right to secede was withdrawn by 1940, with a shift of emphasis on 'national
unity'. "The contradiction between a policy that promotes both autonomy and
assimilation is an irony that continues to plague China's nationality policy" (Gladney
1991:88). 34 While the right to secession was soon withdrawn and the minorities were
incorporated in the "Chinese nation", the institution of national identities, and the
consequent definition of these identities, took place in the early 1950s, just after the
foundation of the People's Republic of China (see Fei 1990).
The recognition of a nationality can be seen as a process of 'invention' and
institutionalisation of an identity. As Wu has remarked,
No classify a group as non-Chinese in China today is to reinterpret the meaning
of minority culture rather than to preserve parts of a past tradition. ... The new
classification of nationalities in China officially emphasizes that each of the
minorities has its own language, culture, and history. China's State Council of
Nationality Affairs has even published an official ethnography, linguistic
study, and ethnohistory for each nationality. Furthermore, one can observe
33 For a 'documentary' discussion of Communist nationality policy see Mosely (1966). McMillen
provides an overview of the policies toward the minority nationalities in Xinjiang between 1949 and
the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, in 1966 (1979:113-29). More recently, the book China's
Minorities. Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century, by Colin Mackerras (1994),
surveys China's minorities addressing three main issues: 1) the nature and extent of changes which
have affected China's minorities during the twentieth century; 2) the extent to which, during this
century, the minorities have amalgamated, integrated, or been assimilated into the Han and how the
revolutions that have swept China over the twentieth century have affected the relationship between
the Han and the minorities; 3) the relationship between integration and modernisation, that is, whether
modernisation assists integration. In particular, Mackerras devotes two chapters (3 and 6) to policy
towards the minorities in Republican and Communist China respectively.
34 As Lucien Pye points out, "[i]t has been considerations of national security which have forced the
Chinese to vacillate in their minority policies", since the great majority of minority population is
concentrated in border territories (1975:493). It was precisely during the Long March that the Chinese
Communists realised how complex the politics of minority interests was and that the deeply rooted
distrust of Han power among these populations could not be overcome merely by means of ideological
proclamations (1975:494-95).
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officially sponsored festivals, officially sanctioned religious celebrations, and
officially approved songs, dances, and costumes in minority regions to represent
the distinctiveness of the newly named non-Han groups. (Wu 1991:167)
Since the foundation of the People's Republic in 1949, nationality policy has been
oscillating between the two extremes of pluralism and ethnocentric (Han) hegemonic
repression. The pluralistic policies of the 1980s, which entail a sort of 'affirmative
action', have made the minority nationality status in many ways a privileged and
therefore desirable one. Thus some people have been willing to accept ascribed
identities defined by the state in order to take advantage of the privileges that these
involve.35 However, where considerations of national security prevail, particularly on
the north-western frontier, local non-Han people find themselves in the highly
vulnerable position of being simultaneously targets of suspicion and subjects of
courting. In fact, it is somewhat misleading to generically discuss 'nationality
policies', since there is a considerable degree of variation in their actual implementation
in specific contexts, and in the way these affect different groups. To put it plainly,
today there is a huge difference between being a Manchu in Beijing and a Uyghur in
Xinjiang. Not many Uyghurs, if any, would think that, on the whole, being a minority
is a privilege.
In short, as far as Chinese Communists are concerned, there has been a shift
from an initial ideological approach, formulated before their take-over in 1949 on the
basis of Lenin's view that minorities should have the right of self-determination, to the
adoption of harsher assimilationist policies dictated by their experience of minorities'
resistance to Han rule. The latter policies were in line with previous governments and
were predicated on the assumption of Han cultural (or 'social') superiority. In other
words, it was yet another "civilising project" (Harrell 1995). Part of the strategy to
achieve control, in order to "civilise", was to train cadres from each minority
community. To this end the Central Institute of Nationalities (Zhongyang Minzu
Xueyuan, now Zhongyang Minzu Daxue) was established in 1951. Besides
language training, propaganda, and political education, minority cadres were also
trained in "their own folkways" (Pye 1975:503-08).
I would like to conclude this cursory discussion of ethnicity in China and policy
toward the minority nationalities (shaoshu minzu) with a pertinent quote from Lucien
Pye's article:
35 This can be the case for many Manchus whose remarkable increase of population is not due to
fertility but rather to the fact that, under these new circumstances, many people have decided to claim
their Manchu identity, once considered as stigmatising.
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[I]t seems highly likely that as the processes of social change proceed in China
and as more members of the national minorities come closer to the Han in
cultural and economic circumstances, the greater will be their concern about
their ethnic identities and the power status of their communities.
... In its very first years the CCP would have welcomed the idea that the
national minorities were increasing in both cultural development and a sense of
autonomy and self-identification. The paradox has been that with the need to
maintain the territorial integrity of China the Communists have moved
toward more and more aggressive assimilationist policies. In order to facilitate
penetration for spreading their control they have also helped maintain
cultural forms and thus the basis for separate identity. (1975:509-10, my
emphasis).
This is precisely the paradox of Communist minority policies: that of promoting (or
producing) assimilation and, at the same time, differentiation. Today, Uyghur urban
intellectuals find themselves in the same paradoxical situation of being at the vanguard
of both assimilation and differentiation.
1.5. The anthropology of food
The cultural and social aspects of food - and its related practices - are at least as
important as its nutritional value. By eating, people do not simply satisfy a biological
need, they choose what to eat, when and how, with whom, etc., displaying a certain
pattern of behaviour. Thus cooking and eating are also cultural processes and social
activities.
Some of the most influential anthropological work focusing on food and eating
has been produced within a structuralist theoretical framework. For Levi-Strauss
cooking can be analysed as a language, in which the universal structures of human
mind are encoded. Thus he devises a 'culinary triangle' whereby the constituent
elements of each cuisine may be organised according to certain structures of opposition
and correlation (Levi-Strauss 1968). Unlike Levi-Strauss, Mary Douglas allows a
certain degree of variation within mankind and does not expect to find a universal
structure underlying the language of food. However, she argues that different dietary
rules mirror different schemes of classification, corresponding to the characteristics of
the society in which the classification takes place (Douglas 1966). Consequently she
classifies groups according to their way of classifying. Probably, Douglas's most
important contribution lies in viewing food categories as encoding social events,
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expressing hierarchy, inclusion and exclusion, boundaries and transactions across
boundaries (as in Douglas 1975).
The weakness of a structuralist approach is that, rather than providing an
explanation of food preferences or choices, it offers mainly a classificatory scheme.
Furthermore, not only are the codes and deep structures depicted as static and
unchanging but so are the patterns of social relations which they are supposed to
express. Moreover, the homogeneity and uniformity of the groups in question are
exaggerated. Jack Goody (1982), another eminent figure within anthropological
approaches to food-related practices, has tried to counterbalance such a tendency. He
remarks that by focusing on the homogeneity of specific groups, one might neglect
important aspects of a culture which are linked with social or individual differences. In
general, more recently there has been a greater concern among anthropologists for
historical change and social relations, including politics and economics, as well as for
the meanings that people construct around the food they consume (cf. Caplan 1997;
Teti 1999).
It is precisely the link with social or individual differences which makes food
relevant to the construction and expression of identity. In other words, 'you are what
you eat'. Or, to unpack this rather simplistic statement, choices - not necessarily in an
active sense - about food, table manners, rules concerning commensality, etc. may be
used to situate oneself and others culturally and socially, defining membership or non-
membership to a group. Here food may symbolise different subsegments - regional,
economic, religious, ethnic, occupational, etc. - in a given society.
At a different level, food and food-related practices are often used in ethnic or
regional stereotyping, where a particular group becomes associated with particular
culinary habits. Within this process, cookbooks written both by insiders and outsiders
may play an important role in crystallising and reinforcing such stereotypes. The
writing of such books often implies a selection from among a large number of different
recipes, thus contributing to the construction of a culinary representation of the other
(Appadurai 1988) - as well as the self. Indeed, it is the notion of selection that is
paramount in the shaping of identity. Whoever is the actor, identity is constructed by
selecting a number of 'authentic' traits. These are by no means permanent but
constantly subject to negotiation between the relevant actors. Thus the construction of
a 'national cuisine', by distilling a corpus of dishes and rules related to eating, can be
situated within the broader process of nation-building. As we shall see, the definition
of what constitutes Uyghur diet and cuisine is an important aspect in the daily process
of identity creation, and it is perhaps on this terrain that Uyghur identity is more
explicitly negotiated.
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Studying food and eating as cultural and social processes acquires a particular
relevance when dealing with such a food-oriented culture as the Chinese. Eating
usually is a social activity, and this is particularly true of China. The very way in
which a Chinese meal is conceived implies collective eating. In China the social
dimension of eating is emphasised by the role of food as a social language: sharing
food is a great social bond, and the food shared communicates the forms and contents
of social interactions (Chang 1977, Anderson & Anderson 1977, Cooper 1986). It is
not surprising, then, that a remarkable amount of work has been produced on this
topic exploring the role of food in different aspects of Chinese culture, such as death
rituals (Thompson 1988), Chinese traditional medicine (Anderson & Anderson 1975),
or, more generally, Chinese concern with harmony (Anderson 1988).
While I am not aware of any similar work exploring the role of food in Uyghur
culture, studies that focus on food in other Muslim communities may help in providing
a framework. For instance, Pillsbury (1975) examines pork avoidance as a strategy for
boundary-maintenance between Han and Muslim Chinese in Taiwan. While in their
article on the Durrani Pashtuns, Tapper & Tapper (1986) consider how boundaries of
ethnic groups are defined by rules relating to commensality. They then proceed
analysing Durrani evaluations and treatment of food within the koranic domain
according to the binary opposition permitted/ forbidden. A recent collection of essays
on the 'Culinary Cultures of the Middle East' also provides some useful insights and a
valuable source of comparative material on various aspects of food and eating among
peoples that are to some extent culturally and/or geographically contiguous to the
Uyghur (Zubaida and Tapper 1994). These range from a discussion of ingredients,
dishes, and cuisines (Fragner 1994a, 1994b; Perry 1994; Zubaida 1994b; Aubaile-
Sallenave 1994), to issues of social hierarchies (Yamani 1994), gender relations
(Maclagan 1994), cultural boundaries (Roden 1994, Bromberger 1994), changing
eating habits (Chase 1994), or semiotic and symbolic aspects of food (Marin 1994;
Tapper 1994; Diouri 1994; Hafez 1994).
Feasts and banquets - for regular religious festivals and for weddings and other
personal celebrations - are occasions in which meanings and symbols condensed
around food and eating are probably displayed at their best. Here culturally appropriate
food is served in the appropriate amount and manner. Focusing on the social dynamics
involved in such occasions allows one to identify notions of inclusion and exclusion
(who are the participants) and to observe social distances and hierarchies within the
group (who sits where, who is served when and how, etc.). Hence feasts and
banquets, while providing rich meals within a normally simpler diet, are extremely
important social events, where bonds, hierarchies of status, and networks are stated,
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reinforced, or created. Bonds and networks may become relevant in other contexts
(e.g. business, politics, etc.). Indeed, this has been an important leitmotiv in my work
among the Uyghur.
Commensality is probably the most important social aspect of feasts and
banquets. It means sharing a table and a meal (Latin, cum - mensa). Such apparently
very ordinary situations can be loaded with symbolic value. Indeed within a group
there are rules relating to coinmensality, and in these rules social meanings are
encoded. Commensality can also serve to define boundaries between groups. Here
both social and cultural aspects are relevant, and often cultural practices concerning
food and eating may be used to state and to reinforce social distance. For example,
pork avoidance is a cultural practice among Muslim groups. In certain contexts such a
practice may impinge on social relations by preventing to share, or allowing not to
share, a table with members of a group which do not observe the same avoidance - as
we shall see, this is definitely relevant in Han-Uyghur relations. This can be a way of
asserting one's membership - or non-membership - to a group, having consequences
beyond the realm of food and eating, given that coznmensality provides access to social
networks.
Ideas and beliefs about food, as well as dietary rules, may also be analysed as an
aspect of a group's cosmology, and in this sense as part of their identity. Harmony
and balance are central concerns for the Chinese, who regard the world as an
harmonious place in which harmony must be maintained: in the cosmos by correctly
performing the rituals, that is, offering the appropriate food to the appropriate spirit; in
the body, by a balanced intake of yin and yang, or hang and re food; finally, in
society, where the maintenance of social harmony also relies on food, in that social
relations and hierarchies are constructed, displayed, and must be respected while
eating (Anderson 1988). As to the Uyghur, the work of Gladney on Muslim Chinese
(Hui) can possibly be used as a guideline. Concepts of ritual purity and pollution seem
to be central to Hui identity (Gladney 1991). These can be translated into dietary rules
framed within a major opposition between that which is permitted and that which is
forbidden (cf. Tapper & Tapper 1986).
While all the above mentioned issues point in the direction of boundary-setting
and boundary-maintenance between groups, it may be worth considering also the role
of 'western' or other 'exotic' foods and drinks within this context. What sort of
people, if any, consume them and how does this situate them in their community? On
the one hand, it seems likely that the adoption of 'imported' lifestyles cuts across
boundaries, thus weakening to some extent the sense of belonging to either of the
groups and creating an elite who possibly share the ideals of modernity and progress
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which are often associated with the West in non-western contexts. Considering the
new trends in Chinese society brought about by two decades of economic reforms,
such a perspective may be particularly relevant to this study. On the other hand,
however, it is not at all clear where the boundary with 'the West' lies, particularly
when looking at Uyghur food practices. In fact, stressing continuity - including food
items, dishes, and food-related practices - with European culture is part of the Uyghur
strategy to differentiate themselves from the Han Chinese and to claim prestige vis-à-
vis the dominant Han majority.
1.6. Food and identity among the Uyghur
This thesis is a study of food and identity among the Uyghur. The argument
underlying my discussion is that food, and all its related practices (i.e. cooking,
eating, offering, etc.), is a powerful form of identity creation and maintenance.
Through the preparation, the exchange, and the consumption of food social
relationships are created, rules of inclusion and exclusion are established, boundaries
are negotiated and maintained. Food - meant as all the activities revolving around it -
has the unique advantage of being the most common daily activity for all members of a
community and, at the same time, of having strong cultural and historical
connotations. The choice of intellectuals as my main interlocutors highlights the
potential of food as both a non-verbal language available to everyone to create identity,
and the subject of a meta-discourse of identity. In a context of volatile relations
between the Uyghur Muslim minority and the dominant Han Chinese population, food
represents a fundamental resource available to Uyghur intellectuals, who are currently
engaged in a difficult process of negotiation and affirmation of their distinctive
identity.
As we have seen, in Xinjiang the economic and political transformations of the
post-Mao era combined in the early 1990s with the break-up of the Soviet Union and
the subsequent independence of the neighbouring Central Asian Republics. This has
resulted in the re-emergence of a (Turkic) Central Asian region with the reorientation
of Xinjiang from the periphery of China to the heart of Central Asia. The Uyghur of
Xinjiang, now increasingly aware of their Turkic and Muslim identity, have been
feeling threatened by Central Government assimilating policies, as well as by relentless
Han migration into the region. They feel that, while being denied in the name of (Han)
national unity the possibility to establish their distinctive historical and cultural
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tradition, they are at the same time discriminated vis-à-vis the Han in their access to the
resources made available by economic development.
In this study I take as a starting point the work of Stevan Harrell, which views
minzu in China - like ethnic groups and nations in general - as resulting from an
ongoing process of negotiation, and not as "historically inevitable collectivities". As
with ethnic groups and nations elsewhere, in China too "the shifting and fluid process
of negotiation that is the real nature of ethnic relations" is often hidden - by
government, ethnic leaders, etc. - behind a "narrative of unfolding". That is, a story of
"the processes by which an ancient people has come down through the ages as ... a
unity" (Harrell 1996:1-6). Indeed, in the increasingly Han cities of Xinjiang, above all
in Ortimchi, identity is the object of daily negotiation. The focus here is on the
negotiation of Uyghur identity by Uyghur urban intellectuals, who find themselves at
the vanguard of both assimilation and differentiation. This paradox, rather than
representing a weakness, can be seen as providing a privileged position within this
process of negotiation. I look in particular at such a process as it unfolds in the realm
of food, which I consider a privileged arena for identity creation and maintenance,
especially in a context, such as that of contemporary Xinjiang, where other arenas for
negotiation are unavailable or highly restricted.
The intellectuals' paradox stems from their ambivalent position with respect to
their own people, on the one hand, and the Chinese state on the other. Hence for
instance their ambivalent attitude towards Tarim oases peasants, which they both
praise as the true repositories and defenders of Uyghur 'tradition' and, at the same
time, despise as backward (i.e. 'non-modern'). Such an attitude underscores another
aspect of the intellectuals' paradox: they are both champions of (Uyghur) tradition
and, simultaneously, of (Han) modernity. This discourse is based on a number of
assumptions, which can be roughly summed up into two opposing equations:
differentiation=Uyghur=tradition vs. assimilation=Han=modernity. Yet Uyghur
intellectuals' view that the 'real' (U. sap, Ch. chun) Uyghurs are those from rural
areas in the South reproduces the Han/state representation of the Uyghur - and of
shaoshu minzu in general - as 'traditional', an intentionally ambiguous concept which
implies also being backward. It follows that, when Uyghurs 'develop' and
'modernise' (cf. Harrell's 'civilising project'), they become less 'authentic' and more
'like the Han' who, of course, set the standard. Hence the dilemma: to retain one's
traditional identity, but stay backward, or to 'modernise', but lose one's traditional
identity.
This dilemma, however, is largely predicated on the Chinese Marxist-
evolutionary approach to shaoshu minzu, and as such can be questioned and
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deconstructed, by questioning and deconstructing the categories of 'modernity',
'tradition', 'authenticity', etc.; in short, by unveiling the political agenda and the
power relations which lie behind the Chinese discourse on shaoshu minzu. Within
such discourse, the target for each minzu is to progress towards the higher step of the
evolutionary ladder, which, of course, is the one reached by the Han. It follows that
they should all become 'like the Han', in other words, assimilate. Here, clearly, there
is no space for an 'evolution', or rather a trajectory, independent of the Han. In short,
it is such discourse that traps Uyghur and other minzu intellectuals in the above
mentioned dilemma, by inscribing their history and their very existence in a Han-
dominated linear evolution. 36 However, if we step out of the constraints imposed by
the Han/state discourse, this dilemma becomes meaningless: of course Uyghurs too
can change (or 'modernise', if they like) while retaining their distinctive identity and
remaining different from the Han. Moreover, while today the Han provide to some
extent the most readily available sources of 'advancement', Uyghurs also have access
to a whole range of alternative sources by virtue of their Turkic and Muslim identity,
as well as of their recent history of Russian/Soviet influence. In other words, Han
China is by no means the only model for modernity. On the contrary, many Uyghurs
look at their 'relatives' across the western border in the Central Asian Republics and as
far as Turkey. Some even put forward the argument that, had they not been 'liberated'
by the Chinese Communists, they would not be as backward as they are today.
In short, in this work I consider Uyghur intellectuals who, while at the cutting
edge of both differentiation and assimilation, are in the process of negotiating Uyghur
identity. In order to do so, I question the assumption that views them as caught
between modernity and tradition, as this is predicated on the equation 'modem' equals
'Han'. Once such equation has been deconstructed by revealing the agenda behind it,
what looked like a dilemma may become, in fact, a privileged position for negotiation.
Within this framework, I posit food (foodways etc.) as a structural boundary par
excellence in Han-Uyghur relations. This is not only about pork avoidance and haram
food but includes the whole 'food culture', which I consider as a privileged terrain
where the negotiation takes place, given also the impossibility to articulate a public
discourse on identity in other, perhaps more conventional, spheres (cf. Bovingdon
36 A most telling example, though just one among many, is that of the museum in Ortimchi, which
has an 'ethnographic' section on Xinjiang (shaoshu) minzu - predictably, the Han are not on display.
This is something like a human zoo, where each minzu is reproduced - with life-size dummies - in its
'traditional' dress, dwelling style, etc. Nobody - including the organisers, the visitors, and the
members of the minzu represented - seems to notice the blatant anachronistic bias: to mention but one
point, the dummies wear dresses that nobody wears anymore. For example, the representatives of the
Russian minzu are dressed like 19th C Europeans. It is as if the Han were dressed in Qing clothes!
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2002). Here a number of principles of distinction between the two food cultures come
into play, allowing to incorporate some elements while keeping differentiation.
What makes food a privileged site is, first and foremost, its being a medium of
sociality. Besides this simple but fundamental point, we may consider a number of
other aspects that make food so special in the negotiation of Uyghur identity: Food is
pervasive, in the sense that cooking, eating, feeding, etc. are activities that inevitably
take up a good part of everybody's daily life. Secondly, as I have already pointed out,
it is 'versatile', being at the same time the most common daily activity as well as an
object of intellectual speculation. Moreover, food is to a great extent outside the reach
of state control, especially in the post-reform era. It is also 'flexible', in that principles
• of distinction allow a great degree of negotiation, that is, assimilation while retaining
differentiation. Finally, food is the one realm where Uyghurs set the rules in their
interaction with the Han, unlike for instance language, where they must adapt and
speak Mandarin.
The first part of this thesis is devoted to Uyghur identity and differentiation. Starting
from a critique of Justin Rudelson's book Oasis Identities (1997), I discuss the
notion of an over-arching Uyghur identity and argue that this is neither invalidated nor
contradicted by oasis attachments. The latter have become subsumed into it by
differentiation from and by the Han in the PRC. I then proceed to analyse in greater
detail the dynamics of Han/Uyghur differentiation in the context of late 1990s
tiriimchi.
The second part deals more specifically with food and food-related issues among
the Uyghur. Here I analyse and describe such process of differentiation as it unfolds,
in all its variability and paradoxes, in the realm of food. Despite local variation, there is
a shared notion of Uyghur collective identity in contemporary Xinjiang, which may
nevertheless be individually 'performed' in different ways - a successful business-
woman in Oriimchi who speaks fluent Mandarin can be just as Uyghur as a Khotanese
peasant who does not even speak standard Uyghur. While a certain degree of
assimilation and exchange with the Han is evident in food vocabulary, menus, and
meal patterns, this collectively shared notion of Uyghur identity can definitely be
observed in the realm of food and food-related practices, where Uyghurs draw clear
boundaries between them and the Han: in the form of shared beliefs concerning food,
shared notions of hospitality, manners, accepted/non-accepted behaviour, shared ritual
practices involving food. Last but not least, in attitudes towards food and in food
choices one can also read a covert political statement, a subversive message against
Han domination which could hardly be articulated in a language other than food.
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The affirmation of Uyghur identity, as opposed to other more local self-
identifications, is prominent in particular for intellectuals in the capital city. In fact,
while I often talk about Uyghurs in general, and some of my observations indeed
apply to Uyghur people at large, I should make clear once again that the main setting
for my discussion is Ortimchi in the late 1990s. That is, an increasingly Han Chinese
and cosmopolitan city, at the cutting edge of Xinjiang urban culture, as opposed to
other mostly Uyghur urban settings such as, for instance, Kashgar or Khotan. As I
have already pointed out, it is particularly important to contextualise my ethnography
and my understanding of certain practices and discourses in terms of both place and
time. The year 1997 marked a turning point for the whole People's Republic: the death
of Deng Xiaoping in February, the Hong Kong handover in July, and the 15th Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October. In Xinjiang these events
intertwined with an escalation of violence and repression which had already started the
year before. While many Han Chinese were murdered by Uyghur "ethnic terrorists",
and many Uyghurs were executed by the Chinese state after summary proceedings,
the state propaganda obsessively promoted "ethnic unity" (minzu tuanjie). It is in this
temporal context that my ethnography is situated. As to place, Ortimchi is a
overwhelmingly Han city (70-80%), where Uyghurs (c.15%) tend to construct their
identity mostly in opposition to the Chinese. These two groups do not interact in a
vacuum, as there are also a large number of other groups - as well as foreign
communities. However, most of these are not numerically significant, hence Uyghur
and Han inevitably are the two reference groups. While the other groups do have a
role in the process of Han-Uyghur interaction and are a constituent part of the broader
context in which such interaction occurs, they do not come to the fore as often.
Indeed, most of the time Uyghurs talk of themselves and the Han in polarised terms,
to the exclusion of all other groups.
Food provides an excellent arena to explore the dynamic and complex nature of
social and cultural interaction in Xinjiang, in this case from an urban Uyghur
perspective. If, on the one hand, a narrative of continuity, tradition, and discrete
identities can be detected in the way Uyghurs talk and write about their food, on the
other hand practices as well as discourses also show the syncretic nature of a culinary
tradition. What we observe at a particular moment in time is in fact a constant process,
where the boundaries of a cuisine are not only permeable but also blurred. Not only is
the core .of what is regarded as traditional Uyghur food the result of a long term
process of borrowings, exchange, adaptation, and reinterpretation, but also many
signature dishes are in fact shared by people who, at this particular moment in time,
belong to different groups. The 'multiple identity' of these dishes can be
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acknowledged - most Uyghurs would declare that Uzbeks are masters (U. usta) in
making polo - or contested - as with naren - depending on the context. Moreover, new
trends (ganpan, so say, dapanji) can be observed on the Uyghur table in the late
1990s. They are the result of recent Han influence and, although these dishes often
figure prominently in urban Uyghurs' diet, they have yet to be fully incorporated into
Uyghur cuisine. The transformation of Han food into Uyghur food involves a degree
of selectivity, negotiation, and manipulation. This process of incorporation, which is
not necessarily conscious, is extremely fascinating, especially when situated in the
context of Han-Uyghur relations and compared to the way in which notions of





2.1. Uyghur identity or oasis identities?
For the last half a century Xinjiang has been basically inaccessible to non-Chinese
scholars and, despite considerable relaxation in the last ten years or so, access to the
area is still restricted.' Nevertheless, since the late 1980s, and particularly since the
mid-1990s, an increasing number of scholars have been carrying out extensive
fieldwork in the region, mostly among the Uyghur. Their work, often focusing on
various aspects of identity, has resulted in a growing number of publications. 2 These
scholars owe an enormous debt not just to explorers such as Sven Hedin, Malov, von
Le Coq, etc., but especially to Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, who was the first outsider
to systematically collect Uyghur ethnographic material. In the new wave of western
interest in Xinjiang, that began in the 1980s, one of the first studies on Uyghur
identity was Rudelson (1997). It was a time when westerners were very optimistic
about being able to analyse complex geographic-ethnic interactions. In the author's
own words, "[t]his book is the result of the first prolonged anthropological field-work
ever conducted in Xinjiang - the first to provide an analysis of ethnic undercurrents
there" (1997:4).3
Rudelson is concerned with the Uyghur intellectual elite's struggle to define their
nationalist ideology. One of the book's central theses is that strong local identities
hinder the shaping of a Uyghur national identity. He sees this strong oasis loyalty as
part of a historical and geographical legacy, especially in as much as the location of an
oasis affects the local population's access to particular cross-border cultural,
economic, and religious influences. Thus Rudelson identifies four main Uyghur sub-
1 One notable exception is the Russian linguist Tenishev, who carried out fieldwork in the region
during the 1950s, at a time when Sino-Soviet relations were still peaceful.
2 Scholars who have carried out prolonged fieldwork in Xinjiang include Ildiko Beller-Hann, Gardner
Bovingdon, Cristina Cesaro, William Clarke, Jay Dautcher, Arienne Dwyer, Chris Hann, Rachel
Harris, Tooru Hayashi, Thomas Hoppe, Nathan Light, Sean Roberts, Justin Rudelson, Joanne Smith,
Stanley Toops. Besides a number of doctoral theses (Rudelson 1992, Light, Clarke 1999, Smith
1999, Dautcher, Bovingdon 2001a, Roberts), published articles on the Uyghur include Beller-Hann
(1997, 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c), Bovingdon (2001b, 2002), Cesar° (2000), Clark
(2001), Gladney (1990, 1996, 1998), Hann (1999), Harris (2002), Roberts (1998a, 1998b), Smith
(2000, forthcoming). With regard to ethnic identity, Hoppe (1998) describes thirteen ethnic groups in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, their cultural differences and their inter ethnic relations. In
particular, a long section of the book is devoted to the Uyghur.
3 The book is based on Rudelson's doctoral thesis Bones in the sand: the struggle to create Uighur
nationalist ideology and ethnic identity in Xinjiang, China (1992). Here I only provide a cursory
treatment of some of the book's main arguments, which are particularly relevant to my discussion.
For a review of the book see Benson (1998).
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regions: the oases of Kashgar in the west, Khotan in the south, Turpan and Qumul
(Hami) in the east, and the Ili (Ghulja) region in the north. 4 The Sino-Soviet split in
the early 1960s, he contends, was crucial in the development of a modern Uyghur
identity, since all cross border communications were closed off thus leaving the
inhabitants of Xinjiang oases completely isolated for the first time in their history.
However, as border ties and trade resumed in the second half of the 1980's, local
oasis identity has become stronger as a result of the outward focus of the oases across
the borders. This, Rudelson argues, is causing a weakening of the overarching
Uyghur identity. In particular, his study points to the process of reification of Uyghur
history and culture and argues that there is a lack of agreement on what the symbols of
such an identity should be.5
Rudelson conducted his last period of fieldwork in 1989-90. Six years later, the
context in which I conducted my own fieldwork was rather different. For the 1990s
witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet Union with the subsequent rise of the
independent Central Asian republics just across the border of Xinjiang, as well as an
increasingly overwhelming Han migration into the region. 6 According to many
Uyghurs, as well as external observers, these are the two major drives that have, in the
late 1990s, fuelled the Uyghur quest for independence. My research findings challenge
a work such as Rudelson's; indeed the opening up of Xinjiang borders has not
resulted in a weakening of Uyghur identity but, on the contrary, it has enhanced
Uyghur people's awareness of their distinctive identity. The independence of the ex-
Soviet Central Asian Republics has stirred the aspiration of many Uyghurs in Xinjiang
4 Cf. Rudelson 1997: 8-9, 24-32, 41-45. According to the author, "insufficient understanding of
Xinjiang geography has clouded modern studies. For the most part, scholars have viewed the region as
a single entity. I argue that Xinjiang is composed of four distinct geographic regions, each influenced
by a different bordering culture." (1997:17). Later he reasserts this concept, stating that the persistence
of distinct oasis identities and strong oasis loyalties "has not been stressed adequately in most studies
of the modern Uyghur", among which he quotes Forbes (Rudelson 1997:45). In fact, in his study of
republican Xinjiang, Forbes argues that before 1949 it is not possible to speak of a single region
since, he contends, enduring local identities split Xinjiang into three regions: north, south, and east
(1986); see also Bovingdon (2001b). Moreover, in Uyghur dialectology we find a long established
tradition of dividing Xinjiang into four distinct regions, as in the work by Tenishev, Malov, and
Osmanov (Arienne Dwyer, personal communication).
5 Cf. Rude!son 1997: 25-26, 40, and Chapter 6.
6 Not only had the Han population in Xinjiang risen by nearly ten percent between 1990 and 1995
(5,746,600 to 6,318,100, an increase of exactly 9.9%), but several thousands of Han migrants - the
so-called floating population (mangliu) - had moved into the region, without their presence being
recorded in the official figures (which also do not include soldiers). During the same period the Uyghur
population had risen by 7.5%. In the previous five years (1985-1990) the Uyghur population had risen
by 15%, while the Han by 7.5%. (Xinjiang... 1996:47). Maugliu literally means "to wander blindly".
This expression has become common in contemporary China to refer to the masses of Chinese
population, usually Han, moving from poorer rural areas to richer urban areas in search for casual
work. This phenomenon of large scale internal migration is a direct consequence of the economic
reforms that begun in the early 1980s. The Chinese government has been trying to contain the afflux
of rural population into the cities. However, in Xinjiang it seems that Han migration is much more
tolerated, if not openly encouraged.
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for a country of their own. Resumed contact with fellow Turkic people, and often with
relatives, across the border has confronted them once again with the realisation that
they do not belong to China and its culture, and that they have more to share with their
neighbours than with their fellow countrymen. In this context, the level of
identification vis-à-vis the Han Chinese, the Uzbek, or the Kazakh, is that of being
Uyghur, as much as Qdshqdrlik, Qumulluq, or Khoteinlik (i.e. oasis identities)?
The second point that I would like to make concerns Rudelson's claim that there
is a lack of shared symbols of Uyghur identity. He argues that, as a result of
competing local identities, Uyghur intellectuals tend to promote their own oasis of
origin and there seems to be no agreement on symbols that could be shared by all
Uyghurs. I will argue, however, that this is not the case. The very fact that there is a
quest for national symbols, however competing these might be, suggests that there is
at least a shared ideal of Uyghur collective identity. In the last section of this chapter I
will look at the consumption at grassroots level of three Uyghur symbols, respectively
a Qumulluq, a Dolanliq, and a Qeishqiirlik, showing that in everyday practice - even
among the urban intellectuals among whom I conducted most of my fieldwork -
symbols of Uyghur identity are shared regardless of their local origin. In other words,
I will show that, from a 'popular consumption' perspective, local identity biases are by
no means competing with an overarching pan-oases Uyghur identity.
Today, `Uyghur' is a category to which people in Xinjiang consistently resort in
order to define a person's identity. Of course, this does not rule out a whole range of
other identities and loyalties. The same person may describe herself as Uyghur, as
well as Muslim, or Turk, or Kashgari. These are not exclusive, but rather
complementary identities. The notion of multiple identities is widely accepted in
current anthropological debate. Gender, religion, ethnicity, class, are only some of the
lines along which such identities can be formed. If we consider identities as relational
and situational, the identity to which people ascribe is clearly dependent on the context
of interaction. For example, in his discussion of Hui, Uyghur, and Kazakh identities
Gladney devises a diagram where different identities, such as Muslim, Turk, Uyghur,
Chinese, etc., coexist in a hierarchy of "relational alterities" (1996:455). That is, each
of these identities is situated at a different level of opposition: e.g. Qdshqiirlik vis-à-
vis Turpanliq, Uyghur vis-à-vis Kazakh, Turkic vis-à-vis non-Turkic, Muslim vis-h-
7 On cross-border Uyghur identity in the post-Soviet era see Sean Roberts' excellent article
Negotiating locality, Islam, and national culture in a changing borderlands: the revival of the
Mashreip ritual among young Uighur men in the Ili valley. With reference to Rudelson's argument that
distinct cultural groups among the Uyghur are becoming increasingly differentiated by the opening up
of border areas, Roberts notes that "the trade opportunities in the borderlands of the XUAR attract
more and more Uighurs from throughout the region, making the borderlands a lightning rod for the
negotiation and reconciliation of various cultural differences" (1998:697).
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vis non-Muslim, etc. This model, based on Evans-Pritchard's notion of hierarchical
segmentary systems (1940), is rather useful in understanding how identities are
constructed and articulated in Xinjiang. However, I would like to stress that these
identities coexist and operate simultaneously, in a non-hierarchical fashion. In short, it
is not a question of Uyghur identity or oasis identities, but rather of Uyghur identity
and oasis identities.
2.2. "Modern" north vs.  "traditional" south
Amangtil, a woman in her thirties, is a teacher of Uyghur and Chinese at the
university. She is originally from Ghulja and, like other "northerners", she looks
down on "southerners", that is, Uyghurs from the Tarim basin. Despite being married
to a man who comes from the south, she is very straightforward and does not miss a
chance to express her belief in northern Uyghurs' superiority and to describe her
husband's relatives as backward and uncivilised. One day I offered her a cup of tea,
apologising because the mug was chipped. For her, that was a pretext to start a
monologue on this subject. "Don't worry about it. But you know, in Ghulja when a
mug or a plate is chipped we replace it with a new one as soon as possible. In southern
Xinjiang they just don't care. They don't care about cleanliness at all. In fact, they are
quite dirty. Women there only care about clothes and make-up. Their husbands earn,
and they spend. Once I went to Kashgar and people were astonished that I, a
university teacher in the capital, wore such ordinary clothes ...".
During my fieldwork, more than by local oasis loyalties I was struck, rather, by
a north-south divide, which can be further simplified in terms of Ghulja vs. Kashgar.
Perhaps because it echoed a very familiar situation, that is north vs. south in Italy,
where the stereotypes that are involved are surprisingly similar. The north is
developed, educated, hardworking, open-minded, sophisticated, while the south is
backward, ignorant, uneducated, lazy, narrow-minded, naive. Clearly, not every
Ghulfiliq (a person from Ghulja) would share such strong stereotypes. However,
regardless of a person's origin, I found a fairly general agreement that the north is
more developed and sophisticated - possibly as a result of Russian influence - while
the south is backward and `traditional'. 8 At the same time, though, every Uyghur I
have met would point at the south, epitomised by Kashgar, as the place to look for
'pure' and 'authentic' Uyghur culture, on the grounds that northern and eastern oases,
8 Standard Uyghur, the language taught in schools and used by the media, is based on Ghulja and
Ortimchi dialect, that is a northern dialect. I wonder to what extent this contributed to create and
reinforce the image of the north as more "civilised".
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such as Ghulja, Turpan, or Qumul, have been corrupted by continued 'foreign'
influence, namely Russian and Chinese. These considerations, while adding to the
complexity of loyalties and identities in Xinjiang and among the Uyghurs, at the same
time also support the argument that there exist a shared notion of what being Uyghur
means, however differently one might relate to it.
The theme of the south as backward and authentic recurred in many of the
conversations I had while in Ortimchi, often in a context that could be traced back to a
tradition-vs.-modernity discourse.
Today the Uyghur don't have a culture [Ch.wenhua] anymore. Five hundred
years ago Uyghur culture was very advanced [fada]. Then, from the 17th-18th
centuries onward the Han came and the decline started. Before, our civilisation
[wenhua] was even more advanced than the Han because we had intensive
contacts with the West and we received all innovation first ... Now, I have
been to Turkey, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and "in the mouth" [kouli, i.e. China
proper], and I've seen that all these people have a much more developed
culture than the Uyghur. Uyghurs are backward Vuohoul, as you will see when
you go to Khotan, or Kashgar, in short to southern Xinjiang. ... Anyway, I'm
very pleased that abroad there are people interested in the Uyghur. But listen,
if you want to find pure [chun, Uy. sap] Uyghurs you must go to southern
Xinjiang, to places like Khotan, Kashgar, Kucha... Although I'm from Kucha,
I'm not a genuine Uyghur because I have travelled, I've studied in Beijing, and
I've been influenced by these places.
Eli, a Uyghur doctor in his thirties, shared these thoughts with me one night, while
sipping a soft drink in a restaurant just outside Oriimchi's main hospital, where he
worked. I had met him in a restaurant shortly after my arrival in Oriimchi. At that time
I was staying at Xinjiang Normal University, located in the northern part of town,
within walking distance of the Medical College and the annexed hospital. This was a
predominantly Han area, except for a cluster of Uyghur restaurants which catered to all
the Uyghurs related to these work units (patients, visitors, staff, students). From a
socio-economic point of view, Eli was a rather successful Uyghur; he was perfectly
bilingual and made good money working also in a private clinic. We met several times,
either in his clinic or for a meal. At first I was a bit puzzled and wondered what his
motives might have been: while, on the one hand, he declared from the beginning that
his marriage was unhappy, at the same time he was clearly interested in discussing
"politics" with me. For some time I was totally paranoid and thought he was a spy.
However, with time I began to appreciate the perceptiveness of his analyses, especially
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when compared to the emotional outburst which typically accompanied any discussion
of these issues with my younger Uyghur friends. Later that same night, once we had
moved from the restaurant to his office, Eli lucidly analysed the Uyghur situation:
The Uyghur are disadvantaged vis-à-vis the Han, first and foremost from a
linguistic point of view. This is a fact, and I can only see two options: either the
Uyghur should reject their culture and assimilate to the Han, or they should
try to be independent. However, I believe the latter option is hopeless. Most
Uyghurs are unwilling to receive the culture of the Han, their language and
their habits. But, on the other hand, in the present context they cannot express
their own culture either. When I was a child I refused to learn Chinese, but
when I went to university in Beijing I had no choice but learn it. I had to study
Chinese for two years before I could start my degree. In this way I was twice
disadvantaged: I stayed two years behind, during which I forgot most of what I
had studied that far, and, despite all my efforts, I was still disadvantaged
vis-à-vis my class-mates, who were all Han, because I was studying in a foreign
language. As a result, once I graduated I wasn't able to get a job in Beijing. On
the other hand, the Uyghur language lacks specialised jargon, so I often find it
very difficult to communicate with my Uyghur patients. I could give you lots of
examples. For instance, yesterday I was in an examination panel and we had to
examine a Uyghur candidate. I let him speak in Uyghur, since he wasn't very
confident about his Chinese. The other examiner, who was Han, went mad and
protested that it was not fair, that everyone should have equal treatment ...
Now many Uyghurs are beginning to realise how useful Chinese is, and more
and more begin to study it. But the point is that, one way or another, whether
they speak Uyghur or Chinese, the Uyghur cannot fully express themselves.
Ninety percent of Oriimchi's residents are Han. I'm talking about the resident
population: you see all those Uyghurs in Erdaoqiao, but nine out of ten are not
residents, they come from other towns. Take my work unit, out of fifty people
only five are minzu [minorities], all the others are Han. In some work units they
are all Han.... In my opinion, though, there is no point in fighting. It would be
much better if some Uyghtu• went abroad and studied politics. Then they could
come back and face the situation with their brains instead of using arms. But
that's not easy either. A friend of mine, who is a writer, was arrested and kept
for twenty days, apparently for no reason, nor was he given any explanation.
Once he was released, he decided that he didn't want to live here any longer
and that he wanted to go abroad. He was about to go to Beijing to study English,
68
but his work unit did not allow him to go: orders from the Police, no
explanation.
This long monologue exemplifies with rare clarity the dilemma that many Uyghurs,
particularly the intellectuals, are facing: to "stay" Uyghur, whatever that might cost, or
to assimilate to the Chinese? This dilemma is evidently borne from a definite and
shared notion of a Uyghur overarching identity; furthermore it reveals the strength of
such an identification. Although Eli wishes a political and peaceful solution to the
current situation, this sounds more like an utopia. For the Uyghur, he seems to see no
alternative to assimilation to the Han, given that independence is not a viable solution.
Moreover, from the very beginning, Eli introduces the theme of modernity vs.
'tradition: the south is authentic and traditional, but backward. It should be stressed
how here he is reproducing Chinese modernising discourse, using the vocabulary of
backwardness commonly referred to rural and remote China. What is striking is that
while today, for him, contact and contamination with other cultures seem to inevitably
imply a loss of identity, at the same time, when projected in the past, contact is a value
in that it is a source of advancement which, at least retrospectively, reinforces Uyghur
identity as distinct from the Chinese.
On another occasion, Eli went back to these same themes. First, though, he
stressed the difference in relating to the Han either as a group or as individuals. While,
from his point of view, i friendly relationship between the Han and the Uyghur as
peoples was inconceivable, individual relationships were something else and for him it
was perfectly normal to have Han friends. 9 "The problem is that most Uyghurs,
especially in rural areas, are backward and ignorant. I can see two reasons for this: the
first is that they identify "progress" with the Han and therefore have an attitude of
refusal; the second is that the schooling/education rate is very low. I think that's
because once they have a degree they can't find a qualified job, so what's the point?
For most people studying is a waste of time, better start working as soon as possible
and earn a living." Clearly, this is the point of view of an urban intellectual, even if
with rural roots. Hence we should not take these statements at face value, but rather as
the expression of a Uyghur urban intellectual's views and attitudes. Then he suddenly
asked: "Can you see any solution for the Uyghur of Xinjiang?" "Well, that's not an
easy question ... - I said, desperately racking my brains to find the 'right' thing to say
- anyway, I think you have to live with the Han: there's too many of them, and some
have lived here for generations, you can't just kick them out!" He agreed "Too right ...
9 It should be stressed that Eli studied in Beijing. Most Uyghurs who have met Han from China
proper have noticed not only how different their attitudes are from the Han in Xinjiang, but more
importantly how different "inter-ethnic" relations are outside the Xinjiang context.
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as I've said before, there seems to be only one alternative to assimilation, and that's
independence. But I wish we could find a political and peaceful solution, something
like real autonomy rather than independence."
In fact, I suggest that there can be a less drastic solution to this dilemma - where
the two alternatives are: either fight a hopeless battle to stay 'uncontaminated' as
Uyghur, or assimilate. However, in both these cases they would disappear. As we
shall see in the second part of this thesis, a possible answer comes from the domain of
food, where Han "contamination" does not seem to jeopardise "Uyghumess", and
where we find adoption without assimilation. But now, let us consider one theme,
which recurs more or less explicitly through most of my conversations with Eli, and
which is particularly relevant within the scope of our discussion. This is the role of
education.
2.3. Tradition, modernity, and the role of education in the shaping of
modern Uyghur identity
We have seen how a tension between modernity and tradition emerges from the north
vs. south 'rivalry'. The north, where Uyghur settlement is relatively recent, is
perceived as advanced and modem while the south, where authentic Uyghurs are said
to be found, is backward and traditional. While, in fact, this is not a real rivalry, the
terms in which it is framed hide, or perhaps reveal, a discourse on Uyghur identity.
Somehow, the real issue here is what the project, or the agenda, for Uyghur identity
should be: to preserve Uyghur tradition but stay backward, or to modernise but lose
authenticity? In other words, which simplified model should prevail, the modem north
or the traditional south?
As already discussed in chapter 1, the pair modernity/tradition does not need to
be such an irreconcilable dichotomy, in the sense that one of the terms does not need to
exclude the other. However, any discourse on these two values - it is important to
stress that we are talking about values, not about some sort of 'objective' traits - is
usually framed in exclusive terms (either/or). Hence tradition is easily conflated with
being backward, undeveloped, and static, thus obliterating the dynamic dimension,
which in fact can be an equally important aspect of tradition. Indeed, tradition could as
well be seen as a strategy to allow change without disruption. However, if tradition
and modernity appear as two exclusive values when inscribed within the relationship
to the Chinese state and within its discourse on the Uyghur (and on minorities in
general), this is not the case when looking at daily practice. In everyday life, tradition -
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as the preservation of a distinctive identity, shared symbols, etc. - and modernity - as
change, coming to terms with the 'outside' world, technology, etc.- do coexist and
indeed go hand in hand. This should become clear in the last section, in particular
when discussing personalities like Abdurehim Otkiir, or Abdulla.
In order to better understand the intellectuals' paradox, it is necessary to
consider the role of (secular) education in the shaping of modern Uyghur identity.
Despite some notable attempts at reform carried out by members of the elite in the early
twentieth century, prior to 1949 education among the Uyghur was substantially
provided at the local level by the Muslim clergy, in the maktelp and the meidreisli.
This situation dramatically changed with the Communist take-over, when secular mass
education became the norm (Beller-Hann 2000:42-73). For the Communist leaders,
centralised education was a privileged means to integrate Xinjiang into the People's
Republic of China. However, I would argue that it also had the unintended
consequence of promoting, or at least creating the conditions for the consolidation of a
Uyghur 'national' unitary consciousness. If, on the one hand, state education was a
powerful vehicle to promote and implement the Communist "civilising project"
(Harrell 1995) - among other things by providing the 'form and content' that Uyghur
identity should have - on the other hand, such discourse was unquestionably based on
the assumption that there was and there had always been a people called the Uyghur.
However unintentionally, centralised secular education not only contributed to, if not
determined, the creation of a Uyghur "imagined community", but more specifically, it
also produced an educated elite that shared the same "context-free language" (Gellner
1983:19-38). These secular intellectuals have become engaged in a process of
definition and negotiation of Uyghur identity, and have been claiming a role as leading
actors in such a process.
Bovingdon (2001b) has indeed stressed the role of the "educational pilgrimage",
as described by Benedict Anderson (1991), in the awakening of modem Uyghur
identity. According to Bovingdon, "Uyghur nationalism as an idea has been present
for decades. What is at issue here is the diffusion of nationalist ideas among a broad
segment of the population, and the spreading recognition that Uyghurs all over
Xinjiang confront similar problems" (2001b:10). 10 Indeed, centralised education also
implied a sort of geographical hierarchy, whereby the higher students went in the
system, the closer they drew to the centres of power, thus participating in a community
of fellow:students, regardless of their origin. By the mid-1990s the number of non-
10 In this article Bovingdon provides a lengthy and well documented discussion of education in
Xinjiang and its role in the shaping of a pan-Uyghur identity. Beller-Hann too gives a very detailed
account of education among the Uyghur, both before and after 1949, in her monograph The Written
and the Spoken. Literacy and Oral Transmission Among the Uyghur (2000).
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Han students (mostly Uyghur) in higher education had massively increased,
accounting for nearly half of the total student population in Xinjiang. As Bovingdon
put it, "a large and growing cohort was now coming together at the apex of the
educational pilgrimage" (2001b: 13).
If we take into account the role that central secular education, and the
"educational pilgrimage" that it implied, played in the shaping of modem Uyghur
identity, then it is easier to understand the intellectuals' paradox. Especially when
considering that after 1949 the (Han) Chinese Communist state has had the monopoly
of secular education - and in fact, it has the monopoly of 'legal' religious education
.too, through the Islamic Institutes. Through secular education intellectuals have
recognised their belonging to the Uyghur "community" and have participated in the
definition of a pan-Uyghur identity, thus finding themselves at the vanguard of
differentiation. Yet they have equally been the most exposed to assimilation by the Han
state. The tension between the two values of tradition and modernity, which emerges
forcefully in conversations I had with college-educated Uyghurs like Eli, can be read
as an expression, or a variation, of this paradox.
In short, my fieldwork data suggest that among Uyghur urban intellectuals there
is a shared notion of Uyghur collective identity, which is not at all challenged, but
rather complemented, by local loyalties. As we have seen, the role of secular education
in the shaping of modem Uyghur identity has been very important. Indeed, today such
collective identity is so strongly felt and, because of the current political context,
sometimes repressed, that individuals and events may act as catalysts for its
expression. Below I will propose three such instances. Drawing from very different
domains, such as literature, pop music/culture, and sport, we shall look at how such
notion of an over-arching Uyghur identity is performed and negotiated in the daily
consumption of shared Uyghur symbols.
2.4. Three Uyghur 'heroes'
Prologue
Midday in Oriimchi. I'm sitting with Nurqiz in front of two steaming bowls of
chOchilrii, a soup of small meat dumplings which, to me, look remarkably similar to
tortellini. My friend Nurqiz has taken me to this ashkhana (small restaurant) in the
Uyghur district of Erdaoqiao. It is famous for serving the best chOchilra in town, and
she knows this is one of my favourite dishes. As I lift my head from my empty bowl,
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Nurqiz points at the poster hanging on the wall above our table. It is the same poster
she has just bought for me in the local Xinhua bookstore; the same poster one finds in
most Uyghur ashkhana, along with pictures of alpine landscapes and breakfast tables.
But, unlike the latter, this poster is not merely a touch of interior design. On the
contrary, the poem in Uyghur that it reproduces - /z by Abdurehim Otkiir - has a
profound meaning for the beholder.
/z (Trace)
When we started this long journey we were young;
now look at our grand-children, they are old enough to ride.
When we left for this difficult journey we were few;
now we have left a trace in the desert and have become a big caravan.
A trace was left between deserts, sometimes even on the hills;
so many brave men lie without a grave in the desert.
Do not say they lie without a grave, in the open country where willows turn red
our graves will be covered with flowers in the early spring.
A trace is left, a destination is left, everything is left far from us;
the wind may blow, the sand may shift, but our traces will never be covered.
Though the horses are exhausted the caravan will not come to a halt,
until one day our grand-children or great-grand-children will find this trace.11
Abdurehim Otkiir
Abdurehim OtIctir has been one of the most prominent contemporary Uyghur
intellectuals and today he is considered a sort of literary father of the nation. 12 A poet
and a writer, he was born in Qumul in 1923. In 1985 he published /z (Traces), a
historical novel which, as Abdurehim explains in the introduction, is his tribute to
TOmtir Halpa, leader of a rebellion in Qumul at the beginning of this century. This
novel, he writes, should be "a mausoleum of white paper and black ink that could
endure any storm and would be passed on from generation to generation. ... Ttimtir
11 Otktir (1996a:1); my translation.
12 See also Bovingdon (2001b). Rudelson too provides a profile of Abdurehim Otkiir, where he
describes him as "One of the most respected of recent Uyghur nationalist intellectuals" (1997:163). I
suggest that the fact that we all mention Abdurehim Otictir when discussing Uyghur identity, far from
being a coincidence, proves that he is a cultural icon among the Uyghur. In other words, OtIctir is a
Uyghur 'hero', one of those symbols shared by all Uyghurs, regardless of their oasis of origin.
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MO [is] a heroic personage in the bloody pages of recent Uyghur history. ... This
book at least will start bringing to light the traces left by our heroes." (OtIctir 1996a:5-
7) The introduction to iz opens with a quotation from the Compendium of the Turkic
Dialects by Mdhmut Qashqiri (Mahmud Kashgari) - "Trace: shows that someone has
passed" - followed by the poem translated above. In short, the significance of such a
title could hardly be missed.13
After Iz, Abdurehim Otkiir published a novel in two volumes with an equally
evocative title, Oyghanghan zemin (Awakened Land). He had planned to write a third
volume but, as he explains at the end of the second volume, he did not have the
opportunity to do so. 14 It was probably ill health that prevented him from completing
his work, as he died of cancer in 1995. However, in the late 1990s the political
atmosphere in Xinjiang was so charged that I have heard many Uyghurs suggest that
his work might have been censored. In their opinion, the obviously evocative and
allegorical nature of his writing, as well as his increasing popularity, had alerted the
authorities to its subversive potential.
According to PRC orthodox historiography, TOnnir fla'pa is an approved
'Chinese national hero', a revolutionary who acted in the wake of the Xinhai
revolution, to fight the feudal regime with the support of the peoples of all
nationalities. 15 This makes /z a 'politically correct' novel. Nevertheless it is difficult
not to read between the lines and to recognise its subversive potential. Today many
Uyghurs, especially among intellectuals, are struggling to overcome their sense of
helplessness and to envisage a viable and positive future for their people, on their own
terms. It is not hard to imagine the effect that a poem like /z has on these people, to
envision what feelings and emotions are stirred when they read it. However beautifully
Abdurehim Otictir may write, it is clear that his popularity is not only due to his artistic
talent: his work represents an empowered image of Uyghur identity. When he died in
eriimchi in 1995, his funeral was attended by a huge crowd. The square in front of
the main Uyghur mosque was packed with people mourning the death of a Tyghur
hero'. They carried his bier all the way to the graveyard, an honour reserved for few
other people since 1949.16
13 About lz Sultan says: "/z deals with the political and historical events that took place in Eastern
Turkestan, mostly in Komul, between 1912 and 1944. The heroes of the novel are Ttimtir Helfe
Amatikul and Hoja Niaz Haji. Yang Tseng-hsin and Nezer Veng are the representatives of the forces of
evil and oppression. Tiimtir Helfe is a historical personality who defeated the joint forces of the
Chinese government and Kumul principality and is one of the genuine heroes of the Uighur historical
scene who gave the Uighur people courage and national consciousness" (Sultan 1993:582).
14 The full title is "Awakened land. Historical novel in three parts" (Otkiir 1996b, 1996c).
15 The Xinhai revolution overthrew the Qing empire and established the republic in 1911.
16 An amateur video was shot on the occasion, showing the funeral, and the celebrations (nlizir) on
the third and the seventh day after his death. On Abdurehim Otktir's funeral see also Bovingdon
(2001b:8).
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While being an intellectual, Abdurehim Otkiir has also been fully incorporated
into popular culture, through a process that clearly cuts across local boundaries and is
the expression of a sense of Uyghur unity. "Our master died, the world died ... the
land is mourning ..." goes a famous song that Omarjan, probably the most popular
singer in the traditional style and himself a Ghuljiliq (from Ghulja), dedicated to
Abdurehim Otidir. 17 Dilnur, a Khotanlik in her forties and a teacher at the university,
played this song once. As she was going through the lyrics for me, she nearly had
tears in her eyes. The content of the song, as well as her quasi-religious attitude, was
striking against the very poor quality of both the tape and the tape recorder, which
nevertheless seemed to be an essential characteristic of Uyghur popular music. 18 Some
of Abdurehim ()tidies most famous poems have been turned into posters and are sold
in bookshops. Predictably, the most popular is /z: one can find a copy of it hanging on
the walls of Uyghur restaurants all over Xinjiang (photo 3), as a reminder to the
Uyghur people that they are not finished, and as an encouragement to go ahead.
Abdulla
Within the field of popular culture, Abdulla is a rather different kind of Tyghur hero'.
Unlike Abdurehim Otkiir, he has not undergone the same process of canonisation,
perhaps because he is still hale and hearty. Probably most people in Xinjiang would
not consciously describe him as a Uyghur symbol, though he is effectively acting as
such. As with Abdurehim Oticiir and Adiljan, whom I will discuss later, the
consumption of Abdulla as a symbol functions as an 'emotional surrogate' for the
expression of an unauthorised Uyghur sense of belonging, one that cannot be
explicitly articulated, especially within the political arena.
Abdulla is a Dolanliq in his thirties. 19 While having a permanent job at the
Xinjiang Song and Dance Troupe in thiiinchi, he has also been on the scene of
17 This song, "Qaldi iz"("A trace is left", quoting the poem lz by Abdurehim Otkiir), is part of a tape
by the same title, published by the Minorities Press. The tape also contains a number of other songs
quoting Abdurehim Otktir's most famous poems. On Omarjan and the Uyghur music industry see
Harris (2002).
18 Low quality cassettes and sound systems are a feature of Uyghur popular music, to the extent that
the hiss of the cassette becomes an essential part of the sound (Harris 2002).
19 Although the Dolan are likely Mongol in origin (see 1.2. on the Uyghur), according to a Uyghur
linguist at Xinjiang University, the Uyghur do not consider the Dolan as a separate ethnic group, or a
Uyghur sub-group. In fact they never talk of a person as a Dolan but rather as a Dolanliq ("Dolaner"),
that is, someone from the Dolan region. This roughly covers the area of the Tarim river, from Shayar
to Mekit. Nowadays, Dolan is commonly used as an adjective to refer to a music or dance style
(Dolan mdshripi, Dolan usuli, Dolan mugam). Very rarely people from that area may be referred to as
Dolanliqlar or Dolan Uyghurliri. Indeed, when I asked Abdulla's brother about the Mongol origin of
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Uyghur pop music, and entertainment in general, for quite a few years.20 His
popularity probably started in the early 1990s, and increased remarkably during the
period I spent in Xinjiang. He is well known by the Uyghur-speaking public not only
as a singer but also as an actor of episod (comic sketches), and as a promoter for a
brand of tea, smiling at people from shop-windows with a steaming cup of tea in his
hand.
His fame as an actor was mainly associated with an episod called Ana til
(Mother Tongue) in which he plays the part of a minkaohan (a Uyghur who studied in
Han schools) who meets his prospective fiancée, a 'Soviet' Uyghur girl (from ex-
Soviet Central Asia, typically Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan). The attempted conversation
between the two has an hilarious effect, since both of them are basically unable to
speak Uyghur and keep slipping into Chinese and Russian respectively. Apart from
Abdulla's and his partner's wonderful performance, the success of Ana til is due to
the fact that it deals with one of the most controversial issues among the Uyghur - at
least among Uyghurs in Ortimchi - that is, assimilation through education. Like many
other peoples who have a minority status, the dilemma they are facing is whether a
certain degree of assimilation, instrumental to 'success' if not survival, is compatible
with the preservation of Uyghur language and culture. In other words, Ana til
encapsulates, not without a good dose of healthy irony, important aspects of what we
have called the intellectuals' paradox.
In early 1996 Abdulla joined the Taklamakan, a newly formed rock band which
featured some of the best Uyghur Pop musicians of those years, and they began
working on a tape. In the summer a promotional tour of the band throughout Xinjiang
was hindered on the grounds of bureaucratic quibbles: the band could go but Abdulla
had to stay in Oriimchi. The tour was cancelled. Nevertheless, Abdulla started
performing the new album in live shows that took place in the early autumn in
Ortimchi universities. The tape - Silkiitaki sada (Sound in the silence) - was finally
released in December and was a great success. For the following eight months (until I
left Xinjiang in September 1997) one could hardly hear anything else being played in
restaurants, taxis, buses, hotels, and at weddings. On campus, groups of Uyghur
students played Abdulla's songs on their guitars.
Although Abdulla is most popular among urban Uyghur youth, his success also
cuts across age and gender, as well as locality boundaries; for instance, I found that he
was very popular also in Kashgar and IChotan. I believe that the reason lies not only in
his voice and in marketing strategies, and that the political dimension in his activities
the Dolan he was rather defensive, if not annoyed, and insisted that the Dolan are just Uyghur, like
every other Uyghur.
20 On Abdulla see also Harris (2002).
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also plays an important role. He is a perfect combination of entertainment and
engagement, modernity and tradition. Shiikiir didim, one of the songs in Siiklitaki
sada which was reportedly written by Abdulla's younger brother, has surprisingly
survived the censorship scrutiny. The main message is "no matter what awful things
they do to me, I'm content (Shiikiir didim)"; the reference to the political and social
situation in Xinjiang is more than obvious to anyone who lives or has lived there. The
tape cover itself represents the various components of Abdulla's success: religion,
technology, modernity, and tradition, as well as a strong evocative element. It features
a photo of Abdulla in a suit against the background of a rosy dawn - the very same
dawn that appears on the cover of Abdurehim Otkiir's Oyghanghan zemin - along with
a photo of the band - portraying five trendy young Uyghur men with their equipment
(drums, amplifier, electric guitar, etc.) - next to a rather surreal photomontage showing
Abdulla again in a suit, kneeling before an immortal (khezir) against the background
of two monumental tombs in a desert landscape (photo 4). The 'Abdulla phenomenon'
can thus be seen as an attempt to envisage a solution to many Uyghurs' dilemma, by
promoting an idea of Uyghur culture that combines 'modernity' with 'tradition', as
opposed to the dominant discourse which tends to equate 'modernity' exclusively to
the Han, and hence to assimilation. Thus his success is also due to the fact that he
touches upon crucial issues that are a shared concern for most Uyghurs in
contemporary Xinjiang. In this sense, he can be seen as a symbol of Uyghur collective
identity, or rather, as a symbol around which this identity coalesces.
Adiljan
With a very different history, Adiljan (Adil Hoshur) has been similarly consumed in
popular culture as a Uyghur symbol - regardless of his Kashgari origin. The first time
I heard of Adiljan was in early April 1997. I had been invited for lunch at a friend's
house and my host, being a sporting man, spent most of the time talking about sports.
Football was of course one of the favourite topics, a common affliction for an Italian
abroad, especially in China. The most interesting aspect of the conversation, for me,
was the often heard argument that Uyghurs are better sportsmen than the Han Chinese,
and yet they are usually excluded from the national teams. "There is no Uyghur player
in the Chinese football team ... and what about basketball? The best player in the
Chinese team is a Uyghur, but they didn't allow him to go to Atlanta last year. They
were immediately disqualified, it serves them right!" 21 Towards the end of the meal he
21 The 1996 Olympic games were held in Atlanta.
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Anticlockwise from top right:
Photo 1 - Cover of the book Asman padishahi, by
Arkin Rozi.
Photo 2 - Cover of the magazine Tarim ghunchiliri
featuring Adiljan in triumph.
Photo 3 - Poster reproducing the poem /z by
Abdurehim Otkiir on the wall of a Uyghur restaurant.
Photo 4- Cover of the tape Siikiittiki sada by Abdulla.
Photo 5- "Eight days left." Huadu department store,
Photo 6- "Welcome the return of Hong Kong to the
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Photo 7- "The child is coming home!" Billboard at
Xinjiang University (Biology Dept.).
Xianggang huigui (The return of Hong Kong)
Photo 8 (tight) - "Wash a hundred years of national
humiliation, welcome the return of Hong Kong."
eventually moved on from football and basketball: "You absolutely must not miss the
event of the year. On June 22 Adiljan darwaz (the `tightroper') will cross the Yangtze
river at the Three Gorges and will break the time world record. 22 He will also perform
some acrobatics while on the rope. Before him, a Canadian had crossed the Three
Gorges, but without any acrobatics. Apparently, the rope has to be delivered from
abroad since there isn't such a long one in China."
As June was getting closer, more and more Uyghurs started talking about
Adiljan. However, by that time the big issue inevitably was the "return of Hong
Kong" (Xianggang huigui, in Chinese), due on July 1. One could not possibly spend
an hour without being reminded how many days were left until the day when "a
hundred years of national humiliation would be washed white", as one of the slogans
created for the occasion put it. Adiljan could not compete with the Hong Kong hand-
over, and he was basically ignored by media and propaganda coverage. His
undertaking was a topic confined to Uyghur informal circles. I did not pay too much
attention to it myself, as I was bombarded with all the brainwashing slogans about "the
return of the child to the motherland" and "the indivisibility of the nation" (photos 5-
8). Only once did it cross my mind that these two events might be seen as somewhat
related.
On June 24, in the late morning, I was on a bus driving along the main road in
the Uyghur part of town. We had almost reached the end of that road when the bus
stopped, it looked as if we were caught in a traffic jam. After a while we saw a crowd
of children coming on the other lane in the opposite direction. At first I thought it was
a demonstration, because they were all shouting. As they got closer I realised they
were all Uyghur children. A Han in the bus cheered and said "The return of Hong
Kong!". When they passed next to us it became clear that it was a spontaneous rally.
Behind the swarm of children there were some men, in the middle of which a young
man was being carried on their shoulders in triumph. He was wearing a badam doppa
(a Uyghur skull cap) and a red silk shirt. The procession, of about a hundred people,
passed us very quickly and the traffic started moving again. Nobody on the bus
seemed to know what was going on. Later, Nurqiz told me that it was Adiljan. A few
days earlier he had crossed the Three Gorges walking on a tightrope in 13 minutes and
48 seconds and had entered the Guinness Book of Records. He had also performed
some acrobatics such as lying on the rope or suddenly falling seated on it, in order to
create a suspense effect. Unfortunately there was no live television coverage, so
22 In recent years the Three Gorges have often made the news, both in China and abroad, in
connection with the construction of a dam. The dam has now been completed, making any attempt to
break Adiljan's record impossible.
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Nurqiz and her family had followed the event on the radio. She said they were so
moved that they had had to cry.
That same morning, not far from this joyous rally, nine Uyghurs were being
taken to be executed. A friend who was waiting for me by one of the biggest shopping
centres had seen a very different kind of procession passing by. Six or seven police
cars followed by three open trucks and another three or four cars. In the back of each
truck there were three prisoners, kneeling, with their hands tied behind their back, a
soldier standing by each of them, pointing a gun at their heads. They were going
north. After parading the prisoners along the high street, the procession would have
turned west towards Xishan, one of the execution camps just outside Oriimchi.
According to rumours (the only available source of information in these cases), they
were being executed as political criminals.
All this was happening in the asphyxiating atmosphere of the 'Hong-Kong-
return fever'. That day, I could not help juxtaposing the triumph of Adiljan to the
execution of nine Uyghurs, and then this to the celebrations, slogans, and films to
welcome Hong Kong. In fact, given the climate of conspiracy theories and generalised
paranoia, it was tempting to speculate that there was a connection, if not a design: to
allow Uyghur passions and emotions to concentrate on Adiljan's undertaking, as a
way of depoliticising Uyghur identity; 23 to discourage any political and rebellious
action by displaying the strength and the power of the state on individuals' lives; and,
finally, to focus everybody's attention on Hong Kong so as to reinforce patriotism, as
well as Chinese nationalism. In such a hypothetical design, though, Uyghurs were
denied any agency.
After a year of escalating violence in Xinjiang, to which the government had
responded with even tighter control and repression, it was difficult not to speculate that
there might have been such a plan on the part of the Chinese authorities. Indeed,
everybody was making a more or less explicit connection between the Hong Kong
hand-over and Xinjiang/East Turkestan independence. I have heard many Uyghurs say
"The day Hong Kong returns, Xinjiang becomes independent". In fact, it was not so
unlikely that some terrorist action was being planned for that occasion. This is
certainly what the Chinese authorities were fearing, and what they were trying to
prevent by all means necessary, from hammering out propaganda on the unity of all
nationalities and the indivisibility of the country, to a massive display of armed
forces.24
23 Hann (1991) on ethnic games in Xinjiang suggests that sport can be a way to depoliticise ethnic
identities.
24 As discussed in Chapter 1, the year 1997 had started with episodes of violence throughout the
region. As to the connection made between the Hong Kong hand-over and Xinjiang independence, the
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However, Adiljan's undertaking was used by the Uyghur in a rather different
way, that is, to state and reinforce their unity, their sense of belonging to the Uyghur
people. The comments I gathered during the following days pointed in this direction.
Bahargiil was indignant: "The Chinese refuse to believe that he really did it!". For
most people this had been an entirely Uyghur matter, and Adiljan had had no support
whatsoever from the state. According to many Uyghur accounts, his undertaking was
made possible thanks to a collection of 150,000 yuan among the Uyghur people; the
rope alone had cost 50,000 yuan. On the other hand, they said, once he had succeeded
and had entered the Guinness Book of Records, the government gave him 100,000
yuan and tried to appropriate his undertaking. In other words, in the end he had done it
as a Chinese citizen, not as a Uyghur. But it did not work, at least not at a grass-roots
level. The Chinese did not believe it or they simply did not care, if they knew at all,
while the Uyghur turned him into their hero.
In the following weeks, this process became more and more evident and the
photo of Adiljan in triumph, with his red shirt and badam doppa, began to appear
everywhere in the Uyghur part of town, from the shop windows to the cover of
magazines in Uyghur language. In one of these magazines he was described as "king
of the Uyghur" (Uyghur padishah0, 25 and by the end of July a book dedicated to the
"king of the sky" (asman padishahi)had already come out (Rozi 1997; photos 1-2). A
couple of weeks later I bought a pop music tape, Teingritagh biirkiiti (The eagle of
Tianshan), featuring Adiljan on the cover and entirely dedicated to him. No doubt its
symbolic value was far greater than its artistic value!
bottom line of the argument was: like Hong Kong is being returned to those to whom it belongs, so
should Xinjiang be returned to the Uyghur. The oddest occasion on which I witnessed such a
' connection being made was on 8 May 1997 when, while wondering in Kashgar's old bazar, I had a
very strange encounter. A Uyghur woman, roughly in her late forties, approached me with suspicious
manners; she pulled out a pen and started scribbling something on a small notebook. She then tore the
page and gave it to me, while muttering something concerning the Hong Kong hand-over and
Xinjiang independence. Before I could ask any question, she left still muttering to herself. With the
help of a Uyghur friend, I managed to decipher her note: "Concerning Allah. Bismillahi reikhman
reiyim. Salam to the kings of the whole world Xinjiang will be independent on June 1 Hong Kong
will not leave [2 illegible words] I am collecting safflower and hemp". Despite the apparent nonsense,
in fact it made almost perfect sense to those I showed the note who, clearly, shared at least some
sympathy for such an argument.
25 Tarim ghunchiliri 1997-yil 8-san (The Young Flowers of Tarim), Ortimchi Shinjang yashlar-
Osmtirlar nashriyati, 25 July 1997. p.8.
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CHAPTER 3
BEING UYGHUR IN UROMCHI
3.1. Uriimchi: from beautiful grassland to modern city
The road was now excellent and we could see on a hill in the distance the twin
pagodas which are the famous landmark of the city. Soon the low walls Were in
sight and we could see the people crowding out to meet us. After 36 days of travel I
was now in the heart of Sinkiang, my journey was now at an end. Here before me lay
the mysterious city of Urumchi. It had, I was aware, a dark history, but I was full
of hope ...
The walls of Tihwa make a circuit of eleven /i, that is, rather less than four miles.
There are seven gates in all, two facing each point of the compass except the north,
on which side there is only one. These gates are narrow and rounded, admitting only
one stream of traffic. The wall is about fifteen feet in height and is of baked clay,
reinforced by stone. In colour it is a dull ochre, a drabness which blends with the
surroundings. Nevertheless, the provincial capital is far from drab; the Urumchi
river gives fertility to the soil, and in summer the green of the trees delights the
eye. From the pagoda of the Red Temple, situated upon a windy eminence to the
north of the city, the course of the river can be seen, bridged at this point by the
rough highway to Tacheng along which we entered. To the south-west lie the Tien-
shan or Celestial Mountains, whose peaks when I first beheld them were white
with snow. Through a pass to the south runs the road to Turfan; eastwards the great
range continues, rising in height, to culminate in Bogdo Ula, the Holy Mountain,
black crags surmounted by three sharp summits, frowning upon the peaceful city.
Northward lie the great plains, where the meandering river loses itself first in
marshland and then in barren sands. This region is the vast Dzungarian steppe,
where between marsh and desert are herded the huge flocks which supply the
wants of the capital.
Fully one third of Tihwa lies outside the walls. Entering from the north the
traveller first passes into the Chinese city; then comes the Moslem city, still
within the walls; lastly, on the far side, lies the nan Kuan, the 'southern suburb',
where the Russian merchants dwell. On my first crossing of the city I was struck by
the contrast between one quarter and the next. In the Chinese quarter all was
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familiar to me, the walled yamens, the neat wooden houses, the seething bazaars.
This was China as I knew it; but within a distance of a few yards I was plunged into
an alien atmosphere. Here was the vigorous life of a city of the southern steppes,
where Turk and Tartar meet - the mosque, the market, the endless rows of stalls.
And passing beyond the fortifications I came into another world, the bare
spaciousness of a Russian market town, the walled compound of the Soviet
Consulate serving as its focus, from which it straggled to the south. (Wu 1940;31-33)
This is how Oriimchi appeared to Wu Aichen in 1932, when he was sent there to advise
the Governor. His excellent description is in many ways still valid, despite the radical
'architectural' changes that have occurred during the second half of the twentieth century,
in particular since the end of the eighties. Today the walls are no longer there and the
buildings from that time are being systematically destroyed and replaced by "modem"
high-rise buildings. However, the structure of the city is roughly the same: stretching
north to south and surrounded by the Tianshan mountains. One can still imagine the
contour of the walled city, since the names of the gates are still used to identify a particular
area. While there is no road or square officially named after the gates, not only do people
normally refer to these areas as beimen (north gate), daximen (big western gate),
xiaoximen (small western gate), and nanmen (south gate), but these are also the names
written on the bus stops. Today these gates are marked by big road intersections, which in
the case of beimen and nanmen have developed into a square.
Oriimchi can be said to have more than one centre, however the centre lies within
beimen, nanmen, daximen, and xiaoximen. This is the geographic, as well as the
administrative and commercial centre of the city and, although today it is definitely more
Chinese (Han) than anything else, it can be seen as a 'neutral zone' between the expanding
Chinese town to the north and the shrinking Uyghur town to the south. Three of these
gates are marked by an administrative building: the main office of Air China is at beimen,
at daximen stands the China Telecom building, while the main branch of the Bank of
China is at nanmen, opposite the People's Theatre, the biggest and most important theatre
in Oriimchi and one of the few gracious buildings left up. In the middle, slightly to the
east, lies Renmin Guangchang (the People's Square), normally referred to as Guangchang
(The Square). Here lies the heart, or rather the mind, of Ortimchi and of the entire
Xinjiang .Uyghur Autonomous Region: the People's Government (Renmin Zhengfu).
Nanmen is somehow the invisible border to the Uyghur part of town. However, the
Chinese and the Uyghur town are not discrete and self-contained and a visual
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representation of such continuity are perhaps the groups of dollarchi (Uyghur money
changers) hanging outside and inside the Bank of China. North of beimen there is
Hongshan (the Red Mountain), a competing city centre developed around a red hill topped
by a pagoda, the latter being a landmark of Chinese presence, as Abdurehim once pointed
out: "They put a pagoda wherever they go, to mark their territory; if you come from
Kazakhstan by train the first thing you see when you approach the Chinese border is a
pagoda!".
Urumchi first comes into historical prominence under the name of "Bishbalik", the
capital of the kingdom established by the Uigurs in southern Dzungaria. Driven out
from their first home in the northern part of this province, they wandered south
until they found a resting-place on the slopes of the Celestial Mountains, and also
in the watered land as far as Hami, which territory they transformed so as to make
of it the fertile district which it is to-day. The middle of the eighteenth century
marks the period when, under the great Emperor Chien Lung, Chinese ascendency
finally asserted itself in Dzungaria.
Ununchi is situated at the junction of four great trade routes. One crossing Mongolia,
another leading through Hami to Kansu, a third connecting it with Ili and Russia,
and a fourth with Kashgar. It thus occupied a position obviously suited to make it
the capital of the New Dominion, called by the Chinese "Sinkiang". The city has
been the battleground of many contending forces, having been taken and retaken by
Mongols, Chinese and Mohammedans, (...).The word "Urumchi" is of Mongolian
origin; to the Chinese the town is known as "Tihwa," but colloquially it is referred
to as "Hungmiaote - "The Red Temple." (Cable & French 1947:259-260)
"Oriimchi" is commonly believed to be a word of Mongolian origin, meaning "beautiful
grassland" (Niu 1994:119). As Cable and French point out, the Chinese used to call it
"Dihua", until in the early 1950s the Communist government introduced a Chinese
transliteration of its indigenous name: Wulumuqi. The name "Dihua", which could be
translated as "lead to civilisation", 1 encapsulates Han Chinese attitudes towards this region
and its indigenous inhabitants, and reveals their "civilising project". Stevan Harrell has
coined this phrase to describe a kind of interaction between peoples based on some sort of
1 Dihua is composed of the Chinese word di, meaning "to guide, to lead" (Xiandai Hanyu Cidian -
Contemporary Chinese Dictionary) or "to advance, to progress; to enlighten, to teach" (Far East Chinese-
English Dictionary), and the suffix hua, which indicates a process implying some sort of change,
something like the English "-isation".
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inequality. "In this interaction, the inequality between the civilizing center and the
peripheral peoples has its ideological basis in the center's claim to a superior degree of
civilization, along with a commitment to raise the peripheral peoples' civilization to the
level of the center, or at least closer to that level." (Harrell 1995:4).
During the three days I spent on the train that took me from Beijing to Ornmchi, I
borrowed a copy of the Lonely Planet guide to China from a fellow-traveller and did a bit
of background reading. "In the centre of Urumqi is a desolate rocky outcrop called Hong
Shan. Steps to the top lead to a small pavilion from which you can get a panoramic view
of the great expanse of dusty roads, shimmering apartment blocks and smokestacks that
have sprung out of the surrounding desolation. Orlimqi is an interesting place to visit but
it's got to be one of the ugliest cities on the face of the earth! ... The [Soviet] inspired
concrete-block architecture of socialist eastern China has been imported lock, stock and
barrel, and Urumqi essentially looks little different from its northern Han China
counterparts 1500 miles east - just uglier. There are few 'sights' as such, but there's an
intrinsic interest to the place which makes it worth visiting." (SamagalsId et al. 1988:769;
photo 9).
I arrived in priimchi on a sunny afternoon in mid-May. A car from the Xinjiang
Normal University (Xinshida) met me at the railway station, which lies in the southwest
end of the city. To reach the University in the north we crossed a big chunk of the city
longitudinally. Despite the background reading, my first impression was one of
disappointment: apart from some occasional Uyghur writings, there was nothing I saw
outside the window that made me think I was in Central Asia rather than in any eastern
Chinese city. During the next few days my disappointment grew: in the area surrounding
the Normal University compound the population was almost exclusively Chinese, with the
exception of a cluster of Uyghur restaurants which lined the street outside the Medical
College and the annexed hospital, not far from the Normal University. Until, one day, I
embarked on a trip to the other major university, Xinjiang University (Xinda).
To reach Xinda from Xinshida there is a direct bus, number 101, which crosses the
whole city north to south. The journey lasts between forty minutes and one hour,
depending on the traffic and the driver. This was my first trip on this route. We passed the
Kunlun Hotel, a Russian building commonly known as "Balou" (Ch. eight-storey)
because until the 1980s it was the tallest building in Ortimchi. Now it looks very small
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compared to the Taihe Hotel, two blocks down the road, which was completed in 1995.
From Balou the bus drives all the way down Youhao Lu (Friendship Road, in Uyghur
Dostluq yoli) to Hongshan. Apparently the name of this road refers to the friendship
between China and the Soviet Union; I was told that with the interruption of Sino-Soviet
relations in the late 1950s the name was changed, and it was resumed only recently, after
the "friendship" between the two countries was re-established. As we approach
Hongshan, the urban landscape is a very familiar one in China: wide orthogonal roads,
concrete blocks and building sites everywhere (photo 11), masses of people buying and
selling and shouting on every square inch of the pavements. The bus is in fact a private
minibus (zhongba), faster but possibly more dangerous due to the Fl driving style of the
driver. The competition is fierce and every driver wants to make sure that they get to the
next stop before all the other minibuses, to do so there seem to be no rules. At every stop
the conductor shouts what at first sounds like an incomprehensible singsong, and which
turns out to be "Yaolingyao yaolingyao, kongche you zuowei" (One-o-one one-o-one,
empty car, free seats). I suppose their notion of space must be different because of the
overpopulation in China. The "empty bus" is already crammed with some thirty people
and the "free seats" are a cushion on top of the engine, just where it is written "do not sit
on the engine". The great majority of the passengers are Han Chinese, and so are the
driver and the conductor. The few occasional Uyghur passengers have to speak Chinese in
order to buy their ticket. At times, the young woman conductor gets impatient because a
Uyghur passenger is mispronouncing his or her destination, which is therefore
incomprehensible. Funny, I think, her strong Sichuanese accent sounds just as
incomprehensible to me. And, by the way, is this not the "Uyghur Autonomous Region"?
Yet a Uyghur who has lived here for generations must speak Chinese to a young
Sichuanese migrant, who probably got here only a few months before.
After Hongshan, as we go through Beimen heading towards Nanmen, the number
of Uyghur passengers begins to increase. The bus stops at Nanmen and drives around the
glass pyramid which stands in a flower-bed in the middle of the square - I wonder if it
intentionally imitates the one at the Louvre (photo 10). Leaving the Bank of China and one
of the oldest Mosques in Ortimchi on the right,2 we turn into Jiefang Nanlu (South
Liberation Road, in Uyghur Azadliq yoli). Suddenly, like Wu Aichen, I am "plunged into
an alien atmosphere". The road is relatively narrow and winding, compared to the large
and straight avenues I have seen so far, and it is lined mostly with low old-looking
2 This Mosque dates back to 1906 (K. Hopkirk 1993:276).
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Photo 9
Urtimchi: view from Yamanliq
shan. In the background the
Tianshan mountains.
Photo 10
Nanmen: the pyramid and, at the
back, the "People's theatre", a
rare example of pre-1949
architecture.
Photo 11
"Modern" Ortimchi: a downtown
junction.
buildings, the ground floor of which is occupied by shops and small restaurants. The
pavements are bustling with hawkers and with a very colourful crowd. This is now the
"Uyghur town", not within the imaginary city walls anymore but being pushed south by
the modern, and predominantly Chinese, Ortimchi. In fact also this part is undergoing
major architectural change and will probably look very different already in a few years.
From that first trip I remember vividly the colours of the rags, scarves, and cloths
hanging outside the shops and the loud Uyghur music, simultaneously played by each of
the numerous cassette shops along the way. This is probably what strikes most the eye
and the ear when visiting this area for the first time. By the time I moved to this part of
. town, four months later, I was already accustomed to all this and my attention was rather
caught by endless smaller details.
3.2. The "Uyghur town"
The area between Nanmen and Xinjiang University can be regarded as the Uyghur town,
with the district of Erdaoqiao at its heart. Jiefang nanlu is the highstreet, which later
splits into Yan'an lu (Yan'an Road)3 and Shengli lu (Victory Road, in Uyghur Ghaliba
yoli; photos 12-14). A series of narrow alleys branch out to the east side of Jiefang nanlu.
Despite the fact that it is relatively new, since it lies outside of what was the walled city,
this is arguably the "old town", since it is the only part of Ortimchi where winding roads,
narrow alleys, and low buildings have been preserved. However, it is misleading to think
of this part of Ortimchi as the "old" and "traditional" Uyghur town, as opposed to the new
Chinese town; in fact, eriimchi as a modern city has developed from what were the
Chinese headquarters in the region (see quotation from Cable and French above).
Somehow in the last two or three centuries it has always been a Chinese - rather than
Turkic - town, although at that time the population might have been predominantly Turkic.
Moreover, as Wu Aichen points out in his description, before the communist take-over (in
1949) the Turkic town lay north of nanmen, within the walled city. In any case, this area
is also slowly, yet inexorably, being reclaimed to modernisation by the Han "civilising
project" (photo 16). In March 1997 I counted ten building sites along Jiefang nanlu,
which stretches for less than a mile. There seems to be a standard technique: an area is
cleared from the old buildings (its inhabitants being forced out, reportedly with bulldozers
3 Yan'an, Shaanxi province, was the communists' base after the Long March, during the civil war.
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Night market in Erdaoqiao.
Photo 12-13-14
(clockwise from top left)
Jiefang nanlu: the `highstreef of the
Uyghur town.
Photo 17
An old building on Jiefang nanlu. Behind, a
new building under construction.
Photo 18
Shanxi hanzi : Rabiya Qadir shopping mall.
Photo 16
The entrance to Erdaoqiao market (right), dominated by a building site.
if they try to resist), while preserving the buildings facing the main road (photo 17). These
will be torn down when the new building has been completed, thus suddenly changing the
urban landscape. None of these new buildings had been completed by the time I left and I
am not sure about their intended function, although it seemed very likely that they were
going to be employed for business use (shopping centres, offices, hotels, etc.). I suspect
the Uyghur town I saw will soon be very different - if there will still be a Uyghur town at
all.
Shanxi hanzi and Yan'an lu are the other two focal areas of the Uyghur town,
respectively north and south of Erdaoqiao. Shanxi hanzi (see Liu 1996:44-45) is mostly
.a shopping area, dominated by the Rabiya Qadir, Bazar, a six-storey building in a sort of
`neo-socialist-Muslim style' which dates back to the early 1990's (photo 18). Each floor
of Rabiyei Qadir Bazar is crowded with small shops selling all sorts of goods, though
shoes, especially boots, and cloth are by far the most popular. On the ground floor one
can also find several stalls selling Uyghur music tapes, henna, custom jewellery, and all
sorts of goods mostly imported from Pakistan, obviously addressing a Uyghur public.
Rabiya Qadir, now in her early fifties, is a well-known Uyghur businesswoman and the
mother of ten children. Besides her domestic assets, her international interests include a
leather factory in neighbouring Kazakhstan and a department store in Uzbekistan.
Business, however, is not the only priority on her agenda. During my stay in eriimchi, on
the last floor of the shopping complex foreign language classes, mainly English, were
regularly held. These were taught by young Uyghurs and addressed a Uyghur public,
aiming at providing an affordable opportunity for all those people who having been
educated in Uyghur schools, did not have a chance to learn a foreign language other than
Chinese.
Indeed Rabiya Qadir has been a key public figure in Xinjiang, especially since the
late 1990s. Until 1997, she was referred to in the Chinese press as the "millionaire woman
of Xinjiang" and had an entry in the Chinese volume of "Who's Who in the World". In
1995 Rabiya had been a delegate to the UN Fourth World Conference on Women, which
was held in Beijing. Moreover, she has been a member of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). 4 However, since early 1997 Rabiya has suffered
4 The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is a political organ representing the
united front which traces its origins back to the anti-Japanese war (1937-45). "Since 1949 the CPPCC has
proved to be essentially a united front weapon for building legitimacy and influence among leading non-
communist democratic parties and non-aligned intellectuals. It is also a transmission belt for conveying
CCP [Chinese Communist Party] principles and policies to these same groups. All along it has been led
and controlled by the CCP, with its successive chairmen being party-state leaders ..." (Forster 2001:69).
87
harassment and restrictions due to her husband's alleged opposition activities abroad, as
well as her own efforts to promote the advancement of Uyghur women by launching, in
November 1997, the "Thousand Mothers Movement", a venture aimed at building
businesses run by women. Shortly after the Movement's third meeting in December 1997,
its assets were frozen by the authorities and the group have not met since. Moreover, since
March 1997 Rabiya has been deprived of her passport, she was administratively detained
for a short time in April 1997 and, at the end of December 1997, was held for a few days
in a police station and subsequently placed under restrictions involving the obligation to
report to the authorities on a weekly basis. In early 1998 she was barred from re-election
to her seat in the CPPCC. The XUAR Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan publicly
commented on this decision, putting forward reasons such as the fact that Rabiya's
business had supposedly run into difficulties but also, most importantly, that her husband,
a lecturer at Xinjiang University who has been residing in the US since 1996, had been
engaging in activities aimed at "splitting the motherland and endangering the state's
security". He concluded that Rabiya is not in a position to declare that she is patriotic and
that she maintains the unity of the motherland.5
Hence Shanxihanzi and the Rabiya Qadir Bazar can be regarded on many levels as
a symbol of Uyghur resistance to the Han "civilising project". The first and most visible
reason being that this Bazar stands as the Uyghur alternative to the growing number of
"modern" department stores that, significantly, are all located north of Nanmen. Not only
are both vendors and customers exclusively Uyghur (or, anyway, non-Han), but most of
the goods sold here - such as henna, atlas, embroidered cushions, copper teapots, rags,
leather boots, etc. - be they imported from neighbouring Central Asian countries or
produced by local artisans, are targeted specifically to a Uyghur public. The Central Asian
trading network, which is the background to this bazar, points to a host of transnational
connections that are predicated on linguistic, cultural, religious, and historical grounds,
which suggest that Han China is definitely not the only available source of
"modernisation" and advancement. Finally, and most importantly, Rabiya Qadir embodies
the living example that there can be an "advancement" for the Uyghur not only without,
but despite, the Chinese.
5 From "Amnesty International Appeal for Uighurs arbitrarily detained" (Al Index: ASA 17/02/99)
published in-Turkistan Newsletter Volume 3:020-05-February-1999, Special issue on the anniversary of
Khulja (Yining) Uprising 4 February 1997.
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Going south along the high street, the area known as Shanxihanzi blurs into
Erdaoqiao. 6 With its bazar (market), mosque, restaurants, and night market, this is the
very centre of Uyghur social life. The most striking feature of this area is the number of
ashkhana (small restaurants) lining both the high street and the side alleys. This is where
the most 'authentic' Uyghur food is to be found, each restaurant specialising in one or two
dishes. In summer, and to a much lesser extent in winter, the pavements are crowded with
kawapchi (kebab sellers) inviting people into their restaurants "Kelinglar! . Kelinglar!"
(Come! Come in!). Besides the restaurants, there are a number of other small shops
typically addressing a Uyghur public, such as pharmacies, selling both traditional Uyghur
medicines and 'western' drugs, barbershops, dentist shops (making false teeth), etc.
People, especially men, do not necessarily come here with a purpose; often they simply
hang out, sitting inside or outside a friend's shop, drinking tea, smoking, and chatting.
The Erdaoqiao bazar is the best place to buy local produces such as raisins, walnuts,
almonds, rock sugar, dried apricots, as well as Uyghur knives, carpets, skull caps, etc.
Next to the bazar, at the junction with Tuanjie lu (Unity road), is the Tuanjie juchang -
Ittipaq teatri (Unity Theatre, in Chinese and Uyghur respectively). At dusk the area
before the theatre gets covered with foodstalls, each with its table and benches, selling
kebab, mutton heads, tonur kawap, Opga hesip, and similar 'delicacies'. This is the
kechlik baziri (night market), where Uyghur social life goes on until late at night,
regardless of the season (photo 15).
Tuanjie lu separates Erdaoqiao from Yan'an lu (Yan'an road). By this name
people normally refer to the area surrounding the junction with the actual Yan'an lu, its
landmarks being the minority language bookstore (i.e. the local branch of the Xinhua
bookstore), the Gewutuan (Song and Dance Troupe) compound, and the Tatar mosque.
Next to the mosque is the "Consulate alley", recalling the times when this was the Imperial
Russian, and later Soviet, diplomatic compound. Today, however, this alley is better
known for its (Uyghur) restaurants, which make it a privileged destination when eating
out, regardless of one's budget. Here one can find both rather expensive restoran as well
as cheaper ashkhana, which nevertheless serve the best qoldama or naren chop in town.7
Further south along Yan'an lu stand the Uyghur hospital, which is the institutional
centre for Uyghur traditional medicine in Ortimchi, and the Islamic Institute, where imam
6 Erdaoqiao literally means "two-way bridge". The Uyghur equivalent is DOng keiriik (lit. "low bridge"),
though everybody refers to it by its Chinese name and, according to one of my teachers, younger Uyghurs
probably do not even know the Uyghur name. My younger Uyghur friends, though, did not agree.
Qoldama and naren chop are Uyghur dishes (see chapter 6). For a discussion of restoran and ashlthana
see chapter 7.
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are trained. The latter is the only government-authorised religious school where,
unsurprisingly, the conditions for admission include "being patriotic" (ai guo). Also on
Van 'an lu is the back gate of the Xinjiang University compound, the main gate being on
Shengli lu (Victory Road). The area now covered by the university campus used to be the
Russian town described by Wu Aichen in the 1930s, as witnessed by a number of vaguely
neo-classical buildings, the only gracious buildings left on campus. Unfortunately, since
the University entered the 211 project in 1996, 8 these buildings are being destroyed in
order to be substituted by "modern" white-tiled concrete blocks.
"The Han and the minority nationalities: one breath, one fate, one heart!" reads a
huge bilingual (Chinese and Uyghur) poster at the junction between Tuanjie lu and
Jiefang nanlu, white ink on a red background (photo 19). "Unity, friendship, co-
operation, development" echo the big red Chinese characters on the wall opposite Xinjiang
University main gate (photo 20). In March 1997, at the end of one month of violence
during which reportedly hundreds of Han and Uyghurs were killed and thousands of
Uyghurs were arrested, the propaganda department of Xinjiang University too launched a
new campaign. The billboards along the main path within the campus were urging to
"strengthen the unity of all nationalities and defend the integrity of the motherland" and
invited everyone to "serve as an example in defending the unity of all nationalities and
safeguarding social stability" (photo 21). Such propaganda on the "unity of all
nationalities" is in sharp contrast with the fact that Uyghurs overtly resent the Han, and
that the Han in Xinjiang both despise and fear the Uyghur.
Uyghur resentment can be expressed in a variety of more or less subtle ways. For
example, the officially approved word in Uyghur to refer to the Han Chinese is "Khanzu",
clearly a calque from Mandarin possibly introduced in the 1960s or 1970s in line with the
language policies of the time, which were aimed at introducing as many phonetic calques
of Chinese words as possible. Before then, Uyghurs as well as the other Turkic peoples
of Central Asia had called the Chinese "Khitai", from the Russian word Kitai, meaning
"China". Today "Khitai" is still used, although, since the government has obliterated it
from Uyghur vocabulary, it has taken on a transgressive and derogatory connotation.
Such a word would never appear in print or in an official speech, but it is commonly used
8 "211" is a project aimed at identifying (through audits) and promoting (with special funding) what will
be the 100 best Universities in the country in the 21st century. According to a Han teqcher at Xinjiang
Normal University, although Xinjiang University was below the national standard, if compared to
Universities such as Beida or Fudan, at least one university in Xinjiang had to be included in the project
for political reasons. In other words, its inclusion should be situated within the "development policies"








Photo 20- "Unity, friendship, co-
operation, development". Across
the road from Xinjiang University
main gate.
Photo 21 - "Everyone serve as an
example in defending the unity of
all nationalities and safeguarding
social stability". Billboard at
Xinjiang University (March 1997).
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Photo 19 - "The Han and the
minority nationalities: one
breath, one fate, one heart!"
Bilingual poster at the junction
between Tuanjie lu and Jiefang
nanlu.
Photo 22 - Admission ticket to the exhibit of "Xinjiang minzu folk customs". Note the showcase
with life-size dummies (left).
in everyday speech. This is one of the ways in which Uyghur people try to turn language
inequality into an advantage, even if it is just a small revenge. For example, Tursun shared
an office with a Uyghur and a Han colleague. Once their Han colleague asked "What is
this word Khitai that you two always say when you talk in Uyghur?" Tursun's reply was
"It's 'Hitachi', you know the Japanese electronics brand?". In my interactions with
Uyghur people, I have come across a whole range of "non-official" terms which are used
with a ridiculing, if not derogatory, intention. These include Chineselar (produced by
adding the Uyghur plural suffix to the English word), ular (them), buyaqlar (these ones),
aka milleit (the older-brother nationality), kapirlar (infidels), choshqanlar (pigs), and
more.
While the propaganda inside and outside the university campus celebrates the unity
of all nationalities, the very way in which the university is set up, from student dormitories
and staff lodging to curricula, seems to declare, if not promote, differentiation. Everything
on campus is organised along the lines of a Hanzu/minzu dichotomy. The quota of
students admitted to university from each of the two groups corresponds to the ratio
between the respective population in the region. Once they've entered a course, minzu
students will be assigned to a minzu class, sleep in a minzu dormitory, and eat at the
minzu dining hall. Needless to say, the great majority of minzu students are Uyghur.
Like other universities in China, the campus is a self-contained institution. Closer to
the main gate are the administrative buildings, the library, and some departments. Further
on there are the student dormitories, with separate buildings for male and female students,
and often for minzu and Han students too. I visited several times Nurqiz in her dormitory,
which was right next to the lao zhaodaisuo (old guest house) where some of the foreign
students, including myself, were lodged. She shared a room with seven classmates of
hers, four of which were Uyghur, one was Uzbek, one Khazak, and one Hui. The room
was crammed with four bank beds and several boxes and suitcases. While we were sitting
on her bed chatting, some of her room-mates were sleeping, some were reading, some
were having a snack. They basically shared every moment of their life for four years. I
once asked Nurqiz how she felt about this. To my surprise, she replied that she loved it
and that she was going to miss this life once she graduated. She often discussed the
current political situation with her room-mates, but always made sure that the Hui and the
Khaiak girls were not around. It was a precaution, she explained; in those days Han-
Uyghur relations were extremely volatile and, while Khazaks and Hui to some extent
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shared Uyghur resentment towards the Han, on the other hand it was not obvious that they
would embrace the Uyghur cause.
Roughly half of the university compound, to the east, is occupied by a vast expanse
of tidily lined-up four-storey concrete blocks (Ch. lou, Uy. bina) where teachers and
other staff live. Here too, by and large, minzu and Han occupy separate blocks. The first
time I went to see one of my teachers I got lost and ended up in the wrong bina, since they
all looked the same to me. When I later found my teacher's flat I explained to her the
reason for my delay. She laughed and said "How could you not notice you were in a Han
bina? The stairs there are so dirty, while the minzu ones are tidy and clean!". I suppose
after all it would not be such a good idea to have Han and Uyghur share the same block...
Between the student dormitories and the staff lodgings there is a lake, which in fact is an
artificial reservoir. The "new guest house" stands right next to the lake. Not far, there is a
market area with a few shops and half a dozen restaurants, some Uyghur, some Hui, and
some Han.
Ironically, during the early 1990s, as a result of the political and economic changes
brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a new "Russian market town" has
developed on Yan'an lu outside the University's back gate. Everything is contained in a
relatively small but self-sufficient area, where the lingua franca is Russian - and vodka. In
1996-1997 the multi-ethnic trading community from the CIS numbered a couple of
hundred men and women from countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan. They lived in the Bianjiang Bin gguan (Border Hotel), worked in the
adjacent Bianjiang pifa shichang (Border wholesale market), and ate chicken cutlets and
mashed potatoes with vodka in a "Baku" or "Katiusha" restaurant across the road.
Everything can be found in situ, provided by entrepreneurial locals (both Han and
minzu), from early products such as winter strawberries to translators and prostitutes. As
a consequence, most laomaozi - literally "old hairs", a slightly derogatory Chinese term
used to refer to the Russian, obviously more hairy than the Chinese - hardly ever go to
town, if not to reach the airport or the railway station.
Given a choice, Uyghurs in ertimchi would live south of nanmen, in the `Uyghur
town'. Indeed a lot of them do, since most minzu danwei (work units) are there, from the
Uyghur hospital to the Song and Dance Troupe, to the Islamic Institute. A large number of
Uyghurs living in the capital come from other oases, and this is particularly true among
college-educated Uyghurs. When I asked these people how life in their hometown
compared with that in Ortimchi, they would almost invariably reply that, if on the one
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hand they enjoyed better living conditions in the capital - such as running water, central
heating, etc. - on the other they felt alienated from 'traditional' ways of life. They normally
identified the different dwelling styles as the main reason for this. Be they originally from
the countryside or from urban areas, back in their hometown their families usually still
lived in what they called dy (pingfang in Chinese), that is a self-contained one-storey
house developed around an inner courtyard, usually inhabited by an extended family.
Whereas in Ortimchi they had no choice but live just with their nuclear family, in tiny flats
within multi-storey concrete blocks (bina, in Chinese loufang). Here too we can clearly
identify the tension between tradition and modernity, with all the ambiguities it implies. In
other words, the price for 'modernity', including better living conditions, seems to be
drowning in a sea of Han and feel alienated from one's origins. In fact different dwelling
styles simply epitomise such alienation, which is actually due also to things such as having
to speak a 'foreign' language (Mandarin) all the time, or else having to adhere to a
working schedule which is incompatible with religious observance. In short, these
Uyghurs have an ambivalent attitude to the capital. While, on the one hand, they are
fascinated by everything they perceive as symbols of modernity - such as skyscrapers,
shopping centres, consumerism, etc. - at the same time they deeply resent the fact that
Ortimchi is not very Uyghur - as opposed to other towns in southern Xinjiang - and is
even becoming more and more Chinese.
3.3. 'We're not Chinese!'
In official discourse, Zhongguoren (Ch., lit. "person from China") refers to any Chinese
citizen, be they Han or belonging to any of the minzu that make up the Zhonghua minzu
(Chinese nationality). However, this is little more than sheer rhetoric. In fact, in popular
discourse and in everyday life things are rather different, and this is particularly true of a
place like Xinjiang. Here the multi-ethnic composition of the PRC population is an
extremely visible fact, rather than just a theory studied in a propaganda textbook, as can be
the case for many Han living in China proper. Hence in casual conversations Zhongguoren
is usually synonymous with Hanzuren (a Han person), and Zhongwen (language of
China) is interchangeable with Hanyu (Han language).
In the introduction to his Zhonghua Minzu, a survey of Chinese nationalities, Tian
states: "Our great Zhonghua minzu is composed of 56 minzu. Every single minzu has
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contributed to the formation and development of the Zhonghua minzu." (Tian 1991:1) The
same principle is also stated in the Foreword to the PRC 1982 Constitution: "The People's
Republic of China is a unitary multi-ethnic state jointly founded by the people of each
minzu in the country." (XUAR 1995:728). Due to the ambiguity which is sometimes
characteristic of the Chinese language, the phrase Zhonghua minzu can be translated both
as "Chinese nationality" and as "China's nationalities". The title of Tian's book -
Zhonghua Minzu - reflects the changes in Chinese nationality policy that have occurred
since the publication of Ma Yin's Zhongguo shaoshu minzu (China's minority
nationalities) in 1981. This book "systematically surveys the 55 minority nationalities who
inhabit vast areas of the People's Republic of China" and significantly does not include the
56th minzu, that is the Han majority (Ma 1989:i).
When talking to people in Xinjiang, I became particularly aware of the ambiguities
implied by this taxonomy and terminology, and especially of the mismatch between theory
and practice. "Chinese" can mean different things, its broadest meaning being "something
or someone that belongs or is related to China". Most of the times, though, this term is
used in a narrower sense, i.e. to refer simply to Han China and the Han Chinese. My use
of the term "Chinese" reflects current practice in Xinjiang - and elsewhere - hence, when I
talk about "Chinese" I usually mean "Han".
"I don't like China because we're not Chinese! You've studied Uyghur history,
right? You know that we've nothing to do with them. Therefore I don't like their culture, I
find Beijing opera revolting." Since our very first encounter, Abdurehim, a young Uyghur
man in his late twenties, would not spend a day without pointing out how much he
dislikes the Chinese and how different Uyghur are from the Chinese. He is ready to
imagine remote connections between Uyghurs and Italians - possibly through Marco Polo
- but opposes vehemently any possible relation with the Chinese. This is our first meeting
and he has invited me to dinner. He wants to make sure that I know where he stands, right
from the beginning. He pours some black tea "You see? Chinese [i.e. green] tea is 'cold',
it's bad for your health, whereas black tea is 'hot'." I then start enquiring about the use of
food in Uyghur traditional medicine, and in what ways it is different from the Chinese.
Abdurehim does not know much about this, but he Is positive that Uyghur medicine is
better than the Chinese. From traditional medicine he moves on to the next topic "You
know, they're crazy ... despite the fact that we are two time-zones behind, they insist in
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using Beijing time and they're convinced that noon is at two o'clock. 9 I know of a
Chinese woman who keeps using Beijing time even after she has moved to the States, can
you imagine?" Abdurehim concludes his 'lecture' by addressing me with a question, to
which he promptly replies himself: "Can you tell a Uyghur from a Han? I'm sure you can,
there is such a big difference ... we're bushy [sic] whereas they have no hairs, we can
whistle while they can't ...".
Abdurehim was born and grew up in Ornmchi; his mother is a Ghuljiliq while his
father comes from Kashgar. Having earned a first class degree in Chinese at the local
university, he later resigned from a prestigious but boring job in the government in order
to pursue his own aspirations. As many other educated young people, both Uyghur and
Han, he thought that these could be better fulfilled abroad. Thanks to his intelligence and
the fact that he was perfectly fluent both in Chinese and in English, he could have enjoyed
a privileged position if he stayed in Ornmchi, nevertheless he felt alienated from the
Chinese society he was living in. This is a common feeling among those young educated
people in contemporary China who share neither their parents or grandparents genuine
belief in the ideals of communism, nor the prevailing aspiration to economic success,
which often appears to be the one and only value in China today. I would say that the mid-
1990s have brought about a radical shift in many Chinese people's motivation to go
abroad. In my experience, in the very early 1990s "leaving the country" (chu guo) was
seen primarily as an opportunity to a better life, above all in terms of access to material
goods and economic success. By the mid-nineties similar opportunities have become
increasingly available in China itself, thus obliterating the need to go abroad for all those
who are happy with economic reforms without political reforms. In Abdurehim's and in
many other Uyghurs' case a further dimension contributes to their feelings of alienation:
the fact that, from their point of view, they live under a "foreign domination" and they
cannot foresee any realistic future improvement. On the contrary, they can only predict
assimilation as a sort of cultural genocide, the only alternative to which is resistance,
however suicidal this may be. The reason why some of them are "ready to die" for the
Uyghur cause - no matter how literal such statement is - is that they know they are
different and they are not ready to give up such differnce, to barter it with an easier and
"better" life.
9 Indeed I have heard Chinese people in Xinjiang say "noon" (zhongwu) and, when I asked if that meant
12, they replied in a rather surprised tone that they meant 2.
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Abdurehim's resentment for the Chinese goes back to his childhood. In 1970, when
he was only a few months old, his father was arrested and detained for ten years. At the
age of 25 his mother was left with four children to raise and had to start working as a
teacher in a primary school. Because she was the wife of a "counter-revolutionary", she
was assigned to a school one hour by bus away from were they lived. Today, both
Abdurehim and his mother are very proud of the dignified manner in which they dealt with
all the hardships. "My mother is very proud of us children. We could have become
hooligans or drop-outs, instead we're all decent and respectable people." When
Abdurehim's father was released he was a different person, so much so that his marriage
did not survive long. "After all those years in jail my father was not able to love anymore,
he had become a selfish person, and my mother was not ready to put up with it."
Abdurehim blames the Chinese for all the hard times that he and his family have endured.
"They must leave! We've had enough, in Uyghur we say gdshtin &tap songeikkd
taciashti, it means that 'it pierced the flesh and has reached the bone". Once, after yet
another of Abdurehim's bursts against "the Chinese", I dared to remark that he cannot
blame individual Chinese for what has happened to his family and for the situation in
which the Uyghur are today. After all, many Chinese have equally suffered and are still
suffering under the same totalitarian regime, and Uyghurs and Chinese are all victims of
the same system. "No, it's different, because we're not Chinese. They are oppressed by
their own people. I want to be ruled by my own people, no matter how bad they might
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There may be different degrees of bitterness; nevertheless all the Uyghurs I have met
agree in stating their difference vis-à-vis the Chinese, whom they definitely perceive as the
other. But what are the key signifiers of such difference? Or, in other words, how can one
tell a Uyghur from a Han? To a foreign visitor the first most striking difference, and
certainly one which is emphasised in Uyghur discourse, lies in the physical appearance.
Two and a half days up the rail line from Xian and in the same country, you couldn't
come across a people more different from the Chinese than the Uygins. Urumqi is
the first place where you'll see these swarthy-skined Turkic descendants in any
number; larger and heavier than the Han Chinese, they have features resembling
those of Caucasians and many of them could easily pass for southern Italians or
Greeks. The Uygur women wear skirts or dresses and brightly coloured scarves, in
contrast to the slacks and baggy trousers of the Han Chinese, and they pierce their
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ears - a practice which repels the Han. The Uygur men must be the only men in
China capable of growing beards. (Samagalski et al. 1988:769-71)
It is true that most Uyghurs have "high noses" and "deep eyes", and that they are
definitely more hairy than the Chinese. There is, however, a great deal of variation in
physical types. These range from very European-looking types, with their blond hair and
blue eyes, at one end of the spectrum, to those almost indiscernible from the Chinese at the
other end. To some extent, phenotypes co-vary with geographical location; hence among
Uyghurs in Qumul it is probably easier to find Chinese-looking types than, say, in
Kashgar. However, the stereotypical look of a Qumulluq or Turpanliq as opposed to a
Qashqdrlik or Khotanlik tends to be exaggerated in popular discourse. For example, I had
a friend from Qumul who could definitely pass for a Sicilian, but never for a Chinese.
Most of the Chinese I have met share the cliché that Uyghurs, both men and
women, are very beautiful (zhangde hen piaoliang). This fits in, and at the same time is
the result of, the hegemonic discourse on minorities in China, a discourse which tends to
emphasise their exotic, primitive, and feminine characteristics. In other words, it is an
example of what Harrell calls "the sexual metaphor", that is, an "eroticization and
feminization of the peripheral" whereby sexual relations become, at different levels and in
different contexts, a metaphor for a relation of domination. At a very simple and direct
level, this involves on the part of the civilisers a view of the peripheral peoples both as
erotic and promiscuous and as objects of sexual desire. In any case, according to Harrell,
"the sexual metaphor is one of domination, in which the literal or figurative femaleness of
the peripheral peoples is one aspect of the act of defining them as subordinate." (Harrell
1995:10-13). Not only are the Uyghur themselves aware and proud of being considered
physically attractive, which could be interpreted as a successful co-option into active
participation in the civilising project, but there is also a general consensus among them that
the same cannot be said of the Chinese. Indeed one of the worst offences for a Uyghur is
to be called a Chinese. This usually implies that s/he is ugly, as well as expressing moral
contempt. Hence mistaking a Uyghur for a Chinese, however unintentionally, can be a
source of major embarrassment, as I could witness when a Uyghur melon-seller addressed
my Uyghur friend in Chinese because he thought he was Han.
•As pointed out in the above quotation from the Lonely Planet guide to China, dress,
and to an even greater extent accessories, can be powerful markers of Uyghur identity vis-
à-vis the Han. Here too there is obviously a great deal of variation among the Uyghur
themselves, depending on age, gender, rural or urban residence, occupation etc. While it
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is impossible to generalise and reduce to a uniform the great variety of clothes that
Uyghurs wear, however we can perhaps identify a particular Uyghur style, or taste. In
Ortimchi the difference is mostly visible in mature women. While it is common to see their
Han counterparts wearing trousers and short hair, elder Uyghur women have their long
hair arranged in a bun or in long thin plates and covered with a head scarf tied behind their
neck. They almost invariably wear a wide loose frock (pOrldngli IcOyindk), the pattern and
the material of which depend on the season. In summer most Uyghur women _wear dads ,
a brightly coloured silk or synthetic lozenge-patterned material which is common across
most of Central Asia, though older women tend to wear a more sober black and white or
blue and white atlas. In winter older women usually wear dresses made of imprinted
velvet. The most common outfit for Uyghur men is shirt and trousers, often a suit; most of
the time, what makes it distinctive is their doppa (skull cap) or flat cap. Older men
sometimes wear a chapan, the 'traditional' gown, and leather boots, though this is not a
common sight in Ortimchi. When it comes to younger people, however, ethnic differences
in their dress code tend to be blurred in favour of the latest fashion. Although Uyghur
women are usually more modest than their Han contemporaries, they all compete in having
the trendiest outfit and some do not hesitate to wear breath-taking mini-skirts.
Nevertheless, a certain difference is still noticeable as far as accessories are concerned.
Regardless of their age, Uyghur women would almost invariably wear pure-gold earrings.
If they are married, they would also wear matching pure-gold bracelets, necklace, and
rings. Similarly, what makes Uyghur men's dress code distinctive is, as already
mentioned, the fact that they usually cover their head with a cap or a hat.
I have spent many a trip on the local minibuses trying to establish each passenger's
ethnic background. While this led me to reflect on what could be the markers of
difference, at the same time it made me even more aware of the way in which labels and
categories inevitably freeze and simplify the complex and dynamic reality in which people
constantly negotiate their identity. And yet in Xinjiang - as elsewhere in China - everyone
must be "something". Not only is this established by the entry "minzu" on their ID, but
this is a generalised assumption whenever dealing with people. In Ortimchi, usually the
two categories into either of which most people are expected to fall are "Uyghur" or
"Han". It did not take very long before I interiorised such an assumption and began to
place people into either of these. Hence for instance the "identification" exercise in which I
used to engage while on the bus. However, while most of the time I could easily tell a
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Uyghur from a Han, I found it much harder to establish what made the difference, and
concluded that often it is a combination of various factors in the right proportion.
Time
As Abdurehim pointed out during our first meeting, time too is a very important marker of
Uyghur identity vis-à-vis the Han. Although Uriimchi and Kashgar lie several thousand
kilometres west of Beijing, officially there is only one time zone in the People's Republic
Of China. This means that in late December the sun does not rise until eleven in the
morning, Beijing time, and in June it does not set before eleven, or even midnight, always
Beijing time. The fact that Xinjiang should be at least two time zones behind Beijing seems
to be acknowledged, more or less explicitly, by everybody in the region. If, on the one
hand, virtually everything, from transport to post offices and schools, runs on Beijing
time, on the other hand their daily working schedule begins and ends two hours later than
in Beijing. Thus the single time zone is nothing but a fiction, as those who work in daily
contact with China proper know very well: by the time they start their working day, people
in the rest of China are about to go to lunch.1°
As a consequence, an unofficial "Xinjiang time" (sometimes also said "Ortimchi",
or "ICashgar" time), more consonant with the rise and fall of the sun, is commonly used
by Uyghurs and by most of the other non-Han groups. This runs two hours behind
Beijing time and, occasionally, it may be granted semi-official status, as for instance in
Oriimchi's main post office which closes at "8 p.m. Beijing time (6p.m. Xinjiang time)",
as the label at the door reads. While most Han in eriimchi are hardly aware of the
existence of "two times", this is usually an issue and a source of confusion among the
Uyghurs. One must often switch between the two times, depending on the situation and
on the interlocutor.
By looking at what time (i.e. whether Beijing or Xinjiang time) people use in
speech, as well as what time their watch is set on, one can infer their assumptions and
consider what strategies some of them adopt to cope yvith such an awkward situation. At
the two ends of the spectrum there are those who are consistently set either on Beijing time
or on Xinjiang time. The latter are extremely rare in Oriimchi, where it is basically
10 On the issue of time in Xinjiang see also Dwyer (1998:74-75). Smith (forthcoming) devotes a paper to
symbolic, spatial, and social boundaries between the Uyghur and the Han, including a long section on
time. Also on boundaries and markers of difference is Beller-Hann (2001c), which examines Han-Uyghur
relations in a southern oasis.
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impossible to leave one's doorstep without having to come to terms with Beijing time.
Whereas the former are by all means the majority, given that more than 80% of ertimchi's
population is Han, and I have never come across a Han in eriimchi who used local time.
Hui (Chinese Muslims) too tend to use Beijing time; having spent more than a year in
Xinjiang, I was extremely surprised when I met an old Hui whose pocket watch was set
on local time and who explained to me that "here in Xinjiang there are two times: Beijing
time and Xinjiang time".
Most Uyghurs stand in the middle, that is, they are those who switch. Whether their
watch is set on one time or the other often depends on their job. For instance,
Abdurehim's watch was set on Beijing time, since he was working for a foreign company
based in Beijing, but he always made a point of using local time with other Uyghurs and
with anybody he regarded as "loyal to the Uyghur cause". In other cases such choice may
indicate a different stance with regard to the assimilation process, as in the case of two of
my teachers. While Bahargtil, who used Beijing time, insisted in speaking Mandarin to her
child so that he could attend Han schools, Dilnur, who instead used Xinjiang time, sent
her daughters to Uyghur schools and had a much more uncompromising attitude to
Chinese culture in general. However, she confessed that her choice of Xinjiang time was
ultimately dictated by practical reasons: "Once I used to switch from one time to the other,
until one day I got up, dressed my daughter and took her to school, only to realise that we
were two hours early! It was too confusing, and at that point I decided to only use
Xinjiang time." As a consequence, I had to cope with classes set on two different time
zones, which was not easy at all. For those who switch it is indeed confusing, since every
time one has an appointment one has to assume what time the other person is on, or what
time the other person assumes one is on. Therefore, it is common practice among those
who switch to specify the time zone whenever there is a possibility of doubt. In any case,
as I've already pointed out, this is never an issue for the Han, who generally fail to
acknowledge the fact that some people use local time, almost as if this made Xinjiang
closer to the capital Beijing.
Language
After food, which will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, language is
probably the most important marker of differentiation, and one which functions as a
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powerful ethnic boundary. Hence many Uyghurs' dilemma, particularly in ürnmchi, as to
whether they should send their children to a Uyghur or a Han school. Indeed, while many
minkaohan are in fact perfectly bilingual, 11 there are also some who are basically unable
to speak Uyghur. These are looked down upon by other Uyghurs to say the least, but
most importantly they are as a matter of fact excluded by most Uyghur networks. The
following discussion should further clarify when and how language, as well as other
markers of difference, become relevant boundary setters among Uyghurs in contemporary
Xinjiang.
Tursun, who told his Han colleague that Khitai means "Hitachi", represents an
interesting case of ambiguity and hybridity among contemporary urban Uyghurs. He was
born in Ortimchi in 1971, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. Soon after his birth his
father, an Uzbek driver, and his mother, a Uyghur doctor, were "sent to the countryside"
(Ch. xia xiang):
When I was 40 days old my mother gave me to a Khazak family who lived in
Nanshan because she and my father had been sent to Turpan.12 It was then the
height of the Cultural Revolution and my mother, who is a doctor, was required to
work for the cadres. In the beginning she refused, she didn't want to leave me, and
yet there was no way she could take me with her. But she was "criticised" for this
and, eventually, she had no choice. I've been raised in Nanshan by a Khazak
mother until I was six. As a child I was very blond. My Khazak mother shaved my
head and my eyebrow twice, until my hair got darker. She was afraid that they
might see a symbol of "capitalism" in it and do something bad to me.
Although Tursun attended Uyghur schools, he declares himself a "half-minkaohan" in
that he had his secondary education at the Ortimchi 17th Experimental Middle School,
apparently the best minzu school in town and one where half of the subjects are taught in
Chinese. Thanks to his fluency in Chinese, Tursun did his university degree in central
China, at the Xi'an School of Law. In short, he is perfectly fluent both in Uyghur and in
Chinese, a degree of bilingualism rarely achieved among Uyghurs. Moreover, due to his
educational background and to his linguistic skills, he is remarkably familiar with both the
11 Minkaohan (lit, a minzu
Chinese native speaker, who
schools.
12 The "Southern Mountain
resort
testing into university in Mandarin) refers to a Uyghur, or any other non-
was educated in Han schools, as opposed to a minkaomin, who went to minzu
s", a pastoral area south of Ortimchi, now also a holiday and sightseeing
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Uyghur and the Han world. Today Tursun too, like Eli, can be regarded as a "successful"
Uyghur. He has a good job in the judiciary and he knows how to make the best of it.
Because of his job, as well as his educational background, he has a lot of Han "friends" -
although in many cases I would call it a patron-client relationship rather than a friendship -
and he is perfectly comfortable in both the Uyghur and the Han world. Seemingly, he has
no personal reason to complain, nor any interest to change the status quo. Yet, along with
a genuine friendship, he shares with Abdurehim feelings of anger and resentment, which
nevertheless he articulates in a humorous rather than bitter vein. Tursun looks everything
but Chinese, so much so that the first time I have met him I thought he was American.
Many Han assume he is a foreigner and he has a collection of favourite anecdotes on this
subject.
Last week I was in Guangzhou on a work-trip. On the way back, when I went to
check-in at the airport the employee addressed me in English. I gave her my ticket
and ID while keeping my mouth shut. When she looked at my ID she said in a
rather surprised and disappointed tone "Oh, you're from Xinjiang!? I thought you
were a foreigner ..." At that point I told her in perfect Mandarin "You're wrong
Madam, for you [plural] I am a foreigner!" Now this is my standard reply ...
I was lucky enough to witness one of these incidents. It was an early spring day and
Tursun and I had gone shopping. While in a stationery shop, we were being served by a
Uyghur attendant when a Han attendant came over and addressed me in a very tentative
English. While I was trying to make sense of what she had said, she turned to her Uyghur
colleague who was talking to Tursun in Uyghur and told her in a low voice "His Uyghur
is not bad, isn't it?" "We are speaking our own language!" was her colleague's reply.
"Really?! He's Uyghur?! I thought he was a foreigner...". I got my notebooks and we
moved to a different counter where they sold pens. In a bad English, Tursun asked the
Han attendant to see some markers. When I asked him why he was speaking English, he
replied "To her I'm a foreigner anyway!". This witty remark in fact conceals some sort of
truth and can be read in two ways. In a passive sense, it refers to the fact that many Han
think that he, as well as other Uyghurs, are "roreigners", i.e. European or North
American, because of the way they look. But it may also be read as a not too subtle
suggestion that the Uyghur are a foreign people in China, thus implying that Chinese rule
in Xinjiang is illegitimate, on the grounds that Uyghurs are not Chinese. In short, despite
his many Han acquaintances, whom he sees quite often, Tursun is loyal to what he
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regards as "his people". To the extent that he tries to keep his Han network separated from
his Uyghur network. While the first is mainly predicated on the Chinese notion of guanxi,
the second relies mostly on family and friendship ties. 13 Although I was a more integral
part of the second, where I definitely felt more comfortable, I was easily admitted to both
thanks to the fact that I was situated outside the Han/Uyghur dichotomy.
3.4. The HanzulMinzu dichotomy
• It is important to stress that in Xinjiang, and particularly in Oriimchi, Han-Uyghur
interaction does not occur in a vacuum. As already pointed out in previous chapters, while
Uyghurs and Han represent by far the biggest groups, they are just two of the thirteen
different minzu into which Xinjiang population is officially classified. However, such
classification does not accurately convey the complexity and the dynamic aspects of ethnic
identities in this region. Rather than being described as discrete and self-contained
collectivities, perhaps these groups could be better represented along a continuum. While
the position of a group, as well as that of an individual, along such continuum would
obviously vary depending on the context, given the current situation we could tentatively
situate the Han and the Uyghur at the two ends. The indigenous Turkic Muslim groups,
such as the Uzbek, Tatar, Kirghiz, and Khazak, would be the closest to the Uyghur end.
In particular, considering the high rate of intermarriage among Uyghurs, Uzbeks, and
Tatars, as well as their linguistic and cultural proximity, I would argue that today in
Xinjiang the boundaries between these three groups are in fact almost totally blurred, or at
least very permeable. Equally closer to the Uyghur end are the Tajik. While they speak an
Indo-European language and therefore cannot be labelled Turkic, they are usually educated
in Uyghur since there is no script for the variant of Tajik they speak. Hence, given also
their numerical exiguity, they feel close to and often tend to identify with the Uyghur, not
least because, as a Tajik friend put it, "we are all Muslim".
Peoples of Mongolic stock, such as the Mongol and the Daur, lie somewhere in the
middle, but still closer to the Uyghur end. While most of them are Buddhist and therefore
do not share the Uyghur's Muslim lifestyle, they too speak an Altaic language and for
them Chinese usually is their second language. Moreover, they share with the Uyghur the
13 Guanxi, literally meaning "connections", is a crucial concept in Chinese society. See Yang (1994) and
Yan (1993).
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experience of being an often 'oppressed' minority, as well as a certain resentment for the
dominant Han majority. Literally in the middle stand the Hui (Muslim Chinese), who are
Muslim like the Uyghur but share the Han's tongue. Hence they are generally alienated
and mistrusted by both the Han and the Uyghur. Finally, groups such as the Manchu and
the Xibe are definitely closer to the Han and often hardly discernible from them, especially
as far as their appearance is concerned. They all speak Chinese as a native language,
although Xibe usually also speak their own language (also of the Altaic family), and in
many aspects they share the Han's culture. Indeed intermarriage among these three groups
is generally unproblematic and fairly common. Moreover, they tend to share the Han's
'negative stereotypes about the other minzu, in particular about the Uyghur.
While this is inevitably a gross generalisation, which certainly does not accurately
describe the shades and subtleties of Xinjiang's ethnic landscape and interaction, at least it
may help to convey a sense of the complexity of the social landscape in this region, and of
the context in which identities are negotiated, by the Uyghur as well as by other groups. In
other words, when we talk of the Uyghur vis-à-vis the Han, one has to bear in mind that
the picture is often much broader and more detailed than that. It is only for the sake of
brevity and clarity that I do not always refer to it.
On the other hand, while in official discourse it is constantly stressed that Xinjiang
population is made up of thirteen different minzu and that these are all united as one in
their effort to modernise and develop the region, in daily practice things are rather
different. In fact, there is a constant awareness that Han and non-Han represent two
distinct categories and enjoy different status in the taxonomy of all the peoples of China;
although, as we have seen, not every non-Han minzu has the same status, nor does it
relate in the same way vis-à-vis the Han. The Hanzulminzu dichotomy is sometimes
implicitly stated, and therefore promoted, by those very slogans which apparently argue
the contrary, such as the one declaring "The Han and the minority nationalities: one breath,
one fate, one heart!" (see above). What we learn is that China's population is divided into
two broad categories: the Han and the non-Han minority nationalities, which in turn are
sub-divided into different groups. According to the latest trend in minority policies this
slogan sounds a bit outdated, since in official discourr the phrase "minority nationalities"
(shaoshu minzu) has been substituted by "nationalities" (minzu), which in theory should
include the Han. However, the fact that the equal status of all 56 minzu is true only on
paper is reflected in the use of such terminology in everyday language, where everything
is conceptualised in terms of the Hanzu/minzu dichotomy. The case of Xinjiang
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University, which I have discussed above, is but one example. Here it is perfectly normal
to talk of minzu students, minzu classes, minzu dormitories, etc., and there is no doubt
that what is meant is "non-Han". In other words "Han" is the default and "minzu", that is
the non-Han, is the marked category. Indeed minzu (in Uyghur milliy) is a synonym for
"non-Han", both in popular discourse and in more or less official expressions, as for
instance in Minzu Chubanshe, the publishing house which publishes material about non-
Han peoples, or in non-Han languages. While this is true throughout China, it becomes
particularly striking in a region like Xinjiang, where one is constantly confronted with
such dichotomy.
The case of the Museum of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is exemplary.
The Museum includes three sections: a display of "cultural and historical relics", one of
"ancient mummies", and an exhibit of "minzu folkways". Leaving aside the first two -
which are predictably inscribed within a sinocentric historical narrative based on the
postulate that this region has always been part of China - we shall consider the third,
which is the most relevant to our discussion. The best way to introduce this is to quote the
"Brief introduction to the exhibit of Xinjiang minzu folk customs", which is printed on the
back of the admission ticket:
Since ancient times, Xinjiang has always been an inseparable part of our great
motherland. On this piece of land live the following minzu: Uyghur, Han, Kazakh,
Hui, Mongol, Kirghiz, Xibe, Tajik, Uzbek, Manchu, Daur, Tatar, and Russian.
Through the display of architecture, dress and personal adornment, tools, artistic
objects, and utensils, this exhibit depicts the outstanding cultural heritage and
social customs that each minzu has developed over a long period of time. By
enhancing mutual respect, help, and knowledge among each minzu, and by
promoting the common goal of development, this exhibit will let the magnificent
flower of each minzu's culture blossom even more splendidly in the "hundred-flower
garden" of our motherland.
Leaving aside the fact that this region was not called Xinjiang until the late 18th century,
what is most striking is that in the actual exhibition there is no sign of the Han! What we
find is a sort of human zoo, where each non-Han minzu has been distilled into a number
of essential characteristics and displayed in a glass showcase. The content of each
showcase includes two life-size dummies, representing a male and a female specimen of
the relevant minzu, dressed in their minzu costume. A number of other supposedly
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representative objects are also displayed, ranging from agricultural implements to carpets,
harnesses, and cooking utensils. The centre of the exhibition hall is occupied by some
examples of minzu "architecture" (photo 22). These include a life-size section of a Uyghur
house, complete with carpets and a carved wooden veranda, and two yurts which look
extremely similar, except that one is supposed to be Khazak while the other is meant to be
Kirghiz. The overall impression is that of a very static representation of these minzu. With
their "traditional" dresses - which nowadays nobody wears, except in Song and Dance
Troupe performances - "traditional" houses, "traditional" agricultural implements, etc., the
image of backwardness usually associated with non-Han minzu is subtly reinforced. In
short, it is as if they were 'frozen in history'. In this sense this could be taken as an
example of what Harrell describes as the "historical metaphor", whereby peripheral
peoples are constituted as ancient by the civilising centre. According to Harrell, by
adopting a social evolutionist approach the Communists have developed the historical
metaphor to its fullest (Harrell 1995:15-16). In any case, such an exhibit testifies the
existence of two distinct categories: the Han, i.e. the civilising centre, and the minzu, i.e.
the peripheral peoples to be civilised.
Be it because of the size of their population, or on the grounds of historical and
political circumstances, not only are the Uyghur the majority group in the region, but they
are also the ones who most overtly oppose the Han and have a very specific claim to self-
determination. Today, while the Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Uzbek, and Mongol in Xinjiang
can look across the border at countries named after their people, the Uyghur are the only
large group with some sort of national consciousness who do not have a country of their
own. Thus, the Han and the Uyghur inevitably are the two reference groups at a regional
level, and in most cases also at a local level. It follows that in the Hanzu/minzu dichotomy
the latter term is often interchangeable with "Uyghur". This is particularly true of
Ortimchi, where every interaction tends to be conceptualised in terms of the Han/Uyghur
binary opposition. For example, when listening to a conversation where a person is being
mentioned only by a personal pronoun, the most usual question would be "Is s/he Han or
Uyghur?". Sometimes such mental process of classification can be unconscious, and one
automatically assumes that the person which is the object of a conversation is either Han or
Uyghur. The fact that there are also other groups often seems to be forgotten. This is
partly due to an inevitable tendency to simplify, but more importantly it reflects the fact
that those two groups play a dominant role in the ethnic mapping of the region. In short,
while the Han/Uyghur dichotomy subsumes a much more complex reality, at the same
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time, such complexity tends to be ordered according to this dichotomy. Hence the idea of a
continuum stretching from the Han end to the Uyghur end, with each group sometimes
implicitly subsumed under the closer end, depending on the context.
In conclusion, as already pointed out by Lucien Pye (1975:510, see 1.4.), at the
heart of Communist nationality policies there is a basic contradiction between an
assimilationist approach and, at the same time, one that de facto promotes differentiation.
Such contradiction derives from the paradox inherent in the Communist civilising project,
that is, the definition of its objects, i.e. the peoples to civilise, as both inferior, and
therefore in need of civilisation, and civilisable (Harrell 1995). In other words, in order to
barry out the process which should ultimately take the "civilisees" to the level of the
civilisers (assimilation), the former must be first defined as inferior, that is at a lower stage
on the scale of civilisation, and therefore different. The Uyghur's reaction to such a project
is inevitably informed by the same paradox, given that this is the framework within which
they negotiate their identity. Hence the tension between tradition and modernity and the
dilemma between assimilation and differentiation, in which many Uyghurs find
themselves. However, I suggest that by looking at the negotiation of Uyghur identity in





In this chapter I begin to explore the construction and the negotiation of Uyghur
identity in the realm of food by looking at ceremonial aspects of Uyghur life which
inevitably revolve around food. Starting with a discussion of hospitality, , both as a
value and as a practice, I proceed to examine some of the main festivals and
ceremonies that are celebrated among the Uyghur, focusing in particular on weddings.
From my fieldwork experience, these seem to occupy a prominent position in Uyghur
social life, providing a good vantage point to explore the themes of identification and
differentiation that are the object of my discussion.
While the perspective is always that of urban intellectuals in ertimchi, there are
constant references to southern rural Xinjiang. Here too we find the same recurrent
theme: the nostalgia for an ideal 'tradition' which is situated in a more or less mythical
south and, at the same time, a quest for 'modernity', of which Ornmchi is the symbol,
which seems to inevitably obliterate 'tradition'. This dilemma is not at all specific to
Uyghur society, on the contrary, it is more or less common to any society facing the
challenge of 'modernity'. However, among the Uyghur such a dilemma acquires a
specific connotation in that it is inscribed within the context of a Chinese hegemonic
discourse which equates Uyghur minzu identity with tradition (and backwardness).
Within this logic modernising amounts to the loss of such a traditional identity and
eventually the adoption of a Chinese (i.e. Han) identity, in short, to assimilation.
Here I am concerned above all with real people, each with their own specificity.
Through the analysis of ethnographic material, I try to suggest that while there is
indeed a solid core of shared norms and ideals, the complexity and the degree of
variation we find in actual practice provide scope for the negotiation of Uyghur identity
beyond such exclusive dichotomy. Moreover, such variation is by no means random
but can be traced to some sort of structure which allows change while preserving a
sense of continuity. Hence, for instance, the adoption of Chinese-style dishes (say) in
the wedding menu does not jeopardise its distinctively Uyghur character.
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4.1. Uyghur hospitality
"The Uyghur are famous for their warm hospitality; in Uyghur society both guests and
hosts should adhere to a specific etiquette." (Tian 1991:174-75). Thus begins the
section devoted to Uyghur customs in Zhonghua Minzu. Indeed, in China any
introduction to the Uyghur minzu would almost invariably mention hospitality (haoke)
as one of their most characteristics traits: "Respecting the elderly and loving the young,
attaching importance to manners, warm hospitality, being able to sing and dance, and
being fond of plants, are among the most important Uyghur values." (Chen 1986:84).
It is therefore not surprising that native discourses on Uyghur identity are equally
articulated around the notion of hospitality (mehmandostluq), although it is difficult to
establish to what extent native representations are informed by the dominant discourse
or, conversely, to what extent this reflects a native discourse.
4.1.1. Being a guest in a Uyghur home
I had my first 'practical' lesson in Uyghur hospitality shortly after I arrived in
Driimchi, when I was invited for dinner by my teacher Bahargiil. When she opened
the door of her flat and welcomed me inside, I was full of curiosity not knowing what
to expect. As soon as she closed the door against the squalor of a concrete stairway in
one of the forty-odd concrete apartment blocks where the university staff are lodged, I
felt suddenly plunged into another world. She showed me the living room and invited
me to take a seat.' I noticed the carpets on the floor and the pile of shoes at the
entrance of the room, so I took my shoes off and walked in barefoot.
The room was small but very carefully furnished and decorated, and most of the
space was taken by a sofa and a coffee table. Although I was the only guest, she
showed me where to sit before leaving to get some fresh tea. Only later did I learn that
rules of hospitality dictate that a guest should have the best seat, that is, the most
central one facing the entrance to the room. Shortly after, Bahargiil returned with a
beautifully engraved copper teapot. She poured some tea in a bowl and offered it to me
with both hands while inviting me to take (eling!) some gezlikkir from the table. This
was literally covered with small silver plates and crystal bowls full of raisins, walnuts,
almonds, biscuits, dried apricots, sweets, meringues, cakes, and fresh fruit (cf. photo
23 showing a dastikhan laid with gezakliir). "I'm terribly sorry, I don't have any non
1 By living room here I refer to what the Uyghur call melunankhana (literally "guest room"), that is
the room where guests are entertained.
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(bread). You can do without all the rest, but nan should never be missing when you
receive a guest" she apologised before leaving the room again. I was left there,
dunking biscuits into my tea and wondering whether I would be expected to eat
something else after all those good things. I started looking around: hand woven
carpets on the floor and on the wall, behind the sofa; bright orange synthetic velvet
curtains; embroidered cushions and white lace on the purple sofa; facing the sofa a
glass-fronted cabinet with silver and crystal-ware carefully displayed ... The decor
was not my taste, but I felt surprisingly cosy. That was the cosiest place I had been
since I had arrived in China two weeks before.
My gaze was caught by a big samovar, complete with matching cups, when
Bahargtil walked into the room with a huge plate of steaming polo and a spoon. She
placed it in front of me and invited me to start eating: "yang!". Before I could protest
that it was far too much for me, she had left and come back with her own portion - at
least four times smaller than mine - and sat down on a chair on the other side of the
table. "Polo is made with rice, mutton, onions, and carrots. First you fry the onions
and mutton in very hot and abundant oil, then you add the carrots, chopped into
'match-sticks', the rice, some water, and cook it covered for about thirty minutes. This
is the basic recipe, I added some raisin and dried apricots too, I think it tastes nicer"
explained Bahargtil while we were eating, and added "yang!" (eat!), as I had paused
for a moment to listen to her.
I had already heard so much about polo. Virtually every Uyghur I had met had
described it to me proudly as the Uyghur food par excellence and the most delicious
food on earth. So much so that I was anticipating a disappointment when I would
finally taste it. On the contrary, I found Bahargtil's polo absolutely delicious. In fact, a
year - and hundreds of polos - later! would still rank it top of the list. "For Uyghurs, a
guest should be treated with polo, as a sign of respect. It's a rule of hospitality, when
you invite someone for the first time, or on any special occasion, you should make
polo" continued Bahargiil. "Of course nowadays you can eat polo anywhere in the
street, but it's not the same as home-made polo. For instance, at home polo is always
served with salat, a cold dish of fresh tomatoes, green peppers, cucumbers, and
onions, seasoned with salt and vinegar. Like this ..." She shovelled a spoonful of
such salad on my polo and I had to agree that a side dish of fresh vegetables matched
perfectly such a fatty main course.
This was the most delicious meal! had in a long time but, despite Bahargiil's
pressure, I had to leave nearly half of my generous portion. In the complex language
of hospitality, I could never work out whether it was more polite to clean up one's
plate, showing appreciation, or to leave half of one's portion there, stressing the host's
110
generosity. In more than a year, I learned that in this realm almost nothing is
straightforward. Fortunately, as a foreigner, I was not expected to be a competent
speaker of that silent language of etiquette.
Indeed, interpreting the language of hospitality is not always easy and it can lead
to amusing misunderstandings. For instance, when I met a friend or acquaintance in
the street, we would stop to greet each other and exchange civilities; then, before
parting, they would invariably say "dyget keling!" (come to my house.!). In the
beginning I interpreted this as an invitation and I used to reply "When?", which must
have provoked their amusement. It took me a while to realise that, most of the time,
what they were actually implying was "good bye". Nevertheless, sometimes people do
want you to go along; hence it is difficult to shed all ambiguity and recognise a real
invitation from a farewell. Usually the degree of familiarity, as well as the context, are
useful indicators. Perhaps prescriptive notions of hospitality are operating when this
kind of 'symbolic' invitation is made. At the same time, an implicit subcode allows
people to get across their real intentions while being polite and hospitable. Hence we
can look at hospitality as a marker of Uyghur identity, in the sense of shared meanings
and norms of behaviour. In other words, being Uyghur also means knowing what is
the right thing to do, or to say, both as a guest and as a host.
4.1.2. Dastikhan and mehmandostluq
Dastikhan is one of the keywords, if not the keyword, around which Uyghur notions
of hospitality revolve. It literally means "table-cloth" and, due to a metonymic shift, its
second meaning is "food" (Shiyong ...1996). However, dastikhan is seldom used in
its literal meaning, for instance, the expression dastikhan selish (spreading the table-
cloth) immediately conjures the image of a guest, possibly unexpected, being attended
by the host; although nowadays the actual table-cloth is rarely used. 2 It is above all in
this acceptation that the term dastikhan is strongly associated with notions of
hospitality, such as in the expressions dastikhan chong or dastikhan keing (lit, having
a large table-cloth), used to describe a very hospitable person, and its antonym
dastikhan yoq (lit, without a table-cloth), meaning "stingy", "mean". Other
2 In fact, the spreading of the tablecloth refers to the 'traditional' eating style, where people sit (or
kneel) on carpets and mats around a tablecloth, on which the food is served (cf. photo 24). Today,
sofas and coffee tables - on which usually no tablecloth is spread - have become very common in
urban areas. Here too, however, there is a considerable degree of variation. While I have never come
across a 'traditional' guestroom (with supa covered with carpets on which people sit) in Ortimchi, in
Kashgar, for instance, the two styles coexist and one can find sofas and coffee tables in "traditional"
houses (Oy) as well as supa and carpets in 'modem' flats (bina).
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occurrences of this word include dastikhan aparmaq (to send gifts of food),
dastikhan tityyarlimaq (to prepare gifts of food), dastikhan chaqirmaq (to invite for
a meal). Here too the stress is on social aspects of food. The 'table-cloth' is charged
with meanings implying a whole range of food exchange whereby relationships are
forged, maintained, and reinforced.
Mehmandostluq, the Uyghur word for "hospitality", is a similarly evocative
term, where the two words mehman (guest) and dost (friend) are combined to convey
the quality of being 'guest-friendly'. Uyghur Orp-adatliri, a book on Uyghur customs
published in Uyghur and therefore addressing a Uyghur public, devotes a whole
section to this institution and provides some rules of hospitality:
Hospitality is the most precious tradition of the Uyghttr people, who regard
the arrival of a guest as the arrival of happiness. Hospitality is expressed in a
number of ways.
1) As a sign of respect for the guest, a new table-cloth is spread. The guest is
then treated with tea and corn-flour bread, at the least. Uyghur hospitality is
displayed at its best during holidays and festivals.
2) Guests deserve respect. When serving tea or food to a guest, a serving tray
should be used. If for any reason one is unable to use both hands, one should
apologise by saying "Please forgive my single hand". Equally, both hands
should be used when taking something from a guest's hands. This is a custom
shared by all Uyghttrs. When pouring tea or serving a guest, the right hand is
used. Using the left hand is a sign of great impoliteness towards the guest.
3) When receiving a married couple, a female host should not serve tea or food
directly to the male guest. The latter should be served only through a man.
4) Special attention should be paid in order to make sure that the bowl into
which tea is poured or food is ladled out for the guest is not chipped. If tea or
food is inadvertently served in a chipped bowl, once the host has realised this,
s/he should eventually replace the bowl and apologise to the guest. When
pouring tea to a guest, the bowl should not be filled up completely. Moreover, it
is a sign of bad manners to pour tea in the middle of a bowl, so that it bubbles
into a froth. In order to avoid this, tea should raiher be poured against the side
of the bowl. Never pour fresh tea on top of the old one, this should first be
removed and then replaced with the fresh one.
5).If a guest is received in a house with kang and supa,3 s/he should be given a
cushion to sit on.
3 See note 2.
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6) Guests are welcomed and escorted outside the door or the gate. It is a big sign
of disrespect sending a guest off without leaving one's doorstep.
7) If a guest comes riding a horse or a donkey, the host besides going out to
welcome him or her should also take the animal from the guest's hand and tie
it. Later, when the guest is leaving, the host should untie the animal and help
the guest to mount (Rakhman et al. 1996:113-114)
This sort of `decalogue for the Uyghur host' tells us that there are shared * rules that
should be respected when entertaining a guest. Some of these rules are described in
great detail. However, this may just give us an indication of the complex role that
. hospitality plays in Uyghur society. In actual practice, the ways in which hospitality is
performed vary considerably, from the most basic to the most elaborated, depending
on the context.
4.1.3. Variation in hospitality
Since my first formal invitation at Bahargiil's, I realised that the Uyghur code of
hospitality can be very complex. In the following months I began to appreciate the
great deal of variation in the display of hospitality. In fact, from the very beginning I
could also experience a much less elaborated kind of hospitality from my other teacher
Dilnur. We had only met twice when, at the end of our first class, she invited me to go
to her house and have lunch with her. On our way home we stopped at the market to
buy some vegetables, "I am going to make Ord" she said. The informality of this
invitation became even more apparent when we got home. As we walked in, Dilnur
showed me the living room to the right, then she gave me a pair of slippers and let me
follow her through the corridor to the kitchen, where she started preparing the filling
for Ora. She had kneaded the dough in the morning, since she used sourdough which
needed at least a couple of hours to rise. Once the filling was ready, she spread the
dough into wide circles, put some filling in each and then folded them into half. In the
meantime she kept talking to me, explaining what she was doing and asking questions
about my country. While she was frying the Orli, Anargiil, her ten-year-old daughter,
came home from school. Dilnur introduced me and asked her to make some tea. I
followed Anargiil in her mother's bedroom, just opposite the kitchen, where we sat on
a carpet. drinking tea and watching television, until Dilnur walked in with a steaming
plate of Orli and we ate. This was the room where they normally sat as a family, to
eat or watch television. Although at that time I could not fully appreciate the degree of
informality in Dilnur's hospitality, I could feel that she wanted me to feel at home.
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When she later said "this is your home, you can come any time", I knew she really
meant it.
The hospitality I could enjoy at Dilnur's was probably the most 'basic', in terms
of elaboration but certainly not in terms of warmth. At the other end of the spectrum I
would situate the kind of hospitality displayed during the major Uyghur festivals,
namely Roza heyt, Qurban heyt. Both are well known Islamic festivals: Roza,
literally "fast", closes the month of Ramadan, while seventy days later Qurban,
literally "sacrifice", commemorates Abraham's sacrifice. During these festivals, which
last three days, people are expected to visit relatives, friends, and acquaintances. The
sequence of these visits should be ordered according to priority of moral respect, for
instance one should first pay a visit to elderly and sick relatives. These occasions pose
high demands in terms of hospitality, not only because of the huge number of visits
that are exchanged, but also because people must perform the role of the host as well
as that of the guest.
I was lucky enough to spend Roza heyt in Kashgar with my friend Nurqiz -
although at the time I was not always sure this was a luck. That year, 1997, the end of
Ramadan coincided with the Chinese Spring festival. This meant that the Uyghur and
all the other Muslim peoples of China could enjoy, for once, a much longer holiday
than the two or three days that they are normally granted on these occasions. Like all
the other students at Xinjiang University, Nurqiz too had gone home to spend the
holiday with her family and friends. When I arrived in Kashgar, a couple of days
before the festival, I found that not only her family but all her friends were expecting
me. The kind of hospitality I experienced during those days combined that reserved to
an old friend who lives far away, as in the case of Nurqiz, with that reserved to a
foreigner, probably the most valued and prestigious guest in Uyghur society. These
days in China, and especially in this part of China, foreigners are often seen as a
potential resource, as the key to access a world otherwise precluded to most people.
This perception inevitably informs, in a more or less conscious way, most interactions
with the local population. However, whenever I have been a guest in a Uyghur home I
could clearly feel that, regardless of any possible ulterior motive, people were also
truly honoured and felt genuine gratitude for the arrival of a guest from so far away. In
other words, in this realm the boundaries between value and practice are blurred in a
complex and sometimes contradictory mix of motivations - prescriptive norms,
genuine feelings, interiorised values, pragmatic reasons, etc. - that hospitality
encapsulates.
When I arrived in Kashgar, short before the end of the holy month of Ramadan,
the streets were bustling with people selling and buying, getting ready for the festival.
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In every home women were busy cleaning the house, making sangza, 4 and preparing
the mehmankhana (guest room) by "spreading the tablecloth" - literally or
metaphorically - and covering it with all sorts of gezdkleir (sweets, fruit, biscuits,
bread, dried fruit, etc..; cf. photos 23-24). Nurqiz's mother was even busier, since on
top of all that she also had to cook two extra meals a day for Nurqiz and me who,
unlike the rest of the family, were not fasting. These meals were very informal in
terms of etiquette, in contrast with the formal visit I had to perform a couple of days
later by sitting for "at least twenty minutes", as Nurqiz instructed me, in her family's
mehmankhana. At dawn on the day of the heyt, all men converged to the Idkah
Mosque, the biggest in the whole province, for the namaz. According to Nurqiz's
father, the giant square in front of the Mosque was completely covered with men who
were praying. This namaz marked the break of the fast and the beginning of the
festival. Later that morning Nurqiz wore the new dress she had bought for the
occasion and we set out for our first visit. She explained that in most cases people sit
for no longer than half an hour, just enough to drink some tea and exchange a few
words with the host. However, for us it was different and we had a long list of
people, mostly Nurqiz's old school mates, who were each expecting us to stay for a
meal, no matter if that would have been the third or fourth meal for us in a day. In the
beginning I was very excited by the prospect of such an intense fieldwork session, but
by the end of the second day I began to feel tired and suggested that perhaps we could
have declined some of the invitations that we had lined up for the following day.
"That's impossible" said Nurqiz "it would be very impolite. We must go ... we don't
need to stay that long and you can eat just a little, to be polite".I was aware that these
people were making an extra effort, in those busy days, to show me their utmost
hospitality. However, it is a lot easier to appreciate this retrospectively. At the time I
felt extremely relieved when we finally bid farewell to the last of our hosts.
The same pattern of short formal visiting (in Uyghur heyt peitisi) is repeated
during the Qurban festival, except that on this occasion guests are also expected to eat
some of the qurban gOshi ("sacrificial meat"), that is the meat of the sheep that each
family is supposed to slaughter on the first day of the festival. In 1997 the Qurban
festival was celebrated in April and this time there, were only three days of holiday. I
stayed in Ortimchi and the first day I followed Nurqiz, who was visiting those among
her many relatives who lived in town. We paid our first visit to Gtilnur, a cousin of
her mother's who lived not far from the University. It was still early and the whole
family was busy getting ready to entertain guests and to go out and visit other people.
4 A sort of fried crunchy noodle made with sheep fat and arranged in the shape of a spiral. These are
made exclusively during the two festivals of Roza and Qurban.
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Photo 23 - Mehmankhana (guestroom) in a Uyghur house prepared to attend guests during
the Roza festival. In the middle of the dastikhan (tablecloth) sangza and, behind, a stack
of nan.
Photo 24 - Attending guests in a Uyghur house during the
Roza festival.
While she was laying the table, Gtilnur complained , to Nurqiz that all her Han
colleagues wanted to visit the following day. "There's so many of them, and it's not
even their festival! As if we didn't have already enough to do ... I stayed up all night
to make sangza. They should give us a holiday before, not after the festival, to have
enough time to prepare everything."
Compared to a place like Kashgar, in Oriimchi, a predominantly Han and
'modem' city, adhering to norms and values of hospitality can be a much heavier
burden for a Uyghur woman, who is faced with the difficult task of mediating between
often contrasting demands. Besides a working schedule which is not at all designed to
accommodate Uyghur traditions and values, Giilnur's remarks also point to what we
may call the 'politics of hospitality'. That is, that subtle game by virtue of which from
'patients' who feel obliged to extend their hospitality to the Han, Uyghurs turn into
'agents' who are empowered by this very same situation, as discussed in the following
section.
In short, we have seen that hospitality is a shared value among the Uyghur, and
that it is considered a marker of identity both by Uyghurs themselves and by the
Chinese, in official rhetoric as well as in popular discourse. But what does it entail
being hospitable? How is hospitality performed? The above accounts suggests that the
answers to these questions are rather complex and that it is reductive, if not
impossible, to summarise them in a set of rules. It is necessary to make a distinction
not only between hospitality as a value and as a practice, but also among different
'degrees' of hospitality, that is from the most basic to the most elaborated, depending
on the guest and on the occasion. Such variation can be manifested in a number of
variables, such as the type and amount of food, from simply tea and bread to a more or
less elaborated meal; the space where a guest is entertained, which could be the
mehmankhana, the room where the family normally hangs out, or even the kitchen; or
else time, both as duration as well as time of the day in which a visit is paid.
In particular, it seems that the degree of elaboration increases with the 'social
distance' between the guest and the host. Such distance may be determined by a
variety of factors, such as difference in age, gender, social status, etc., or simply by
the occasion (a casual visit as opposed to, say, the Ql.trban festival). In other words, it
depends on the role that each actor is playing in each particular context. The kind of
hospitality will also vary depending on the extent to which it is dictated on the one
hand by genuine feelings for the guest - and for the host - and on the other by
prescriptive norms of behaviour. Indeed hospitality, as a practice, is a combination of
these two elements and, when normative considerations prevail, it can be a painful
chore for both the host and the guest. I often experienced Uyghur hospitality both as a
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pleasure and, at the same time, as an obligation: the higher the distance and hence the
scale of elaboration, the more the interaction had to be mediated by the appropriate
code of behaviour. In practice this meant, for instance, feeling obliged to eat even if I
was not hungry at all. For me, this was further complicated by 'social ignorance', as it
is not always easy for an outsider to discern politeness from actual intentions - to
understand, for instance, when people mean what they say and when instead they are
performing the role of the host - and to know how is one supposed to react as a guest.
To give but one example, not only should one know that when a guest manifests the
intention to leave the host is expected to stop him from leaving, but one also needs to
know how many times this polite dialogue should take place before the guest can
actually leave. This is not so straightforward but will depend on the context, that is on
the degree of elaboration.
It is above all in this sense that hospitality is a marker of Uyghur identity: as an
interiorised value which is manifested also through normative behaviour. The
competence in decoding such behaviour may function as a boundary, hence an
outsider can be defined by the complete or partial lack of this competence. However,
things are not so clear-cut and even within the community successful decoding may be
affected by a whole host of factors. Here too it is useful to consider 'competence in
hospitality' as a tendency rather than an objective and universal trait among the
Uyghur.
4.1.4. The politics of hospitality
Hospitality is a universal value among Uyghurs. However, we have seen that in actual
practice it can be performed in a variety of ways and take on a variety of meanings.
Hence it is not easy to disentangle all the different narratives embedded in the practice
of hospitality. While at the core there certainly is genuine friendliness and generosity,
another important dimension is a prescriptive notion: one is expected to behave in a
certain way and will be judged accordingly. This tension was often articulated by
Uyghurs in Oriimchi, both taking pride in their pepple's renowned hospitality, but
equally complaining about it as a chore. I have heard several times Uyghur women
complaining about all the work and inconvenience entailed by the presence of a guest.
These were all women who had a job outside their home and found it often difficult to
combine - their urban lifestyle with "traditional" Uyghur values, such as that of a
housewife's hospitality, to which they nevertheless subscribed. A common remark
was "In southern Xinjiang" or "In the countryside it is different, people there are truly
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hospitable. They can afford it because women usually don't have a job and even those
who work, including the men, can take it a lot easier, they can take time off, or even a
day, whenever they want. They don't realise that in tiriimchi it's not like that. Our
working schedule is much tighter and we can't take time off simply because we have a
guest." Such comments were usually elicited by the presence of a relative or friend
from that person's hometown.
Notions of hospitality are so pervasive in Uyghur culture and society that they
are also used to articulate a (political) discourse of resistance. "We are hospitable, but
not stupid" a friend once told me "when, during the holidays, our Han colleagues
come to our houses, we offer them tea and food with a smile on our face. But in our
heart we cry." She then pulled out a tape hidden behind a draw and played it to me.
"You must listen to this, it's really interesting...":
"Sulayman Guwah, a poem by Talchir Talip" announced emphatically a male
voice, creating an amusing contrast with the poor quality of both the tape and the tape
recorder. A cheerful tune, a sort of traditional-style electronic tune, introduced the
poem, somehow anticipating its comic tone, then the tune faded in the background and
the male voice started reciting:
"There's a guest!" children shouted
I also greeted him with happiness
I spread the table-cloth for him generously
I asked him to feel at home throughout
I offered and kept him at the guest's seat
I gave him food until he refused
I took him to the gardens and orchards
He truly enjoyed himself
He got fatter and his belly got bigger
By eating the polo and meat I provided
He sat there and never moved
No mention of leaving at all
"What kind of guest is this?" I wondered
As I have never seen a guest who doesn't leave
The characteristics of this guest have taken me aback
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Later I learned that he is my big brothers
My father had him on his way to Mecca [with another woman]
We hugged again after learning the long kept secret
My stepmother cheated him and told him to follow
his stepfather's footsteps
She gave him ajar filled with fragrants and sent him
to find his little brothers
He is still sitting at the guest's seat
I think I've done enough for our brotherhood
But I keep my head down all the time in front of him
And I do not hide anything from him
Now I feel a guest in my own home
I feel obliged to be grateful to him even for a cup of tea
He started giving me orders
I virtually became his servant
I am in this situation now
I, kind and obedient
I am even willing to be a resting place for birds
Sulayman could prove all this6
The tape was a collection of fifteen poems written by contemporary Uyghur writers.
Pighan ("Sigh"), one of these poems, gave the title to the collection, which featured
well known masterpieces, such as Oyghan by Abduwaliq Uyghur and /z by
Abdurehim Otktir, along with less famous but equally meaningful pieces. This tape
came out in 1993; one of the poems, Hdykal (Statue) was first published on the
Wulumuqi Wanbao ( lOrtimchi Evening Standard). In this poem a Uyghur veteran of
the Ili rebellion, which in Communist China is offIcially called "the three provinces
revolution" (sanqu geming), stands at the foot of a statue dedicated to the Unknown
Soldier (a Han). He remembers the times when they were 'brothers', fighting together
against the nationalists to liberate Xinjiang, and regrets the present, when all the
promises that were made then seem to be forgotten. They are no longer brothers and
5 See chapter 3 on the Han being the aka millat ("older-brother nationality").
6 Many thanks to Mamtimyn Stinnat for helping with the transcription and translation of this poem.
119
while one is 'up there', the other stays 'down here', "eyes red with anger and a sigh in
my heart".
"In the beginning, they didn't realise what this was all about ... when they
finally did, the poem and the whole tape were banned and the statue, which was at
beimen, was removed. ... Well, you know, this tape is basically all against the Han
... these lyrics are full of meaning, although not everybody can understand them. For
us it's obvious, perhaps because metaphors are a privileged form in Uyghur literature.
These poems talk directly to our hearts."
Despite the fact that this tape is now illegal, like all similar publications, both
printed and recorded, it probably enjoys an even wider circulation than when it was
openly sold in shops. I asked my friend if I could borrow that tape in order to copy it.
She hesitated and then said that hers was already a copy of a copy that a friend had
given her, and that I probably would not have been able to understand a word had I
made a further copy of it. I wondered to what extent her hesitation was due to genuine
concern about sound quality, or if it was rather dictated by the nature of the tape and
the atmosphere of suspicion and fear that was reigning in Xinjiang. Therefore I
suggested that I would try to find a better copy first, and I would use hers only as a
last resort. I needed someone I trusted and who trusted me, preferably someone 'on
the ball', with an extended network: Tursun was the ideal person. We met for lunch
the following day and, after making sure that nobody could listen to our conversation,
I told him what I was after. He had never heard of the tape but said he would find it
for me. Few days later he turned up in my room and put the tape on my desk "This is
the tape you wanted, Pighan. It's an original, I borrowed it from a friend. In fact, it's
his father's and we have to give it back as soon as possible. Don't show it to anybody
and make me a copy too, all right?'
This was the atmosphere in Ortimchi in 1996-1997. It is not surprising, then,
that virtually every word and every act, even those apparently insignificant, could be
loaded with symbolic meaning. The harsher the censorship and repression, the subtler
and more sophisticated the strategies for daily resistance. The less people are allowed
to openly articulate a political discourse, the more innocent activities such as eating or
feeding a guest can become politicised. The metaphpr of the guest is a particularly
powerful one, given the role that the value of hospitality plays in Uyghur society. Here
a discourse of resistance is played on the subtle ambiguity of the host-guest
relationship. On the one hand, the Uyghur portray themselves as victims of an abuse,
committed by a guest who takes advantage of their hospitality. But, on the other hand,
by depicting themselves as hosts they give an empowered image of themselves, even
when they are reluctant hosts to a guest that never leaves. As we shall discuss in later
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chapters, their role as hosts is made even more powerful by the fact that they refuse to
be the Han's guests, thus establishing an asymmetrical power relation by condemning
the Han to the impossibility to reciprocate.
4.2. Food in rituals and ceremonies
"Perhaps we [Uyghur people] are poorer because of all the ceremonies prescribed by
our religion, like weddings, circumcisions ... each time one has to invite hundreds of
people." This was Bahargiil's conclusion to a long digression on ethnic inequality in
Xinjiang during one of our first classes. While being a consciously simplistic
explanation, this statement is significant here in that it points out the frequency and the
size of such celebrations in Uyghur society. In these occasions food plays an
important role, both symbolically and socially. Often a particular food item is charged
with ritual meaning and, almost invariably, the offering and sharing of food is used to
mark the event.
"Before I die I must settle my debt" Bahtiyar's father once said, meaning that
he wanted to have him married. "A father has two duties towards his son: he must
have him circumcised and he must have him married, then he can rest in peace"
explained Bakhtiyar. It follows that the two main events in a man's life that require
adequate celebrations are circumcision (siinnlit toy) and wedding (qiz-yigit toy).
According to Uyghur custom, girls are also celebrated, on the fortieth day of their
birth, with a bashilk toy ("cradle party"). While this is a Uyghur, rather than Muslim,
tradition, for the purpose of our discussion this celebration can be assimilated to the
siinnlit toy in that, at least in Ortimchi, it involves the same kind of food events.
For urban Uyghurs today a circumcision or a wedding imply a huge banquet,
with hundreds of guests, held in a work-unit dining hall or, more prestigiously, in a
restaurant. To my question "what is the difference between a siinnat toy and a toy?"
the reply was "There is no difference, except that in the former you greet the boy while
in the latter the groom and the bride; the rest is the same: food, spirit (baijiu), and
dances". Whatever significance these ceremonies may,have for those directly involved
- such as the boy, the newly married couple, and their families - to an external
observer the most striking social content is the display of prestige and affluence.
Privately many seem to complain, both among hosts and among guests, about the
obligations they feel with respect to such ceremonies: for the host they represent a
huge expense, while the guests say that there are too many of them and most of the
time they attend simply because they feel obliged to. Yet more and more money are
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spent on these occasions, hosts are easily offended if one does not attend and guests
are resentful when they are not invited. In short, these events largely dominate urban
Uyghurs' life.
At the other end of the life cycle, death is also marked by food events. According
to the Muslim custom, on the same day that death has occurred, the dead is taken to the
mosque for the jinaza namizi (funeral) and then buried in the cemetery. A
commemorative meizir (a gathering involving a meal) is held on the third, the seventh
and the fortieth day as well as after one year. With the exception of close female
relatives, only men take part in the nazir. On those days mourners start visiting the
dead's family from the morning and are offered food, usually polo. In priimchi, since
flats are very small, a neizir may be held in a public space (a restaurant or a dining
hall), especially when the dead is a public figure and many guests are expected.
Besides the nlizir, during the forty days following a person's death, friends and
acquaintances are expected to visit the family (Oillm patish) and bring a "tray"
(tawaq), that is, some ready-made food such as manta (steamed dumplings), samsa
(baked dumplings), or at least some boiled eggs, on the assumption that family
members are mourning and need to be fed.
A recently introduced custom is that of celebrating birthdays. As in the rest of
China, this has been adopted from the West and has become popular especially during
the 1990s. However, birthday parties tend to be reserved to children and younger
generations. As Bakhtiyar, who was then in his mid-twenties, put it "I don't even
know what day I was born, my mother claims it was during the apricot season, my
father swears it was in the grape season ... in the end on my ID they wrote 20 June.
Anyway, I don't care because I don't celebrate. Traditionally Uyghurs don't celebrate
birthdays, in my household only my younger brother and sister, who are seven and
twelve, celebrate their birthdays, it's because they have learned from TV."
Uyghur parents in Ortimchi celebrate their children's birthday with a dinner
party. The magnitude of this may vary, from a meal at home where other children and
their mothers are invited, to a banquet in the most expensive restaurant in town, worth
a few thousand yuan. During a five-year-old's birthday party, which her parents held
at home, I could observe a fascinating contamination pf cultures: while children were
quietly playing in the smaller room, adult guests, mostly their mothers, were
entertained according to Uyghur rules of hospitality with tea and gezeikkir in the living
room. Once everybody had arrived, they served a western-style birthday cake and
performed the 'cake ceremony' (with candles etc.), while a plastic birthday gadget was
playing an obnoxiously loud 'happy-birthday-to-you' tune which seemed to go on
forever. After the cake, which tasted rather like greasy toothpaste, they served a meal
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consisting in a number of Chinese style stir-fried dishes (say). At the end of the meal
rose wine (meiguixiang) was offered to the women, while the few men who were
there drank baijiu (Chinese distilled spirit).
I will now turn to a detailed discussion of the wedding, this being the ceremony
that I have had the opportunity to observe more closely, perhaps because most of the
people I was involved with belonged to an age group where this was the most relevant
event. Moreover, it illuminates a whole range of pertinent issues concerning
contemporary Uyghur society.
4.2.1. Uyghur Weddings
Weddings (toy) occupy a central role in Uyghur life, both as a religious institution
and, even more so, as a social event. They often represent the most conspicuous
expense in a household budget, since they are the opportunity to display a family's
wealth and/or power thus confirming or acquiring a certain status and prestige in the
community. Weddings can also be a privileged means for establishing or reinforcing a
social network, through affinal relationships. Moreover, wedding celebrations can
provide an arena for the definition and reproduction of social hierarchies. From the
1980s, and especially since the early 1990s, with the rapid introduction of new values,
new models, and new life-styles, things have been changing relatively fast throughout
China. This is true also of Xinjiang where, although perhaps at a slower pace, change
has been particularly evident in big cities like eriimchi. Marriage too, both as an
institution and as a ceremony, has been affected. Young people are getting more and
more independent and, sometimes, they may even earn more than their parents. Young
women start thinking about their career too and their perspectives on marriage are
rapidly changing. Both age and gender relations are thus undergoing a process of
redefinition. With the following accounts I intend to illustrate such dynamic situation
and to look at weddings not as an archetypal institution but rather as intimately bound
to the socio-cultural context of contemporary Uyghur (urban) life. For this reason I
have chosen to reconstruct Uyghur weddings as a process. Through the words of
some Uyghur young people, as well as by giving an account of my own experience at
a wedding party, I intend to convey both the complexity and some degree of variation.
Moreover, by providing a multiple perspective on this event, I hope to represent
Uyghur Weddings as a lived experience.
The pattern of Uyghur weddings may present a great deal of variation, especially
between different areas. In order to make the following descriptions more intelligible, I
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will briefly sketch the main stages of what I regard as the wedding process, before
introducing native accounts. The actual wedding, starts early in the morning with the
religious ceremony (nikah) performed by an imam at the bride's house. Later that
day, friends and relatives are invited to celebrate. Celebrations - mostly involving a
banquet - occur in different stages and involve different groups, divided according to
gender and age. Older people take part to the earlier part of the celebration, starting in
the late morning, and give way to younger guests in the early afternoon. Moreover, the
bride and the groom start two separate parties and only later, in the afternoon, the
groom and his bestmen go to fetch the bride and her party joins the groom's party.
Other events precede and follow the actual wedding, respectively the miislihat chay
and the chong chay before, and salam and chillaq after the wedding. This is a basic
pattern, which roughly reproduces what can be observed in Ortimchi.
Last Saturday I went to one of my best friend's wedding - began Giilbahar. Only
a month ago she swore she wouldn't get married before a year or two ... I didn't
even know her boyfriend, they've been going out only for three or four months.
Anyway, these days it's fairly common that girls get married so quickly, I
think they marry as soon as they find a good match, it's not about love. At the
wedding I had a lot of fun and I danced all day. From eleven in the morning
until four in the afternoon we were at the bride's restaurant, then the men came
to fetch the bride and we moved to the groom's restaurant, where we stayed
until ten in the evening. I went there so early because the bride was one of my
best friends, we went to college together. If the groom were my best friend I
would have gone to his restaurant, but only to greet him, I wouldn't have
stayed because they are all men and they drink. I would have gone back in the
afternoon. After we moved to the groom's restaurant, his mother kissed the
bride and gave her a ring. Then the older people left and we danced all night
usul [Uyghur dance], disco, and tan gsa [waltzing] ... but mostly usul, unlike
other weddings. If you don't know any of the male guests it's a bit boring, you
don't get many chances to dance since it's very rare that a stranger invites you
and you cannot dance if you're not invited.
Gtilbahar is twenty-four and is doing a Master's in economics. She has clear ideas
about her future. Although she is aware of all the difficulties - being a Uyghur and a
woman - she wants to study and, ultimately, her dream is becoming a woman
manager. She says her parents support her choice and she expects a prospective
partner to support her too and to grant her a reasonable degree of independence. She
thinks it is not easy to find such Uyghur men because "usually they don't want a
124
girlfriend who is 'better' than them", although it turns out that her two room-mates
apparently have found such men. On the other hand she feels social pressure for
having a partner and getting married soon, lest people think that nobody wants her.
Giilbahar says that until the late 1980s weddings were 'traditional', the bride
wore a 'traditional' Uyghur costume, like those that usul professional dancers wear
today. Then the white wedding dress was introduced. Today, ten years later, someone
in ertimchi may choose to have a 'traditional' wedding. She knows of a friend of a
friend who made this choice: no alcohol at her wedding, only tea; no modem dances
like tangsa and disco, only Uyghur usul. However, she says that guests do not
appreciate much.
Once people used to give lengths of material or silver and crystal ware as a
wedding present. Nowadays in Oriimchi everybody gives money, both the
guests and the bride and groom find it more convenient. By law women must be
eighteen and men twenty before they can get married. However, in the
countryside girls can be married when they are only fourteen or fifteen,
sometimes even thirteen. Often the groom is forty or older, usually he is
someone who has money and is willing to help a poor family if they let him
marry their young daughter. Girls don't agree, but they have no choice because
their parents force them. Sometimes an older man doesn't need to be rich in
order to marry a young girl, she can be the daughter of a friend. In the
countryside, for instance in Aqtu county, people are so poor ... they may have
more than ten children and they have nothing to live on because they must sell
to the state at subsidised prices everything they produce.
Giilbahar likes to talk about marriage and relationships in general. She believes in
romantic love, as well as in women emancipation, and she feels that most of her
friends do not share her views, but rather value status, money, success. Her ideas
about peasant women's condition may be that of an educated urban dweller; however,
she does have first hand experience of rural areas since her family is from Kashgar and
she goes there often to visit her grandparents, who "live near Aqtu in a traditional




When Uyghur people talk about a wedding (toy), most of the time like Giilbahar they
refer to the party. In fact, there are different stages in a Uyghur wedding and not
everybody takes part in all of them. Today the precondition to celebrate a wedding is to
obtain a marriage certificate (jiehun zheng) from the relevant office. This may happen
several months before the actual wedding ceremony and, by law, a couple who has
such certificate is already married. However, people do not perceive this as part of the
wedding, and a couple is considered married only after the religious ceremony (nikah)
and the public party have taken place. "Dilbar and Shireli had their marriage certificate
for two years before they could get married" explained Nurqiz, "finally their parents
agreed and they celebrated their wedding a month ago".
Food plays a role in each stage of the Uyghur wedding process, both
symbolically and as the core of a socialising event. I asked GUlbahar and Nurqiz to
give me a complete account of the wedding, since, as a guest, I had only attended the
final celebration.
Early in the morning, around six Xinjiang time, the imam goes to the bride's
house to perform the nikah. The groom is there with his father and close male
friends, together with the bride's family and close friends. Only a few people
take part in this stage. The imam recites the Qur'an in a room together with
the groom and his friends, while the bride is in the next room, where she can
hear unseen. At the end the imam asks the couple whether they agree on
getting married, and they reply "maqul" [yes]. Then the imam dunks some nan
in salted water, breaks it into two and gives one piece each to the groom's and
the bride's friends. They, in turn, give it to the bride and the groom, who must
both eat the nan, in order to get off to a good start. If the bride eats it first,
because her friends are faster, she will be the one to run the household.7
After the nikah everybody goes home, only to meet again a few hours
later at the respective parties, which start at around eleven in the morning.
There are basically three parties: the bride and her friends meet at her place
or in a restaurant, if her house is small - which is almost always the case in
Otiimchi; another party is held by the bride's parents for their friends and
older relatives; while the groom's parents entertain their own friends and older
relatives, in a restaurant or dining hall. In the early afternoon, the groom's
7 This description roughly corresponds to that in Uyghur Orp-adtitliri (Uyghur Customs). In particular
the book says: "Uyghurs believe that salt strengthens the young couple's love. It is said that the
side who takes it [the nail] first will not fear the other side" (Raldunan 1996:129).
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friends join this last party and most of the older guests leave. Then the groom,
with a group of friends, goes to fetch the bride and her guests - mostly women.
Originally he went on a cart, with a band playing naghra-sunay [kettle drums
and shawm]; nowadays they use fancy cars, but they still have a pick-up truck
with people playing naghra-sunay to open the procession. At this stage the
party becomes one, mostly of young people, with the exception of older family
members. After people have eaten, the groom's mother welcomes the bride to
the family by kissing her and giving her a ring, then the older people leave
and the young keep celebrating.
Weddings in Kashgar
According to Nurqiz weddings in eriimchi have inevitably adapted to the city's
lifestyle and rhythms, the two main factors being lack of space and time, compared to
other parts of the region. "For instance" she says "weddings in Kashgar, especially in
rural areas, are very different from here, they usually last two days." The morning of
the first day the nikah is performed at the bride's house. Not many people take part
and, apart from the bride and a few close female relatives, all the other participants are
male. After the nikah, a nazir is held at the bride's house and all the men of the local
mosque community (mahalla) are invited to eat polo, which is provided by the
groom's family. During the morning, the men also visit the groom's house. In the
afternoon the bride's female guests go to her house, while the groom's female guests
and his closest male friends celebrate at his house. Later in the afternoon the toy
(party) is held at the groom's house, with male and female guests. Food, such as polo,
manta, samsa, is shared in fours and is usually eaten with fingers. Men dance
Uyghur usul to live 'traditional' music and drink discretely. In the evening, the groom
and his male friends go to fetch the bride and take her to his house, usually on a horse
or a donkey cart. Three female relatives - but not too close - of the bride go with her
and prepare the nuptial bed. That night they sleep in the room next door and the next
morning they go and check that there is blood on the sheets. The second day the bride
does not wear white anymore but red, to symbolise the transition from qiz to ayal, in
short her new status of (married) woman.8
8 For the Uyghur a woman who is not married yet is a qiz ("girl", but also "virgin"; qizliq, "the
quality of being a girl", means "virginity"). Being an ayal ("woman") implies being married. It struck
me that Nurqiz included this detail in her description. In fact, virginity was an issue that was discussed
and possibly challenged among urban youth in Ortimchi, at least among those I knew.
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On the second day there is nashtiliq in the morning and yiiz achqu (unveiling) in
the afternoon, the latter includes tartishmaq (skirmish). Nashtiliq lasts half a day and
is a sort of brunch where close female relatives and friends of the bride bring a wide
variety of foods, such as polo, manta, Opga hesip, kawap, to the groom's house.
The afternoon, always at the groom's house, is devoted to the yiiz achqu (unveiling)
ceremony, to which the groom's young male friends and both sides' female guests
participate. The food offered is simpler: polo, manta, and qordaq. Before the actual
unveiling, tartishmaq (skirmish) takes place, either in the courtyard (oyla) or in the
hall (mehmankhana): the groom and his mother-in-law (qeyin ana) want to exchange
presents, usually lengths of material, but her friends prevent her from reaching him,
on the grounds that now that he is her son it is he who must come to her. Similarly,
the groom's friends stop him from approaching her saying that she is his mother now,
therefore she must come. This skirmish lasts about half an hour and eventually they
meet half way. The actual unveiling (yiiz achqu) is performed in the hall. The bride
seats in a corner, usually on the supa, and her mother covers her head with a long
precious drape. The groom's younger sister - or a cousin, or a niece, provided that she
is younger than eighteen - while dancing usul slowly pulls the drape until the bride is
completely unveiled, at which point she kisses her.
A wedding party in Uriimchi
None of my closer friends got married while I was there, however, since weddings are
large-scale social occasions I had the opportunity to attend several of them. Below I
give an account of my experience at a wedding in Ortimchi.
It is a Saturday afternoon in mid-June and I am getting ready to attend a wedding
party. I have no idea who is getting married but Yasin, a friend who studies in the
literature department, has insisted that I should go. "It's an 'upper class' wedding, you
may meet interesting people, they work at the TV station". He had been invited and
asked to take a foreign friend with him. This will probably give prestige both to him
and to the hosts, I think to myself. On the other ,hand, he believes that it would be an
interesting experience for me. When I protest that I do not know any of the women
there, he says that he has arranged everything: Rahild, a friend of his from the
language department who claims to know me, will take care of me.
The wedding party is held in the zal (hall) of the Xinjiang Central Television
station, just across the road from the studios. It is four o'clock when we get there and
people are still arriving, some lingering outside for a while before getting in. A young
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woman meets us at the entrance, it is Rahila. She greets Yasin and takes me to a table.
We cross the entire hall diagonally until we reach the last table in the corner on the
(young) women side. There are already some eight or ten young women sitting there.
Rahila introduces me and leaves to meet other guests.
The women's side is fairly crowded, while the men's is nearly empty. They
have all gone to fetch the bride. The nuptial table has been arranged just two tables
behind us, right in the middle of the women's side. I look around: the young woman
on my left seems approachable and I start a conversation. She studies literature at
Xinjiang Normal University. She and the woman to her left have been friends with
Rahila since they were children, they grew up together. After a while, I gather that
Rahila is the qiz beshi (literally "head-girl"), that is, she is in charge of the women
side. Yet I am still not clear as to her relationship with the newly wed, perhaps she is a
relative. Later Yasin would tell me that she is the groom's younger sister.
While we wait for the bride, we chat and munch the usual gezdkldr - biscuits,
sweets, raisins, walnuts, etc. - that are always served to entertain guests before a meal.
For some reason the serving of tea is delayed. Short before the bride arrives, Rahila
opens the dances and some women join her. They start with Uyghur usul and after a
while men join them too. Before food is served, there is a solo performance by a
woman usulchi (professional usul dancer) in her late forties, probably a guest, and a
few more rounds of usul danced by couples. Dancing will be resumed after eating and
it will be mostly tangsa (waltzing).
All in all, the twelve young women who are sitting at my table are not an exciting
company. They spend their time looking into their mirrors, making themselves up, and
arranging their hair. I wish I could sit with the older women, who are much more
talkative and far more interesting. Moreover, I am closer to their age, although I do not
share their status: for them I am still a qiz (girl) and not an ayal (woman). All the
guests are dressed up and I surprise myself being shocked by the arrival of a young
woman wearing a vest and dungarees. I love her casual style but, as I look around, I
find her totally out of place among all those frills. I have partly internalised local
fashion and modesty standards and I find myself staring at her naked shoulders with a
mixture of admiration and disapproval.
Finally, around five o'clock, the bride and the groom arrive. The bride is
wearing a white long wide dress and is accompanied by her qiz qoldash (maid) who
wears a very similar dress, only bright red. They reach their seats at the nuptial table
with some difficulty, given the width of their dresses. The groom and his best man are
the only men at that table. Meanwhile, the band, which includes a synthesiser, an
electric guitar, and a singer, keeps playing Uyghur pop songs by Abdulla, M.
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Sulayman, and others, while the photographer and cameraman keep shooting. Shortly
after they have arrived, the bride, groom, best man and maid of honour, move to the
middle of the hall. Here the groom's mother unveils the bride, whose face so far has
been covered by a white wedding veil, gives her a ring, and covers her head with a
red veil, which symbolises her new married status. Later, the bride and groom are
called out again, they must dance while their friends spray them with streamers and
urge them to kiss. Their third outing is for the group photographs (photo 26)..
I keep staring at the bride while she sits with a very serious, almost sad,
expression and her maid clears the make up which is melting on her face. I wonder if
she is performing, if she is simply behaving as a bride is expected to behave on her
wedding day, or if she is really sad or, most probably, tired. I look at the whole
wedding as a performance, the bride sad and serious, the girls making themselves up.
I cannot help recalling some older women's comments that weddings are an
unavoidable bother. Yet, younger people seem to enjoy them, at least according to
Giilbahar.
At about six they start serving food. Since this is a work-unit hall and not a
restaurant, they have hired some cooks. As usual, it is guests - close friends and
relatives - who serve. This happens also when the party is in a restaurant. The menu
follows what seems to be a standard wedding meal pattern in eriimchi, starting with
Uyghur 'traditional' food followed by liangsay (cold dishes) and sosay (stir fried
dishes; cf. photo 25). However, this is not as rich as at other weddings I have
attended, where they had more Uyghur dishes and more say. Here they serve first
some qordaq (a mutton stew), then three liangsay (cucumbers, tripe, soya noodles), a
dabanji (chicken stew), and finally four sosay (meat with peppers, meat with green
beans, scrambled eggs and mushrooms, spinach). 9 The actual meal lasts roughly half
an hour, then people start dancing again. At this stage men intrude the women's space
and 'shop' around for a dancing partner. Women do not seem to have a very active
role, they cannot dance if nobody invites them, nor is it always easy to refuse an
invitation.
Once the meal is over, they bring a tray with bottles of champagne, baijiu,
boxes of cigarettes, and tins of Sprite, to the nuptial table. As far as I see it stays there
untouched. Meanwhile, two women - and two men on the men's side - start collecting
gifts: they stop at each table and, while one collects the money from each guest, the
other records on a notebook the name and the sum that has been given. m By eight
o'clock some guests are already leaving. I cross the hall through the men's side, where
9 For a discussion of dishes, menus, etc. see chapter 6.
10 I was told that the standard offer at a wedding banquet was around 30 yuan.
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Photo 25 - A women's table at a Uyghur wedding in ürilmchi.
Photo 26 - Group photograph at a Uyghur wedding in ürtimchi.
they have started the drinking session, and I go out. There I find Yasin, my friend,
who is sitting at a long table with a dozen men in their fifties. As I get closer he tells
me that these are intellectuals and that if! am ready to drink a few glasses it might be
interesting to sit with them for a while. After I am introduced, they first insist that I
look Uyghur, then suddenly ask me if men and women are equal. I say yes. "Then sit
down and drink!" I protest until we reach a compromise: I will only drink a glass of
beer. After a couple of toasts I realize that they are quite drunk and decide to leave.
Later, Yasin's comment is "If these are Uyghur intellectuals ... we are hopeless!" But
after all, who says that intellectuals cannot have fun?
The material and the moral economy of Uyghur weddings
So far, I have proposed different accounts of what happens at weddings. In fact, the
process that culminates on the wedding day actually starts at least a week before, with
the naislihat chay and the chong chay (or ashsoy, in Kashgar). The mtislihat chay
(lit. "advice tea") is something like a stag or hen-night, a meal organised about a week
before the wedding by the groom and the bride separately, each with his/her own
friends, in order to collect money and organise the practicalities of the wedding, such
as who is going to serve tea and food, who is going to arrange the cars, etc.. If
weddings mean a huge expense for the groom's family, they may also have financial
consequences on the bride and the groom's closer friends. This is particularly true for
a very popular person like Tursun. He once showed me his empty wallet and told me
he was broke "It's because of all these mtisliheit chay. Last night I had one and I gave
200 yuan. This month I've attended three. At one I gave 300 yuan, at another I
arranged a couple of cars for the wedding. My salary is 700 yuan a month, which is
not bad for a young person, but still, it's not a lot of money. If a good friend gets
married, one gives 500 yuan. The least one can give, for not too close friends, is 100-
200 yuan."
After all, there might have been some truth in Bahargiil's statement that Uyghurs
are poorer because of all their ceremonies. When considering all the money that is
spent on weddings, one wonders how people Can afford it. However, this is not
incomprehensible from a Uyghur perspective. As Bakhtiyar remarked above,
'marrying' a son is a father's duty, therefore this is not an unplanned and unexpected
expense. On the contrary, a family starts saving money for their son's wedding long
before he is old enough to get married. Sometimes there may be a hitch: "we had saved
twenty thousand yuan for our son's wedding. It's not much, but we've told him, this
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is what we can afford. Then our work unit told us we must buy the flat we live in. It's
small, but we can't afford a bigger flat. Of course we had to use that money ... now
we can forget about our son's wedding for a while." In ertimchi, twenty thousand
yuan is not that much for a wedding. I have heard of an old professor at the university
who spent thirty thousand yuan on his son's wedding.
Like elsewhere, also among Uyghurs the bride brings a trousseau for the house.
However, it is the groom's family who has the biggest financial commitment. Roughly
a week before the wedding, the groom's parents visit the bride's parents - even if they
live in another town - and bring the toyluq (bethrotal gift), consisting of a set of pure-
gold earrings, bracelet, ring, and necklace for the bride, plus some lengths of material
and some clothes both for the bride and her family. They also bring food, such as
meat, fruit, grains (rice, corn), sweets (kempit), assorted biscuits and cakes (pichinii,
baqali, bala pirenik, qat-qat, bdlish) raisin, walnuts, etc.. This event is called chong
chay (lit. "big tea") and the food which is given on this occasion is meant to be used
by the bride's parents to entertain their guests on the day of the wedding, before the
groom comes to fetch the bride. If the bride's parents do not want food, then the
groom's family gives them money.
If it is the groom or, often, his family who chooses the bride, the bride's family
has the possibility to negotiate the wedding by setting the toyluq. "My brother has
been engaged for some years" told me a young woman in Kashgar "but he hasn't
married yet because the bride's family asked twenty thousand yuan and he hasn't got
all that money." According to Nurqiz, a man today needs at least five to ten thousand
yuan in order to get married. However, there are some exceptions like Di!bar and
Shireli, the couple mentioned above, who decided to get married despite their parents
disapproval and, in the end, their parents had to agree.
The 'wedding process' continues also after the toy (actual wedding), with still
more food exchange. According to Patigiil, who got married in Oriimchi in the
summer of 1997, the day after the wedding there is an exchange of visits which is
called salam. First the bride's female relatives visit her at her in-laws bringing hot
food, then the groom with his qoldash (best man) and yigit beshi (head-boy) visit the
bride's family and are offered food. On day two the newly wed visit the bride's family
together, accompanied by the qiz qoldash (bride's maid). Finally, the last event is
chillaq, which takes place on the third and fourth day, when the in-laws invite each
other's relatives.
Uyghurs' attitudes to weddings may vary considerably, from criticising the
waste of time and resources to praising weddings and related activities as an
expression of a specifically Uyghur culture. In fact there is no contradiction but,
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rather, people consider and evaluate different aspects. "I've been to Han weddings,"
said Tursun once, "of course it was in a qingzhen [halal] restaurant. It's very simple:
guests greet the bride and the groom and hand them a red envelope with money in it,
then they sit down. They eat, there are a few toasts to the newly-wed, and that's it. It
is much better than Uyghur weddings because there is not so much waste and the
couple can use the money to buy electrical and household appliances, like a TV set, or
a hi-fi. A table at a Chinese wedding costs about 200 yuan, whereas at a Uyghur
wedding it costs at least 300 to 400 yuan because Uyghurs want a lot of dishes."
Moreover, not only are meals more expensive, but at Uyghur weddings the number of
guests seems to be considerably bigger. Someone told me that there may be up to
seven hundred guests. While this may be an exaggeration, I have counted about three
hundred guests at the wedding I described above, and this did not include all the
guests that had been entertained in the morning; it is a fair guess that altogether at least
four to five hundred people had been invited. On the other hand, as Giilbahar pointed
out, nowadays in Ortimchi guests always give money as a gift. Leaving the moral
economy aside, ultimately it is as if they paid for their own meal.
Weddings may pose a high demand on people's time and resources, especially
between September and December. "This is the busiest time" complained Dilnur once;
"During these months one cannot do anything else but attending weddings, every
weekend there is at least one, sometimes even three or four." During the rest of the
year they are less frequent, while between the two heyit, Roza and Qurban (ara-ay),
there is a taboo against getting married, lest the couple may be divided because of the
two 'barriers' represented by the two holidays. However, I know of at least one
wedding celebrated during that period.
If Uyghurs sometimes complain about, if not criticise and condemn, the waste of
time and resources, they still remain proud of their values of hospitality and of their
ability to enjoy life and have a good time. At a wedding someone asked what I thought
about Uyghur weddings. Before I could reply he remarked "we have fun, the Khitay
[Chinese] have a toast with baijiu and that's it". At another wedding a friend who had
invited me to dance made a similar comment "the Chinese do not have fun at
weddings, they don't 'let their hair down', they just eat and drink but never dance."
While watching people dancing usul at a third wedding, Bakhtiyar, who incidentally
cannot dance, went as far as stating that "Uyghur usul is the most beautiful dance in
the world." When I remarked that there are many other equally beautiful dances in the




From the chong chay, through the wedding party, to the chillaq food appears in every
stage of the wedding process. The role of food may be analysed along a continuum
stretching from symbolic to cultural and social aspects. Starting from the symbolic
end, we find nan dipped in salted water, used to 'seal' the marriage, as part of the
nikah. Furthermore, despite the adoption of a set of Chinese-style 'stir-fried dishes'
(so say) as the core of the wedding meal in Ortlinchi, Uyghurs cling to at least one or
two Uyghur dishes, which according to Tursun, is one of the reasons why their
wedding banquets are so expensive. Here several symbolic elements can be identified.
The number and selection of Uyghur dishes may vary, however, qordaq and/or polo
will be inevitably served at every wedding. Somehow these dishes can be said to
symbolise the event - although polo may be associated also with other values and
events, such as hospitality or funerals - and have been kept in the wedding menu as
representatives of Uyghur culture. Polo, I was told, should always be served at a
wedding because, being 'hot' (in the hot/cold/neutral classification of foods), it
'strengthens' the men, in particular the groom. This additional meaning alludes to the
fact that a newly-wed couple is expected to have a child as soon as possible, lest
people think that there is something wrong with them. Also the position of Uyghur
dishes within the meal structure lends itself to a symbolic interpretation: being served
at the beginning, as a sort of preamble leading to the core of the meal, they mark the
event as unquestionably Uyghur.
Moving towards socially informed aspects of food in weddings, we can identify
a whole set of economic and social relations being expressed and reinforced through
the exchange and the sharing of food. In the chong chay, for instance, the relationship
between the groom's and the bride's families is established through a food exchange
that is performed before the wedding. Such a relationship is reaffirmed after the
wedding, with a further food exchange between the two families, during salam and
chillaq. It is the parents who are the main actors in this event, thus pointing to the fact
that a wedding involves not just two individuals; rather it establishes a bond between
two families. We could also speculate a structural symmetry in the direction of the
exchange: while in the chong chay it is the groom who gives food to the bride -
through their families - once they are married it will be the bride who will feed the
groom; or, from yet another perspective, the groom's family gives raw unprocessed
food to the bride's family, who will then transform it into cooked/ edible food. Such a
division of labour will be reproduced in the married couple. While these may be little
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more than mere speculations, the role of food in the negotiation of social relationships
is undeniable.
Besides the exchange of actual foodstuff, commensality is another arena where
social relations are displayed, established, manipulated or reinforced. While the
sharing of a meal can be an expression of solidarity among the participants and a
marker of their common identity and equality, social structures along gender, age, and
ethnic lines are also discernible (Zubaida and Tapper 1994:12). This is particularly
evident in the space arrangement of a Uyghur wedding banquet. The first and most
striking criterion of division here is gender: even in secular and 'modern' Oriimchi, the
communal dining hall is clearly divided between the men and the women side, with a
sort of neutral ground in the middle where the dancing takes place. Space is further
defined within these two areas, where participants are distributed according to their
age, that is, people of the same age set share the same table. Finally, a table is specially
devoted to the few Han participants, usually colleagues from the bride and/or groom's
working place. This arrangement, in fact, marks their exclusion more than their
inclusion, given that this is usually the only ethnic division. Uzbek, Kazakh, and even
Mongol and Hui guests are usually incorporated in the `Uyghur' tables, suggesting
that the relevant distinction is Han/ non-Han. A distinction that may even precede the
gender separation, since usually Han men and women share the same table, further
stressing their extraneousness and reproducing categories of ethnic (Han vs.
minorities) segregation operating in the wider social context. Last but not least, notions
of pollution (halallharam) may also serve as a key to interpret this distinction, as we
shall see in chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PRIVATE SPHERE: FOOD, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY
Last Saturday I had lunch at Dilber's. When I arrived, she announced that we
were going to have kawa manta (pumpkin dumplings). "To let you taste
something different ... it's not one of the usual meat-based dishes" she said. Her
husband was preparing the filling in the kitchen. That was their daughters
request, as they think their father can do that better than their mother. Then
the three of us sat in the living room, the TV inexorably on. While we chatted,
Dilber rolled out the dough and her husband filled and sealed the dumplings.
Meanwhile Muhabat, their older daughter, was cleaning the house. When
their younger daughter Anargiil came home, her mother told her to offer me
some tea, but she said there was no boiled water ready. "Then give her some
fruit" said Dilber. Anargiil came back from the kitchen and handed me a
mandarin. "Arrange some fruits in a plate, don't do like the Chinese who give
things directly in your hands!" scolded her mother.
Previous chapters have introduced a series of dichotomies and apparent contradictions
surrounding urban Uyghur identity: ambivalent attitudes to change; antinomies of
tradition and modernity; the tension between ideal models and practice; different
degrees of elaboration in food-related practices. In this chapter I would like to pursue
some of these themes by introducing a new dimension: the construction of gender
identities and the management of gender relations in the domain of food. In particular,
I intend to focus on the private sphere, that is, home and the family, and I shall look at
how relationships and roles are defined, shaped, or challenged, in the production and
consumption of food.
5.1. Food at home and gender relations
Once I visited a friend who was a lecturer at Xinjiang University. He lived in
one of those old Russian buildings where single or newlywed employees are
lodged. 1 Those flats have no kitchen, only a bedroom and a bathroom, so
everybody cooks in the corridor. It was dinner time and, as I was looking for his
door, I noticed that the Uyghur who were cooking were all women, while the
1 The work unit provides accommodation, the size of which depends on one's position at work as well
as one's marital status.
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Han were all men. I recognised my friend's wife, who was making dinner just
outside their flat, and Tasked her the reason for this. "Our men satisfy us, so we
cook for them; Han men cannot satisfy their women, so they cook for them."
I was told this anecdote by Abdurehim. It provides a good starting point to look at
food and gender relations among urban Uyghur intellectuals. In popular discourse,
Uyghurs are described by outsiders, especially the Han, as wild, violent, and male
chauvinist, a typical remark being "they beat their wives up". As usual, such a
simplistic stereotype conceals a more complex situation, both in terms of ideal values
and actual practices. Leaving aside outsiders' representations, here I look at gender
relations, particularly in relation to food, as constructed by Uyghur men and women.
The ways in which urban Uyghurs talk about these issues provide an insight into what
are perceived as accepted values and norms of behaviour. As is often the case, actual
practices do not always correspond to these ideal patterns. Moreover, both women and
men's attitudes present a degree of ambiguity: if women often complain about men, at
the same time they are proud of their manly behaviour, especially when compared to
Han men; similarly, some men would like women to be more independent, but at the
same time they expect them to abide by conventional roles, (e.g. cooking, not
drinking, etc.).
Despite the ritual complaints, especially on the part of women, Uyghur men and
women also tend to be proud of each other, by virtue of their counterpart adherence to
what is commonly understood as their role, as the above anecdote exemplifies. It may
be significant that the latter was mediated by a male perspective, although I have heard
myself similar remarks made by women. Nevertheless, there is a degree of gender
inequality even among the most emancipated urban Uyghur, for instance in terms of
job opportunities, housework and family responsibilities, accepted behaviour, leisure
opportunities, sexual freedom, and the degree of independence in general.
In Uyghur society, as in many others, food production and consumption provide
an excellent vantage point to look at gender relations. The work of Maclagan on food
and gender, based on field research conducted in a Yemeni community between 1981
and 1983, points to a number of relevant issues.
Food is one of the main idioms through which gender relations are expressed.
The women's world and the men's world meet at food. Men buy it, women
prepare it. Men and women eat it but often separately: men in contexts of public
display and women privately. They also eat together as a family group.
Women's relation to food - what they are able to eat, how much of their time
must be spent preparing it - is defined by their relation to men. Men's relation to
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food is also delimited by women, through whose labour the food must pass after
purchase (or production) and before consumption. ... Men's and women's
obligations to each other are defined largely in terms of food. Men owe women
their subsistence.... Women's obligations towards men also centre round food. A
woman's day is structured by obligations towards men concerning food
preparation. (Maclagan 1994:159-160)
Maclagan's depiction of how gender relations are structured around food and food
events in a Yemeni community suggests several lines of enquiry, which may help to
frame an analysis of food and gender in Uyghur society. However, before focusing
specifically on food, I would like to start with a broader discussion of issues of gender
among the Uyghur. This needs to be situated within the framework of some of the
relevant literature on gender in general, and more specifically in a non-Western
context, such as Muslim societies, or China and rural Xinjiang. While an exhaustive
discussion of gender issues in non-western contexts is far beyond my scope, here I
simply intend to report some lines of argument, in order to problematise the issue and
to provide a critical framework within which the material I am going to present can be
situated.
5.2. Gender in non-western societies
The debates within feminist scholarship in the 1980s have produced a gradual but
significant shift from 'woman' to 'gender' as a central analytic category (Kandiyoti
1996:6). With specific reference to anthropology, Henrietta Moore wrote "the concept
'woman' cannot stand as an analytical category in anthropological enquiry, and
consequently there can be no analytical meaning in such concepts as 'the position of
women', the 'subordination of women' and 'male dominance' when applied
universally" (Moore 1988:7).
It is indeed very important to situate issues of gender historically and culturally
and understand these categories in their own context. Women, as Leila Ahmed put it,
"are those whom the societies under review defined as women and to whom they
applied legal and cultural roles on the basis of these definitions" (Ahmed 1992:7). For
instance, as Anagnost points out, "[the Western] notion of "woman" as an autonomous
entity, a female being, separable from familial roles, had little or no referent in Chinese
society outside a small circle of theorists. ... Women themselves continued to identify
with their kin and family roles, and therefore were motivated to restore the integrity of
138
the family that had been rent by decades of economic and political crisis" (Anagnost
1989:319).
Memissi seems to make a similar point when she argues that "the Muslim system
is not so much opposed to women as to the heterosexual unit" (Mernissi 1985:8).
Therefore, "at stake in Muslim society is not the emancipation of women (if that means
only equality with men), but the fate of the heterosexual unit" (Memissi 1985:20).
According to her, sexual inequality in Islam is not justified in terms of women's
biological inferiority. On the contrary, it is based on the assumption that women are
powerful and dangerous creatures, in that the involvement between a man and a
woman represents a threat to man's allegiance to God. Thus the women's liberation
movement in Muslim countries would be concerned with the kind of relationship
between the sexes, rather than claiming women's equality with men, and would
consequently be couched in terms of a generational rather than sexual conflict
(Memissi 1985:20).
In her review of feminist scholarship and Middle East studies, Kandiyoti situates
Memissi's position within the debate on "the compatibility of Islam with women's
emancipation". She identifies two strategies, both representing an important departure
from stereotypical, Orientalist depictions of subjugated Muslim women: one, with
potentially conservative implications, denies the necessarily oppressive nature of
Islamic practices, while the other, more radical, claims that oppressive practices are not
necessarily Islamic. According to Kandiyoti, the work produced within the latter, such
as Memissi' s, "challenges uniformly patriarchal interpretations of Islam by presenting
more radical alternatives as part and parcel of Islamic tradition" (Kandiyoti 1996:9-10).
5.3. Work and gender in Southern Xinjiang
In 1997 Beller-Hann conducted fieldwork in villages close to Kashgar. Through a
discussion of an extremely rich and valuable ethnographic material, she explores
gendered economic relations, mostly among peasants in the Kashgar region, in two
articles (Beller-Hann 1998a, 1998b). The first focuses on Uyghur peasants'
perceptions of work in three periods: the pre-socialist period (before 1949), the
collectivised period (roughly 1949-1980), and the post-1980 reform era (Beller-Hann
1998a). The pre-socialist period is reconstructed through older people's recollections,
as well as indigenous accounts in manuscripts dating back to the first decades of this
century. By combining these two sources, Beller-Ham highlights the divergence
between actual practice and values. Her informants tend to stress the value system
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prevailing at the time, rather than actual practice. For instance, while they usually claim
that women did not work in the fields, written evidence shows that many women did
in fact perform agricultural work. "Informants concede that this may have been the
actual practice, but it was not the ideal situation" (Beller-Hann 1998a:96-97). She
concludes that before 1949 a gender division of labour assigned different tasks to men
and women, but equally valued both.
[On the whole,[ men and women played complementary, symbiotic social roles.
Certainly these were profoundly marked by Islam; but to condude simply that
men exploited and dominated women is a gross simplification not only of the
social diversity, but also of the underpinning cultural constitution of male and
female personhood. Moreover, the incidence of high divorce rates indicates
that even if Islamic cultures generally can be construed as patriarchal, the
position of women in Eastern Turkestan was markedly different from norms
elsewhere. (BeBk.-Hann 1998a:99)
When we come to recollections of the collectivised period, both men and women's
experiences are largely negative. While official ideology still holds that women have
been the beneficiaries of socialist gender policies, in actual practice men and women
carried out the same tasks, but men received greater credit. Moreover, the support
services that were meant to ease women's burden were often inadequate and
sometimes represented an additional burden on them. "What for my Chinese co-
researchers represented a great • advance for women" notes Beller-Hann "was
remembered with great bitterness by the people themselves". Besides the practical
outcome, the mass mobilisation of women represented a radical break with the past, in
that it subverted the ideal that women should not work outside, as well as disregarding
the traditional modesty code which regulates men and women's daily interaction
(Beller-Hann 1998a: 99, 101).
This evaluation of gender dynamics in Communist China, albeit among a non-
Han group, is consistent with Anagnost's work. After assessing a number of studies
which show that patriarchal structures have been reproduced if not strengthened in
post-Liberation China, Anagnost suggests that the goals of such political campaigns
may have been other than raising women's status. "The invention of "woman" as a
political category must be seen as part of the larger emergence of a discourse of
modernity in 20th-century China, one that helped to empower the socialist state." The
question that Anagnost asks is: "to what extent the radical promise of the Chinese
revolution for the transformation of gender relations was in part a projection onto the
Chinese experience of Western feminism" (Anagnost 1989:318-19).
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Indeed, according to Beller-Hann, in the reform period women continue to be
regarded as primary carers, and have withdrawn once again into the domestic domain.
Although the participation of women in nearly all areas of production is significant,
this remains masked and undervalued. Moreover, women usually have no direct access
to the income they generate. Also in official discourse, as represented by the All-China
Women's Federation, women's contribution to the household economy tends to be
overlooked and their performance is acknowledged mainly in the domestic sphere.
Beller-Hann concludes that in the 1990s "local and Maoist legacies combine in the new
context of 'socialist commodity economy' to ensure that women's work remains
undervalued. It is curious that local Han scholars in Xinjiang ... continue to pretend
that patriarchy flows only from Islam" (Beller-Harm 1998a:111).
5.4. Gender relations among urban Uyghurs
Issues of gender were often at the forefront of my fieldwork experience, even though
gender was not one of my intended areas of research. In this section I would like to
give a brief account of my experience and my reflections, bearing in mind that I have
been dealing almost exclusively with urban educated women. Clearly, an adequate
treatment of gender among the Uyghur, even if limited to an urban context, would
require a much more accurate research and analysis. Here I just want to give some
sense of the dynamic situation and follow some of the themes that have emerged so
far. Indeed, the process of negotiation and redefinition of gender roles among
Uyghurs, which often unfolds in the realm of food, is part of the broader process of
identity negotiation which is the object of this study.
I am aware of the difficulties and dangers of such a cursory discussion, first of
all that of imposing western categories and discourses on a non-western context
(Moore 1988). Moreover, while there is a wide literature on gender in Muslim
societies, this tends to focus on the Middle East and north Africa. When looking at a
so-called "peripheral" Muslim society within the boundaries of a (post-) socialist state,
there are a number of factors that need to be ta1cen into account. On the one hand, it is
useful to consider recent feminist scholarship, which has shifted from a focus on
"women" to one on "difference", thus recognising the relevance of other categories
often overlapping or intertwined with gender, such as ethnicity, class, etc.. "Gender
has therefore been transformed into an increasingly inclusive category denoting an
expression of difference within a field of power relations" (Kandiyoti 1996:6). On the
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other hand, it should also be considered how issues of modernity, nationalism, and
globalisation are articulated in the local context.
In other words, besides understanding and adopting "indigenous" categories and
idioms, an exhaustive treatment of gender relations in Uyghur society should also
historicise and contextualise the issue by addressing a number of questions, as the
work Beller-Ham suggests. For example, to what extent are such relations informed
by Islamic values and practices and what is the role of `autochtoncats' Central
Asian/Turkic traditions? How have gender relations been affected by Chinese
communist policies after 1949, and by the economic reforms and modernising tide that
have swept mainland China since the early 1980s? How relevant is the status of
"minority nationality" (C. shaoshu minzu) and to what extent does ethnic
discrimination overlap or add to gender discrimination? Finally, what is the influence,
especially in an urban context, of 'global encounters' - through media, tourism,
missionaries, expats, trade, etc. - with different experiences and traditions? While I do
not address all these questions systematically, it is useful to bear them in mind, given
that change, and particularly the management of change, is one of the themes at the
core of our discussion.
In order to give a vivid sense of gender dynamics among urban educated
Uyghurs, I report what I perceived as a crucial episode in my experience of and
reflection on gender issues among the Uyghur. This occurred while I was in Kashgar
visiting Nurqiz during the Roza festival. As I have said before, on this occasion not
only her family but all her friends were competing to show their utmost hospitality.
Two other male foreign students were with me, and during the first two days of the
festival we familiarised ourselves with a large number of Nurqiz's friends, including
both men and women. On the third day they had organised a trip to Mahmud
Kashgari's mausoleum, situated near the village of Opal, roughly twenty miles outside
Kashgar. We spent a very pleasant morning and I felt completely at ease in such
friendly company. In particular, I found Anargiil, a young woman who was working
as a health carer, particularly charming. She was extremely outgoing and had a sharp
tongue, defying all the stereotypes of the submissive and subjugated Muslim woman. I
enjoyed observing the relationship she had with her husband, who was also a health
worker. It definitely seemed like a peers relationship and she did not hesitate to bully
him jokingly. Despite her pretty skirt, it seemed she "wore the trousers" - just to
borrow yet another stereotype. I wonder if on their nikah she was the one who ate the
nan first! On the way back Nurqiz had to leave us in order to attend to some personal
matters, so we stayed with her friends. We stopped in a small restaurant for lunch and
then proceeded to further sightseeing in Kashgar. At the end of our tour, my two male
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companions and I were left with Anargal, her husband Anwar, and Adiljan, who was
driving. We dropped Anargal at their house and stayed with Anwar and Adiljan, who
had some errands to do. Half an hour later, we all went to Anwar's house, where I
experienced one of the most frustrating moments of my fieldwork.
Anwar lived with his extended family in a dy ('traditional' house), in one of the
alleys of the old town adjoining the new bazar. From the road, the door opened onto a
relatively small courtyard. We were led straight to the mehmankhana ("guest room"),
which was already fairly crowded. Most of the room was occupied by a carpet, and
most of the carpet by the dastikhan, laid with all sort of gezakliir. All around the
dastikhan a dozen young men, roughly in their twenties, were sitting or kneeling on
some thin padded cushions. I recognised Abdurehim among them, an ex-schoolmate
and close friend of Nurqiz's that we had already met several times in the previous
days. After a while more people arrived, but they were all men. In other words, I was
the only woman in the room. Needless to say, I felt out of place! Soon it became clear
that, despite my efforts to take part in the conversation, and despite one of my
(foreign) companion's strenuous attempts at involving me, nobody dared to talk to me.
In fact, it seemed that everybody ignored me pretending that I was not there, even
those I had been talking to no longer than a few hours earlier. Ironically, my other
companion, who unlike me did not speak any Uyghur at all, being male was yet the
recipient of some attention, despite his inability to follow the conversation and to
communicate. My heart rose when I saw Anargal appearing at the door. But it did not
last for long. She just handed two plates of melon seeds to the man who was closer to
the door and then disappeared, only to reappear some time later to serve polo, and
disappear again in some other room. I stayed there, utterly frustrated and feeling
trapped, thinking with a mixture of resentment and envy "She's back into her Uyghur
woman role ... but somehow she is enjoying a greater freedom than I am". But what is
a "Uyghur woman's role"? Or, rather, roles? What about the role she performed in the
afternoon? Was not that equally, if not more, 'authentic'? I think what I was trying to
put my finger on was the fact that the sexual segregation that I was experiencing in that
moment was not necessarily the expression of gendered power dynamics. It was more
a question of being or not being in the right place.
Meanwhile everybody's attention kept being focused on my Uyghur-speaking
companion, sitting to my left, who became the target of a hail of questions. In fact, the
questioning was dominated by two or three particularly eager individuals. I started
steaming ... The last straw came when they began to talk about smoking. One of the
eager three asked my friend whether many people smoke in the US. "Very few" he
said "what about here?" They claimed that ninety percent of the people smoked. "Does
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that include women?" "Of course not!" They looked outraged, then one of them added
"Normal women [normal ayaliri] don't smoke." "What about abnormal [binormal]
women?" asked my friend sarcastically. There was general laughter. At that point I
was about to explode: my first instinct was to light a cigarette and observe their
reaction. I resisted the temptation, out of respect for my hosts and, above all, for the
sake of Nurqiz's reputation. But I could not take anymore of this and I decided to
leave. "It's been a long day and I'm tired" I excused myself politely, and I reached for
the door. Predictably, nobody insisted that I should stay a little longer (yeinii
olturung!), as hosts normally do when a guest is leaving.
After a long walk, I was able to consider the episode with more detachment and
look at it in perspective. I should probably not have been there in the first place. It was
a very anomalous situation indeed, being the only woman in an exclusively male
gathering. Perhaps they simply did not know how to relate to me and decided not to
relate at all. My friend's attempt at involving me may have had the unintended
consequence of making my presence even more obtrusive and intimidating. In that
context, I was defying the 'ideal' pattern of male and female roles, even though, as
individuals, in actual practice they might have not subscribed to such ideal. But this
was, in a sense, a formal gathering and even those who had, earlier that day, freely
interacted with me, in this context found no space to shape their own mode of
interaction and adopted the 'ideal' behaviour, i.e. that considered proper and acceptable
by the society at large. I thought again, with some envy, of Anargfil: excluded by that
gathering but, on the other hand, presumably free to mind her own business. Whereas
my 'freedom', as a foreign woman, to attend such a meeting had turned out to be
deceptive. Alter all, more than anything else my frustration was due to my own
assumptions about gender roles, which clearly clashed with those prevailing in that
context. Ultimately, it seemed somewhat unfair to resent those men, Who were
performing a role just as much as Anargiil was. Rather, what I resented was being
caught in a situation where I did not have a role.
In tiriimchi I had been in an exclusively male company on several occasions.
However, these had been informal and smaller gatherings, typically held in public
places, such as bars or restaurants. While this was`a much more formal and elaborated
occasion: not only was this gathering part of the celebrations for the Roza festival, but
we were in a private home, where 'traditional' codes of behaviour tend to be strictly
adhered to, if anything out of respect for senior family members. To some extent, this
generation of young Uyghurs epitomise the transition to different models of gender
relations. They can be seen as negotiating between conventional roles - such as that
they performed at Anwar' s - and more informal modes of gender interaction - such as
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hanging out in a mixed company. It is important to stress the role of education in the
redefinition of gender relations. If anything, because it provides the context for forging
long lasting cross-gender relationships. Indeed, these were all ex-schoolmates and the
bond between them originated in this shared experience during their adolescence.
5.5. Food and gender among urban Uyghnrs
When we arrived Nurmamat was on his own. As we walked into his flat an old
man, roughly in his sixties, walked in and sat with us. While my friend and I
were being entertained by Smitilla bowa - this was the man's name - Nurmarnat
took Dilshat aside. Before long Dilshat, who had subsequently left, was back
with a bag full of samsa. Nurmarnat apologised: that day his wife was
attending a wedding, so he could not offer us a proper meal. The samsa were for
us, since both he and Smitilla bowa had already eaten. On our way back
Dilshat remarked "Well, we had a good time. But it's a shame that his wife
was not there to make dinner. In fact, when I called him this morning to say
that we wanted to visit him, he did sound a bit hesitant ...".
Dilshat, a kind and gentle Uyghur man in his early twenties, was a post-graduate
student at Xinjiang University. For a long time he had been wanting me to meet his
friend Nurmamat, whom he described as a fine intellectual, despite his young age.
They had known each other in Qumul, where they both came from. Nurmamat, now in
his late twenties, was working for a literary magazine in Ortimchi. He lived with his
wife and their one-year-old girl in a tiny flat consisting of just one bedroom, where
most of the space that was not taken up by the bed was occupied by a cupboard full of
books. They had to pay an outrageous rent for this place, since his work unit could not
provide any accommodation facilities.
This episode somehow epitomises the generational transition which is taking
place among urban Uyghur intellectuals as far as gender roles are concerned. As
Maclagan, writing about Yemen, has pointed out, food plays a very important role in
the definition of gender identities. Hence it is useful to consider how educated urban
Uyghurs are redefining gender relations in the realm of food. Both Dilshat and
Nurmamat are highly educated. Relating to women as peers apparently is not an issue
for them. At the same time, they both seem to take for granted that it is Dilshat's wife
who does the cooking; consequently her presence is necessary in order to adequately
entertain guests. This, at least, should be the ideal situation, even if in practice
Nurrnamat equally entertains us while his wife is absent.
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A number of real-life situations may give some sense of what are the actual
gender dynamics revolving around food. It must be stressed that we are talking about
urban educated Uyghurs. Indeed, both education and urban living conditions are two
important, if not determining, factors in the redefinition of gender roles and gender
relations. Not only, as already pointed out, have these men and women all shared in
their adolescence and early youth a formative experience which to a great extent cuts
across gender distinctions. But they have also been interacting on a daily, basis with
'the other sex', namely their classmates, on a more or less equal basis. While their
perspective on gender roles may still be largely influenced by 'traditional' reference
models, at the same time it has also been affected by such an experience. Furthermore,
as already pointed out when discussing hospitality, practical living conditions in
Ortimchi almost inevitably imply a departure from traditional models. Particularly
among intellectuals, nuclear families where both parents work tend to be the norm,
where time and space constraints often conflict with what may still be regarded as ideal
models.
On a Saturday morning Tursun came to pick me up and took me to his house. His
parents were at a wedding. In the living room the table was laid with the usual
gezialiir, including nan. There was also a pot containing the soup for suytiq ash
and a note that his mother had left with instructions. Tursun invited me to take
a seat, switched the TV on, and went to the kitchen to make lunch. Rather than
watching TV alone, I preferred to hang out in the kitchen with him. The dough
had already been prepared and rolled into thick long pieces by his mum. He
rolled them out, then started pulling small squares of dough and throwing them
into the piping soup. He said that his mother had prepared everything in
advance because she knew I was coming and she was afraid that he would be
unable to make me lunch. I remarked that it was really sweet of her to cook for
us before she went to the wedding, where she would have eaten anyway.
"Today Uyghur women are not like they used to be" replied Tursun "today girls
[qizlai] are lazy and they can't do anything." I pointed out that perhaps it is
not a question of laziness but of independertce. After all it was he who
complained about the lack of independence among Uyghur young women.
One night we were invited at Adil's, a friend of Tursun's who lived with his
parents in the Uyghur hospital housing compound, behind Xinjiang University.
We were entertained in the living room by Adil alone. Every now and then his
mother would turn up with tea or food. All the other members of the household
did not show up and I'm not even sure who was in and who was out.
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Tursun and Adil are both university graduates in their mid-twenties. They both have a
good job but, as they are not married yet, they still live with their parents. They belong
to that generation of educated urban Uyghurs who have grown up in the reform era. A
generation which has been consistently exposed to more or less non-mediated external
influences, especially from the west, which have inevitably affected or at least
questioned their views on gender roles. At the same time, though, in their daily lives
the reference model for gender relations is their parents' generation. In particular, their
mothers represent the primary model - to imitate or question - for their ideas and
attitudes about women's roles. Their mothers are women in their late forties or early
fifties, who have therefore lived all the stages of Communist China, with all the
contradictions in terms of gender policies that we have mentioned before. That is, they
have been "emancipated" - the passive voice is intentional - according to western
models mediated by Chinese socialism. As we have seen for women in rural Kashgar
(Beller-Hann 1998a), such emancipation was carried out primarily through work
outside the household, while gender roles within the family were largely unaffected.
However, in the case of women like Tursun and Adil's mothers, access to higher
education was also a determining factor. Today these women are often respected
professionals, as in the case of Tursun' s mother who, as a doctor, possibly enjoys a
higher status than her husband who is a driver. At the same time, their role within the
household is still that of primary carers and they regard themselves and are regarded by
others as those responsible for feeding both family members and their guests. Hence
their sons find themselves in the ambivalent position of both desiring to imitate the new
models of gender roles to which they are constantly, although somewhat superficially,
exposed, and at the same time of fearing the disruption of the model embodied by their
mothers, which they have been experiencing on a daily basis and have therefore
interiorised. The following account further exemplifies what is these young men's
reference model by looking at their mother's attitudes.
Dinner at Anwar's, a friend of Yasin's. Their front door opens on a sort of
entrance hall which is used as a living room, where guests are entertained.
There is a couch, a carpet, a TV, and a table' laid with geziikliir (biscuits,
walnuts, raisins, etc.) plus a loaf of home made bread, black currant and
strawberry jams, and cream. Anwar's mother has baked the bread in an electric
oven, and she has also made the jam. Everything is delicious. When she serves
tea, she apologises repeatedly because she has come home from work very late
and the house is not tidy (in fact, everything is perfectly tidy). She also
apologises for the dinner which, she says, is not very good since her son only
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told her that morning that he was having guests. Despite this, dinner is
excellent and rather elaborate too.
Paradoxically, it is among Uyghurs slightly older than Tursun, Adil, or Anwar that an
actual redefinition of gender roles within the family, in particular as far as food is
concerned, may be taking place. I am thinking of couples in their thirties with young
children, where both partners are university graduates. Born in the 1960s, they grew
up during the Cultural Revolution, which surely must have affected their views on
gender. However, a more obvious difference with Tursun' s generation is that they are
daily engaged in the negotiation of gender roles with their partners within the context
of a nuclear family. That is, at a significant distance from the reference model
represented by their parents. In other words, unlike Tursun and his peers, they are not
caught between two contradictory ideal models, but rather they are directly involved in
the daily management of gender relations. In this kind of households I have observed a
clear trend towards the redefinition of gender roles. In most cases it was common that
men helped in the kitchen, although their contribution was often seen as an exception.
While these may indeed be exceptions, nevertheless they represent a departure from the
pattern prevailing among older generations. In other words, it is possible to identify at
least a tendency towards a redefinition of gender roles, both in terms of ideal models
and in terms of practices. More significantly, I remember at least a couple of occasions
in which men were entirely in charge of cooking and attending guests.
Last Wednesday Abliz invited me for lunch. When I arrived, he was preparing
polo in the kitchen and a (male) neighbour of his was also there. Rather than
watching TV on my own in the living room and wait for the meal to be served, I
decided to chat with them in the kitchen. Perhaps this was inappropriate,
given my guest status, but there was no strong objection on their side. After all it
was a rather anomalous situation according to Uyghur codes of behaviour: a
female guest being entertained by a male host while neither his wife nor other
women were around. The anomaly was possibly due to the fact that I was a
foreigner, as well as to eriimchi residential patterns and lifestyle. In rural
areas, and even in most urban settings outside trriimchi (such as Ghulja, Khotan,
Kashgar), Uyghur people usually live in big houses (dy) with their extended
family. Almost at any lime there would be at least one woman at home to
entertain female guests or to take care of male guests from the kitchen', by
preparing tea, food, etc.
Once the meal was ready, Abliz's neighbour left carrying a large portion for
him and his children. Abliz's wife was at her parents', who live at the other
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end of town close to her working place. She did not usually come home for lunch.
In fact, she stayed there with their child for two or three days during the
week. Abliz learnt to make polo by watching other people making it. He said
that polo is the only food he can make, but he makes it better than his wife.
This in fact was a common claim among urban Uyghttr men, often confirmed by
women too. This time, as before, we had an 'informal' meal, that is, without all
the preambles - the coffee table laid with all the gezakldr: sweets, dried
fruits, nan, etc.. Abliz's polo was memorable, I would rank it among the five best
polo I had throughout my stay in Xinjiang.
There are a variety of factors which can be used to explain such a situation, from living
conditions and residential patterns to personal inclination, but what matters is that the
ideal that cooking and feeding guests is inevitably a woman's role has been challenged.
Even if these may be considered exceptions, they are not seen as reproachable
deviations to be condemned. The fact that it is acceptable that a man cooks and
entertains guests suggests that there is a shift not only as far as practices are concerned
but also in terms of ideal models. Moreover, even if Abliz may be considered an
exception, it was by no means an isolated case. On another occasion, I was invited for
dinner by Nuriya, a woman in her late-thirties who was a lecturer in mathematics at
university. She had been awarded a grant to spend some time in an Italian university,
so her younger sister Barna, whom I knew from Xinjiang University, decided that we
should meet. Nuriya lived with their husband and their 11-year-old daughter Gulnar.
When Barna and I arrived, we sat in the living room with Nuriya and her daughter.
While we were chatting, Nuriya's husband was in the kitchen making polo. Once it
was ready, he went to eat in their bedroom while watching TV, while the four of us ate
in the living room. I remember being rather surprised by this sort of role reversal, but
it was even more surprising to see that for them it was perfectly normal. After all it
made sense: it was Nuriya who was interested in meeting me, that was the reason why
I had been invited.
In conclusion, in urban intellectual households, if men rarely cook at home they
often help. This is particularly common among younger generations. However, these
are considered as exceptions, almost a sort of concession. Here we could tentatively
suggest a structural symmetry with Beller-Hann's observations in southern Xinjiang,
where _women's performance is acknowledged mainly in the domestic sphere while
their contribution to income generating sidelines tend to be overlooked and to be seen
as 'leisure' done in one's spare time (Bell6r-Hann 1998a). Similarly, among urban
intellectuals, men's contribution to domestic work may be overlooked because
conventional models of gender roles tend to dominate, at least at an ideal level. Indeed,
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the women I knew almost invariably complained about the unfair division of labour
within the household and about gender relations in general among Uyghurs, despite
the fact that many of them were still students, therefore unmarried, or had a 'helpful'
husband. They usually spoke in general terms, almost referring to an archetypal
Uyghur family ideally situated in some rural area of southern Xinjiang, which they
perceived as the most representative of Uyghur society.
However, women should not be seen merely as passive recipients but as having
an active role in the negotiation of gender roles. Those women who were married
would hardly ever complain about their own husbands as individuals. They would
rather make general statements on how difficult and demanding it is for a working
woman to look after the house and the children. But they did not seem to question their
role in the household and would take for granted that, however unfair, that was their
job. Once I went out for dinner with a young married woman. She was a teacher at
university and the mother of a three year old. By Uyghur standards she was very
emancipated and independent. She was telling me about women's revolving chay
parties and how often she attended them.2 I asked her, half jokingly, whether she
cooked for her husband and child before going to the party. "Of course!" she said, as
if it was inconceivable that her husband might cook dinner for himself and their child.
Uyghur male chauvinism can be a common cliché among Uyghur themselves, at
least among those I was familiar with. On a number of occasions, urban educated
young men showed an awareness of this issue, which was rather unusual among
Uyghur men at large. However, rather than being generated by their own observation
and reflection on the society they lived in, it seemed that such awareness was prompted
by their familiarity with western discourse on gender relations and women's
emancipation, which they had acquired mostly through American films and television
series, as well as through contact with foreigners, mostly American. Their statements
were often contradicted by their behaviour, which was not always as 'liberal' as they
wanted. In fact they seemed to be struggling between different models, neither of
which they were able to accept in toto, both in theory and in practice. Tursun
exemplifies this dilemma at best. He would act as a defender of women's rights and
wish that Uyghur women were more independent. At the same time he would
complain that nowadays Uyghur girls are lazy and cannot do anything at home, or he
would declare that they should not drink alcohol. Similarly Abdurehim, despite his
claims to be open-minded and influenced by western models, when speaking of the
wife of one of his friends would occasionally come up with comments such as "She's
2 These are parties, usually held on a monthly basis, each time organised by a different member of the
party; in Ortimchi they are held in restaurants.
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a good wife, she serves her husband well". Not to mention his strenuous defence of
virginity, the preservation of which should be a girl's preoccupation and
responsibility, a requirement that he did not perceive as clashing with aspirations to
independence and emancipation.
In short, even among the relatively emancipated households I was familiar with
in Oriimclii, on the whole women remain responsible for preparing and serving food at
home, both to their family and to guests. Evidence suggests that this is even more the
case in smaller urban contexts and rural areas. Despite an increasing awareness of
women's rights, especially among young people of both sexes, and despite the
tendency among many urban educated men to share some of their wives' burden at
home, it is still accepted that cooking meals and looking after the house is a woman's
job. However, we have seen that to some extent a redefinition of gender roles is taking
place, especially among young educated urban couples.
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CHAPTER 6
UYGHUR FOOD: CUISINE, DIET, AND BELIEF
In this chapter I focus more specifically on food, both solid and liquid: that is, what in
Uyghur is yimak-ichmak and in Chinese is yinshi (literally "eating and drinking"). I
start by discussing Uyghur diet and cuisine. With the former I refer to the actual
foodstuff that people eat. By contrast, I understand cuisine not only as a corpus of
dishes and cooking methods but also as the link between a community and its food:
i.e. how people in a community feel about "their" food, the extent to which they
identify with it, the meanings they attach to and construct around it. Despite the fact
that boundaries between cuisines and food practices are to some extent permeable, in
this realm too Uyghurs construct their identity in sharp opposition to the Han Chinese.
Hence even food items and practices of clear Chinese origin may be incorporated into
Uyghur cuisine and transformed into Uyghur. Moreover, as discussed in the second
part of this chapter, notions of contamination derived from Muslim dietary
prescriptions are manipulated to draw a sharp boundary and possibly articulate a
discourse of resistance vis-a-vis the Han.
6.1. Uyghur diet and cuisine
A few days before returning to England I went to see my old teacher Bahargiil. Her
husband Dilshat, a social scientist himself, was also there. He had just returned from
two months' fieldwork in the Tarim basin and his advice for my research was: "If you
want to know traditional Uyghur food, you should go to Southern Xinjiang. In fact,
even Uyghur themselves don't know what their traditional food is. For instance, man
par, the dough in suyuq ash, comes from the Chinese mian plan. But you can't say
that to a Uyghur ...". "And what about sangza? They are originally Hui" added
Bahargiil. "Chinese", corrected her husband. "No, they're Hui" insisted Bahargiil.
"After all it's the same, he said, how many years of history have the Han? More than
5000. And how many have the Hui? Only a few hundreds."
It was too late to follow Dilshat's advice, since that was the end of my
fieldwork, and I tried to explain that I found equally interesting what I had observed in
1 Suyuq ash (lit. "liquid food") is a meat and vegetable soup with little squares of dough in it. Mian
pian means "dough square(s)" (cf. 5.5.). Sangza, a sort of fried noodles arranged in a spiral, mark the
holidays of Roza heyt (end of Ramadan) and Qurban heyt and are prepared in every household during
that time (cf. 4.1.3.).
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Ortimchi. However, I was grateful for his remark, since it encapsulates a number of
questions that I shall address more specifically in this chapter. In a nutshell, he had
renewed my awareness to the meaning of "traditional Uyghur food" and the
implications of its definition. First of all, whose definition? That of a Chinese-trained
Uyghur academic - twice authoritative, as a Uyghur and as an academic - or that of the
"common Uyghur"? Moreover, in Dilshat's advice was implicit the assumption that
when studying Uyghur - or any other people's - food one should be concerned with
"traditional" food, a long history being the hallmark of tradition (on this see also
Uyghur Customs below, quoting Qashqari). This reflected a certain Chinese
essentialising discourse on the appropriate object of ethnographic research, especially
when dealing with minorities. As already discussed, these are usually seen as more
'traditional' than the 'modern' Han. At the same time, by situating tradition in a
relatively remote southern Xinjiang, he was also saying something about eriimchi,
implying that eating habits in the capital were not as purely Uyghur. 2 He further
problematised this not only by pointing out the 'foreign' influences in foods that are
generally .regarded as traditionally Uyghur, but also suggesting that this knowledge
may obliterate their traditional nature.
In fact, the practices and discourses that I had observed and recorded during my
fieldwork were rather complex and could not be simply pigeon-holed as
'traditional'/'non-traditional', or `Uyghuer non-Uyghur'. The boundaries of a
cuisine, like those of an ethnic group, are not static but constantly shifting and
undergoing a process of redefinition. What follows is an attempt to make sense of
such complexity, while preserving as much as possible the nuances that are part of
everyday lived experience. I will first address the general question of what is a cuisine.
Drawing on ethnographic material as well as on primary sources, I will then proceed to
consider whether we can talk of a Uyghur cuisine and, if so, how and by whom it is
defined. In particular, I wish to explore the ways in which Uyghur urban intellectuals
talk and write about their food, as well as examining what, in actual practice,
constitutes their diet. While many, more or less recent, external influences can be
identified on the Uyghur dastikhan, I will argue that there is a strong sense among the
Uyghur of having a distinctive cuisine.
2 Cf. Eli on 'pure Uyghurs' , 2.2.
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6.1.1. Cuisine
"Cuisine" is a French word whose literal meaning of "kitchen" extends metonytnically
to that of "cooking". It is used in English to refer to a style or method of cooking,
usually of a particular country or region - as in French or Middle Eastern cuisine - or
establishment - as in haute cuisine. While there is no question of the empirical use of
this term, especially in popular discourse, it is worthwhile considering its meaning
when used as an analytic category in scholarly writing. Is a cuisine regional, or
national? Is it possible for a society not to have a cuisine? Sidney Mintz (1996) has
addressed these questions and explored what is meant by "cuisine". According to him,
what makes a cuisine is not only a set of dishes or cooking methods, but the existence
of a community of people who eat those foods and, more important, have feelings
about them. "In spite of the variability of individual differences in [food attitudes],
there is a point in trying to link people's feelings about food in some one particular
culture with the foods that people in that society customarily eat - what gets called,
more or less imprecisely, its 'cuisine'." (Mintz 1996:94).
According to Mintz it is questionable whether it makes sense to speak of a
national cuisine at all. In fact, he concludes that "a 'national cuisine' is a contradiction
in terms ... a holistic artifice based on the foods of the people who live inside some
political system" (Mintz 1996: 94, 104). He claims that cuisines are regional, indeed
"when seen from the perspective of people who care about the foods, [cuisines] are
never the foods of a country, but the foods of a place" (Mintz 1996: 95-96, emphasis
in original). While his assumptions concerning the authenticity of a regional cuisine, as
opposed to the artifice of a national cuisine, can be questioned, his stress on the links
between a community, the food they eat, and the way they feel about this food, in the
definition of a cuisine proves insightful. In fact, he seems to contradict his own
argument when he states that "a cuisine requires a population that eats that cuisine with
sufficient frequency to consider themselves experts on it. They all believe, and care
that they believe, that they know what it consists of, how it is made, and how it should
taste. In short, a genuine cuisine has common social roots; it is the food of a
community - albeit often a very large community." (Mintz 1996: 96). I could not think
of a better definition; what is not clear is why such a community could not be a nation,
however "imagined" it may be (Anderson 1991).
Leaving aside the question of what a national cuisine is, and how to make one
(Appadurai 1988), here I intend to focus on the links between a community and its
food. Like ethnic consciousness, a cuisine is defined both by a process of
identification - of a community with its food - and, simultaneously, by one of
155
differentiation - in opposition to other cuisines. Regardless of its actual content, which
is subject to constant change, what matters is that people believe that they know what
it consists of, how it is made, and how it should taste. In her discussion of Jewish
food in the Middle East, Claudia Roden (1994) mentions a number of foods and
dishes which are not exclusively Jewish but are shared by most Middle Eastern
people. However, she concludes that Iblecause these dishes have such a powerful
hold on the emotions of Jews, are so much part of their ancestral memories and so tied
to their culture and identity, I believe that they should be considered Jewish."
(1994:158). We can then talk of a Uyghur cuisine, in as much as Uyghur people
.believe their food is distinctive. Through an analysis of primary sources and
ethnographic material I intend to explore the ways in which the idea of a Uyghur
cuisine is constructed, as well as the processes of negotiation that lie behind its
definition.
6.1.2. Uyghur cuisine
At the end of January 1999 the City authorities in Beijing evacuated and demolished
what had become known as the "Uyghur Village", in the north-west district of
Ganjialcou. The "Village" had developed since the mid-1980s, when Uyghur migrants
from Xinjiang started a number of catering businesses, mainly aimed at visitors from
that region who stayed in the nearby Xinjiang Centre (Xinjiang Banshichu). Within a
decade, the road, lined with restaurants, bakeries, and kebab stalls, had become the
centre of a lively Uyghur community, attracting not only Uyghur residents and visitors
but also a large number of Chinese and foreigners who went there to experience
Uyghur cuisine. Sadly, the year 1999 brought bad news for the Uyghur Village: the
owners and workers of more than 30 Uyghur restaurants there were ordered to leave
their establishments by the end of January. The order was issued less than three weeks
before the deadline to move and there were no proposed compensations. According to
a Beijing city official, the reason for the order was "to repair the road which runs
through the village".3 Given the reputation that Uygliurs have in China, and the threat
that they have represented in recent years to the stability of the country, it is very likely
that reasons of public order and security also instigated this decision.
Without dismissing the political implications of this incident, here I want to
consider the aspects of a "cuisine" that I have outlined above. That is, the link between
a community and its food and the sense of belonging inspired and enhanced by such
3 From an AFP report posted to the Uighur-1 on 28 January 1999.
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food. Food that can also have an evocative power, helping to remember or recreate a
homey atmosphere. To illustrate this I use the words of a Uyghur émigré living in the
United States. His "Tribute to the Ganjiakou Uyghur Village" was sparked by the
news of its demolition.
I feel very sad at the recent news that Beijing City authorities have begun
demolishing the Uyghur village in Beijing's Ganjiakou district. One of the best
memories of my college years in Beijing is going out for dinner with my friends
at the Uyghur restaurants in the Xinjiang Village which is just a couple of
blocks away from the school. It had been a place for me to fight the
homesickness at the weekends and holidays.
When I first went to Beijing in 1983, there was only one Muslim restaurant in
the entire Beijing city. The state owned restaurant had only beef dumplings.
Short after I arrived in Beijing, I went to that restaurant with several friends
to take a break from the Chinese food at the school cafeteria. We had to wait
for 4 hours online to get the food. Uyghurs are very conservative about food, we
are very reluctant to try new tastes. It was very hard for me to get used to the
Chinese food at school. ... At the second year of my college, some Uyghurs,
mostly farmers from the Eastern Turkistan countrysides began to come to Beijing
in search of a better way of making money. They had quickly made the Uyghur
kebab a household name in Beijing. Soon after, Beijing people began to call
every Uyghur person a "lamb kebab", some innocently, some to ridicule us. I
witnessed many conflicts caused by this nick name. Selling kebab turned out to
be a good business in Beijing and other Chinese cities. ...
As the Uyghur population increased, several Uyghur restaurants were opened
to serve the increasing Uyghur population. Those restaurants immediately
became the favorite hangouts for Uyghur students, businessmen and government
officials onbusiness trips. ... As result, Uyghur restaurants spread all over the
city. But a little street named Ganjiakou boasted the most restaurants because
of its proximity to Xinjiang Center where most of the Uyghur visitors stay.
Beijing people began to call the street "Xinjiang Villager' or "Uyghur Village".
After a long day work, Uyghur merchants, shish kebab sellers and other
businessmen would come to the village to have dinner and hangout with other
Uyghurs. For them, it became a place to feel at home in a foreign land 2,000
miles away from home.
I left Beijing in 1989 after my graduation from the college. Five years later, I
stopped by in Beijing on my way to the United States. While I was waiting for
visa, I stayed in Xinjiang Center and ate in the Xinjiang Village. I also spent
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the Kurban heit (the biggest Muslim holiday) there. ... Last time when I was
in Beijing it was December 1995. I stayed in Beijing over night. As I walked
into the village to have a lagman (my favorite Uyghur dish), I had a warm
coming-home feeling. After the restaurant owner found out I just came from
United States where I was a graduate student, he insisted to treat me free. I
kindly refused his offer, but the warm feeling stayed long after the delicious
lagrnan was digested.... Now the place where many Uyghurs found prosperity
and peace will be gone.... Without the Uyghur village, Beijing will be a very
different place for me. I am sure all Uyghurs who have visited Beijing will
share my feelings.4
A number of themes that are relevant to our discussion of Uyghur cuisine can be
singled out from this passage. First of all, Uyghur food is characterised in opposition
to Chinese food. Moreover, specific items can be read as signature dishes (leighmein),
or function as ethnic markers (kebab). What emerges even more strongly though, is
the sense of a community which unites around food, both physically and
metaphorically. These feelings are clearly heightened by the somewhat displaced status
of most Uyghurs in Beijing, who are "in a foreign land 2,000 miles away from
home". While this is, in a sense, an extreme case, it helps to set the scene and begin to
understand how Uyghur people feel about their food and identify with it, in the context
that I have delineated in the first part of this thesis. In other words, Turdi's account
exemplifies that emotional link between a community and its food, which we have
identified as a fundamental dimension of a cuisine. The evocative nature of his account
can be contrasted with the analytic approach adopted by some Uyghur academics
2,000 miles west of Beijing, back "at home". While here too the link between a
community and its food is established, the focus is rather on the material aspects of a
cuisine and on its content.
Eating and drinking habits are a constituent part of a people's culture and are
reflected in people's daily lives, as a result of the development of certain
productive forces. During their long history, on the ground of their eating
habits and of their climatic and living conditions, Uyghur people have created
a rich culinary art and a variety of traditional foods suitable for the
peculiarity of their lives. Uyghur people have always given great attention to
the art of cooking, to hygiene, as well as to taste in food. There are many kinds
of Uyghur food, among these meat- and starch-based foods play a prominent
role in Uyghur diet. In Malunut Qashciari's "Compendium of Turkic Dialects" a
4 This message was posted by Turdi to the Uighur-1 on 1 February 1999.
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number of relatively ancient traditional Uyghur foods are described.
(Rakhman et al. 1996:26)
Thus starts the long chapter (25 pages) devoted to "Uyghur eating and drinking habits"
in the book Uyghur Orp-adatliri (Uyghur Customs, Rakhman et al. 1996). The book
has that encyclopaedic ethnographic flavour common to most publications of this kind
in the PRC. But with a significant difference: it is written by Uyghur academics, in
Uyghur, for a Uyghur public. Because of the position of both the authors and the
audience with respect to the subject, I would say that in such a book pride in one's
own culture replaces the exoticising if not patronising tone that we often find in similar
publications in Chinese, usually written by Han Chinese. 5 The book met remarkable
success as soon as it appeared, at the end of 1996, in the few bookstores that sold
non-Chinese language material in tiriimchi. In particular, it became very popular
among educated Uyghurs, suggesting that it was not perceived as the usual
propaganda. Indeed, the chapter on food in Uyghur Orp-addtliri includes 36 entries
devoted to "traditional" Uyghur foods, ranging from nan (bread) to polo and murabba
(fruit preserve). Besides a detailed description of ingredients and methods of
preparation, indicating a producer rather than a consumer readership, it also provides
an accurate and in depth discussion of social and cultural aspects of food. This,
besides obviously language, makes this book Uyghur. Especially when compared, for
instance, to Lu (1992) where the author concludes the short section on Uyghur
"Holiday food" declaring that today the Uyghur, besides the Roza and Qurban
festivals, also celebrate public holidays such as May 1 (Labour Day) and the
foundation of the PRC with the same kind of food (1992:110) - which is blatantly
false and mere propaganda.
Going back to the book Uyghur Orp-adatliri, in the introduction to the chapter
on Uyghur foods and drinks quoted above, the first concern of the authors is to
establish a long history for Uyghur culinary art. An attitude which was also implicit in
Dilshat and BahargUl's comments at the beginning of this chapter, as already pointed
out. Here evidence for such antiquity is produced by reporting a long list of foods that
appear in what is considered a 10th century Uyghur "classic", Mahmut Qashqdri's
Compendium of Turkic Dialects.
5 See for instance Xinjiang Meishi (Lou 1995). When introducing "Xinjiang minorities eating and
drinking habits" the author writes "by learning their eating and drinking habits we can further improve
our understanding of each minzu" (1995:1). In the book "A survey of China's nationalities eating and
drinking customs" the chapter on Xinjiang does not include a section on the Han because their "eating
and drinking customs are too rich and complex to be summarised" (Lu 1992:109).
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The word kOwisak (I tome, p. 628) is explained as "leavened nan", and the word
chiikmin (I, 578) as "a kind of steamed nan". KOnaich (I, 567) is "nan cooked by
burying it under ashes", while sinchu (I, 544) is glossed as "khulima nan, a kind
of nan between girdii and hamak. (Rakhman eta!. 1996:26)
This is only the beginning of the list, which continues with all sorts of foods and
drinks, mostly featuring grains and starchy foods, but also milk, yoghurt, meat, fresh
and dried fruits, oil, honey, sugar, and rice. In fact, this long quote from Mahrnut
Qashqdri's work has also the merit of helping to reconstruct the diet and cuisine of
settled Turkic peoples ten centuries ago. Peoples who are supposedly the ancestors of,
and certainly related to, modern Uyghurs.
Another point that the authors make in their introduction concerns the richness
and variety of Uyghur cuisine:
The above foods mentioned in the Compendium of Turkic Dialects are only a
small part of Uyghur foods before the 10th century. The book Uyghur tamaqliri
(Uyghur food), published in 1985 by the Xinjiang People's Publishing House,
presents in detail nearly 300 different types of dishes, with their ingredients
and methods of preparation. (Rakhman et al. 1996:27)
Finally, the concluding paragraph of this introduction acknowledges the dynamic
nature of Uyghur food habits, as well as the emergence of new habits as a
consequence of recent developments:
Such characteristics of Uyghur eating and drinking habits have formed in the
course of long historical developments and they constantly change and renew
following social developments. For instance, in ancient times Uyghur were not
used to eat fried foods Norma tamaglarl. Following the development of inter
ethnic cultural exchange, several kinds of fried dishes [qorulghan say] have
started entering contemporary Uyghur eating habits. Nevertheless, these fried
dishes [qoruma saylar] still have a specific Uyghur [milliy] flavour as far as
ingredients and taste are concerned. Below a number of Uyghur own traditional
foods and dishes are presented. (Ralchman et al. 1996:27)
Before proceeding to describe in detail a large number of "traditional" Uyghur dishes,
the authors devote a few pages to Uyghur beliefs and social values concerning food.
For instance, they mention the practice of exchanging gifts of food among relatives,
close friends, and neighbours. Moreover, they devote a section to each of the
following: daily food at home, food for the guests, food for religious holidays, healing
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with food, and dietetic food. Here notions of hospitality and etiquette are discussed
along with meal structures and folk dietetics. In other words, what defines Uyghur
cuisine as distinctive is not just a set of dishes, but also a long standing tradition and a
number of social practices and values expressed in the domain of food. In particular,
here too there is a suggestion of different degrees of elaboration. For example, from
the most basic food eaten daily at home, to more elaborated food offered to guests, or
prepared during religious holidays. We can conclude that what makes Uyghur cuisine
distinctive is also the practice of cooking and eating more or less elaborated food
depending on the context, which implies the knowledge of what is the appropriate
degree of elaboration in each specific situation.
6.1.3. Uyghur dishes
What then is this food that many Uyghurs feel so strongly about? We have learnt that
there are a large number of Uyghur dishes that are considered traditional. However,
the first three items that most people today would mention as typically Uyghur are
polo, llighnzan, and kawap. Polo is probably regarded as the most typical Uyghur
dish by both Uyghurs and Han Chinese (photo 30). As already discussed in previous
chapters, it is the food normally served to guests, or at weddings, funerals, and similar
celebrations. In Chinese it is called zhuafan, which can be translated as "rice eaten
with fingers", although most Uyghurs in Oriimchi have abandoned this habit and have
introduced the use of a spoon. It is a rice dish of which there are a number of different
versions, depending on the other ingredients. In the cookbook Uyghur tamaqliri
(Uyghur food) we find twenty-four different recipes for polo (Baqi 1984). According
to the most common version, carrots and mutton are first fried in abundant oil with
onions in a qazan, a thick cast iron pan, then rice and water are added and the whole
concoction is covered and steamed. Some like to add raisins and dried apricots.
In fact, polo can be found throughout Central Asia (polau, plof, etc.) and it is
particularly popular among Uzbeks. In Iran we find polow, which is evidently related
to the Uyghur polo. Polow is prepared by mixing tasty ingredients with boiled rice
and steaming everything together. According to Fragner (1994a), the use of rice
probably spread from China to Central Asia during the Mongol conquest and may
subsequently have been brought to Iran by migrating Turks. In an early 16th century
Persian cookbook, written by a professional cook possibly of Turkic origin, the word
polow is used in the sense of 'rice with something'. By comparing this use to that of a
cookbook written seventy years later, Fragner concludes that "the modern Iranian
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conception of polow came into existence during the first century of Safavid rule [16th
century]. ... [This] new and very sophisticated method of preparing polow did not
cross the frontiers to the Uzbek kahnates of Central Asia" (1994:58-59). Ironically, the
dish which Uyghurs today consider their most representative dish, laden with
symbolic meaning for identity, hospitality, and ritual purposes, is found, in a more or
less similar version, in most of Central Asia as well as in Iran. It is even more ironic
that the origin of its main ingredient, rice, could possibly be traced back to that same
Chinese civilisation which Uyghurs today consider totally alien and against whose
assimilating policies they are trying to defend themselves. Such a paradox, however,
is not uncommon. For instance, writing about red chilli among southern Italian
immigrants in Toronto, Teti says "Oddly enough, in the New World southern Italian
immigrants display as an emblem of identification and self-representation precisely an
'American' product." (Teti 1997:45).
If polo may be considered the most representative Uyghur dish, that which is
normally served to an invited guest, leighmlin (sometimes also llingman) is the most
common ordinary food among Uyghurs (photos 28, 32). Righman are hand-pulled
noodles made with wheat flour, boiled and eaten with a stir-fried topping, usually
made with tomatoes, green peppers, mutton, and other vegetables. While in Xinjiang
and in ex-Soviet Central Asia they are usually associated with Uyghurs, liighmiin are
most probably of Hui (Muslim Chinese) origin. According to Ablikim, a Uyghur
linguist, the phonetic structure of the word suggests that it is a loan-word as no Turkic
word in Uyghur language starts with "1". The most likely etymology is its derivation
from the Chinese "leng mian" (cold noodles) or "la mian" (pulled noodles).6
Laghman, as a dish, is also an interesting example of syncretism in food, where
ingredients of different origins, such as tomatoes and peppers, are combined to create
what is regarded by many as a distinctive Uyghur dish.
Kawap (kebab) are similarly far from exclusive to Uyghur culinary culture.
They are found, with a similar name or an equivalent, throughout Central Asia, as well
as in Turkey, Greece, and even beyond the Balkans in Croatia and Slovenia. In fact
kawap is a general term for grilled meat, although the most common kind in Xinjiang
is what in Uyghur is sometimes called gosh kawap (literally meat kebab), that is,
pieces of mutton on a skewer grilled on a characteristic brazier and seasoned with
ground cumin and, sometimes, ground chilli (photos 31, 40). The use of ground chilli
on kawap, which is conspicuous in Ortimchi, may be a recent habit possibly adopted
6 I am not aware of the existence of a Uyghur etymological dictionary; this etymology is derived from
a Khazak etymological dictionary (Qazaq ... 1987).
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Photo 27 - Selling nan in the street.
Photo 28- Making laghmlin at home.
Photo 29- Shorpa
Photo 30 - Polo
Photo 31 - A kawap brazier outside an ashkhana in Criimchi.
Photo 32 - Making liighmiin at the Kashgar Sunday market.
Photo 33 - ChOchilrel
from the Chinese, as I have noticed that it was hardly used in southern oases such as
Kucha or Kashgar.
As Turdi has pointed out in his "A tribute to Ganjiakou", in Chinese people's
imagination this kebab, which they call yangrouchuan (mutton skewer), is generally
associated with the Uyghur; so much so that in China proper the most common
stereotypical image of the Uyghur is that of the kebab seller. Whether Uyghurs in
Xinjiang have appropriated this image or not, in any case they consider kawap as a
typically Uyghur food.7 The section of Uyghur tamagliri devoted to kawap has
nineteen entries (Baqi 1984). Among these the most popular are, along with liver or
kidney kawap, qiyma kawap and tonur kawap. Qiyma kawap are made with lean
mutton mince mixed with chopped onions, eggs, flour, ground cumin, black pepper,
and chilli. This mix is then wrapped on a skewer and grilled. In fact, they are not very
different from the kOfte kebab one can eat in any kebab shop in Britain. While tonur
kawap consists of a whole sheep roasted in a tonur, which is a clay oven where also
nan is baked. Clearly, this is a rather expensive and time consuming dish which is
normally served at banquets.
Other dishes commonly found in Uyghur homes, as well as in street stalls and
restaurants, usually involve some kind of dough, often with a filling of minced (fat)
mutton, chopped onions, and spices, typically cumin and black pepper. For instance,
petir manta, bolaq manta, samsa, pdrmudd, chöchiird (photo 33), khoshdn, Ord,
gash nan, all feature more or less the same ingredients but they differ in the kind of
dough used (leavened or unleavened), the size and shape, and the method of cooking:
they may be steamed, as for manta and khoshan, boiled in a soup, as for chOcharcY,
baked, as for samsa and plirmudd, or fried, as for Ord and gosh nan. Among these,
manta are probably the most common, both at home and in the street. Petir (thin) and
bolaq (thick) refer to the dough, respectively unleavened and leavened. They roughly
correspond to Chinese steamed jiaozi and baozi. Indeed it is likely that they are
Chinese in origin, as their name suggests. Manta is a calque from the Chinese word
mantou, a steamed bun which in the Xinjiang variant of Mandarin is called momo,
presumably to avoid confusion.
Besides these, various kinds of suyuq tamaqtar, which literally means "watery
foods" and can be translated as "soups", are also very popular at all seasons. I would
stretch this category to include all kinds of more or less 'liquid' foods, from shorpa, to
tigra and suyuq ash, and to qoldama. Dough, of various shape and size, characterises
all these dishes, except for shorpa, which is a clear meat soup (photo 29). Ugrd and
7 Recently, I had a conversation about food with a Kurdish refugee, who came from Turkish
Kurdistan. He insisted that kebab is a Kurdish dish. I believe in this case what Claudia Roden (1994)
says about Jewish food may also apply.
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suyuq ash are basically the same dish, except for the dough, which is in the shape of
very thin noodles in tigra, as opposed to flat squares of dough - the man par that
Dilshat mentioned at the beginning of this chapter - in suyuq ash. Qoldama, the less
watery of these dishes, is made with a characteristic dough, roughly in the shape of
small dices, which is called precisely qoldama. Besides dough, other ingredients used
in these dishes are meat and vegetables, such as tomatoes, carrots, potatoes, onions,
chillies, and green peppers, though in much smaller quantities.
6.1.4. Uyghur diet
Grenard gives a detailed account of eating habits in Chinese Turkestan at the end of
last century (1898:103-109). We learn that at the time corn and wheat flour formed the
basic diet for the majority of the population, mainly in the form of bread and noodles.
Meat, mostly mutton, was a luxury, but most people would eat it at least once a week.
This suggests a variation among meals, from simpler starch-based meals to more
luxurious ones that included also meat. Onions were the most popular vegetables,
followed by carrots and turnips. Potatoes, as well as various kinds of Chinese
vegetables, like cabbage or spinach, were known but rarely used. Fruit, on the other
hand, was consumed in large quantities. His account is consistent with the description
of food found in Mahmut Qashqdri' s tenth century Compendium of the Turkic
Dialects, cited by Raldunan et al. (1996).
Today the staples of Uyghur diet still are "flour-based food" (un tamaq) - such
as noodles, dumplings, nan (bread; photo 27), etc. - and meat. However, in practice
meat still is to some extent a luxury and its consumption varies considerably according
to income and gender. Fruit is still consumed in large quantities, especially in summer.
I was often entertained by people praising the variety and the quality of the fruit in their
homeland. As already mentioned in chapter 2, each place has its own speciality.
Turpan grapes and Hami (Qumul) melons are renowned throughout China. Less
widely known but equally tasty are apricots frgm Kucha, figs from Atush,
pomegranate from Kashgar, apples from Ghulja, pears from Korla, almonds from
Yarkand, walnuts and peaches from Khotan. Compared to a century ago, a wider
variety of vegetables have entered Uyghur diet. However, these are still consumed in
relatively small quantities, and were mostly introduced by the Han, as many of their
names reveal. For example, the most common word for cucumber is khuangga (from
the Chinese word huanggua), while aubergines are usually called chayza (from the
Chinese word qiezi). The indigenous Uyghur words for cucumber and aubergine,
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respectively tarkhlimeik and pedigdn, are rarely used, if known at all, at least in
Oriimchi. The most characteristic spice in Uyghur cuisine is definitely cumin, along
with a wide range of peppers and other spices. Uyghurs in CrUmchi have recently
developed a taste for hot chillies, which they call laza, a calque from the Chinese
colloquial term lazi (lajiao). These were reportedly introduced in the region by Han
migrants from Sichuan. Finally, black tea is the most common beverage among
Uyghurs. They often `cure' it with chay dora, a mixture of spices which is also
believed to have therapeutic qualities.
A meal usually consists of a cooked dish and, on the whole, llighmdn noodles
probably rank as the favourite and most popular daily meal among Uyghurs. I would
say that today dough is still at the core of Uyghur diet. Despite her tight working
schedule, Dilber would knead a sourdough nearly every morning and use it at lunch or
dinner to make khoshein, pörä, bolaq manta, or simply nan. Each time she would
remove a small piece of dough and put it in a jar in the refrigerator. Thus she would
keep the natural yeast until the next time. It is not unusual, however, to lunch or dine
simply on nan and tea, or nan and fruit. According to Amangtil, in the countryside
most people don't eat a proper meal more than once or twice a week, the rest of the
time they just have tea with nan. This view seems to be supported by the authors of
the above mentioned book on Uyghur customs: "Uyghurs eat three meals a day, in the
morning, at noon, and in the evening. Each household eating habits depend on their
financial conditions. Usually, for their two daytime meals people eat nan with tea,
while in the evening they have a cooked meal. Today the habit of eating a cooked meal
at lunch too has become very popular." (Rakhrnan 1996:28). Urban residents usually
are better off than their rural counterparts and can afford a proper meal twice a day.
But, besides the economic implications, cooking a meal is also time consuming and
dining on bread and fruit can also be a matter of convenience. In Ortimchi this is
especially true for students, who do not have cooking facilities in their dormitories and
have to rely on the university canteen or small restaurants on campus, which can be
both expensive and inconvenient.
Short after the end of the winter holidays, which that year coincided with
the Roza festival, I went to visit Nurqiz in her dormitory, which she shared
with seven class-mates of hers. While I was there, Gulsayra pulled a
cardboard box out from under her bed. It was full of nan, that she had made
herself when she was at home during the holidays, as well as other food items.
She took some karat [ewe's milk cheese] and some sort of soft cheese. Shortly
later, also Shamshinur pulled out a box of food and had a snack. She ate some
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sangza and miishiikiir with eris. 8 I asked Nurqiz if it was usual that they
brought all that nan from home and whether it lasted. She said that
everybody does and that it lasted very long because there was a lot of oil in the
dough. After they baked it, they left it out for three days, so that it was
completely dry before they packaged it for the trip.
Indeed, when visiting their families who live in other towns, it is very common that
students and young graduates who live in Ortimchi take big boxes full of home-made
nan and preserves with them. Besides nostalgic aspects, this means saving a
considerable amount of money, given that in 1996-97 one nan from a bakery cost 1
yuan (more than an average bus fare). Moreover, most people believe that home-made
bread is better than the bread bought in bakeries. In this way, students would have at
least some basic but healthy meals guaranteed.
6.2. Chinese foods, Uyghur ways
The foods and dishes that I have described lie at the core of what Uyghurs regard as
their cuisine, both in people's accounts and in written sources. Clearly this cuisine has
not developed in isolation and has been influenced by interaction with other culinary
traditions, incorporating individual food items as well as dishes. This is true of most if
not all culinary cultures, which are usually the result of an ongoing process of food
migration and syncretism (cf. Zubaida and Tapper 1994). The boundaries of what is
considered traditional are permeable and, to a certain extent, arbitrary. For some the
knowledge of the "foreign" origin of lagiunlin or miinpar may question their
Uyghurness, for others there is no doubt that these are Uyghur and they would take
offence if someone questioned this. However, on the whole there is a shared notion of
what Uyghur cuisine consists of. Identification implies differentiation, and people very
often discuss also what is not Uyghur. Recent developments in Xinjiang, above all the
increasing influx of Han population in the last two or three decades, have also affected
Uyghur diet and food habits. While some of these •influences are still recognised as
external to the core of Uyghur cuisine, perhaps it will not be too long before they are
incorporated within its boundaries. Having discussed by and large what is Uyghur
cuisine and what Uyghur diet consists of, let us have a closer look at what Uyghurs
actually eat and how they talk about it.
8 Miishiikfir are small pieces of fried dough, while ens is a sort of toffee cream made of milk boiled
with sugar, possibly of Russian origin. It is common in northern Xinjiang but not in the south.
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After my class at Dilber's I stayed for lunch. I asked her what she was cooking.
"So say and mifan" [mifan is "rice" in Chinese] was her reply. That is, stir-
fried vegetables with mutton and boiled rice. Then she added "We're not like
the Chinese who use only one vegetable for a dish.". Her so say had tomatoes,
green beans, meat, and other vegetables. "The rice we make is also better,
because we add salt. Moreover, Xinjiang rice is the best and I always buy that,
even if it's more expensive". A few days earlier I had stayed for dinner and she
had made a similar dish of stir-fried mutton and vegetables with rice,
accompanied by a remark in the same tone "The Chinese make four or five
different dishes, while for us one is enough.".
When her daughter Anargiil heard that we were going to eat "mifan" for lunch
she was delighted. Her mother didn't miss this chance to tease her with a
usual joke "You see? She's the daughter of some Chinese, she's not my
daughter" she said. "When she was a baby two poor Han peasants knocked at
our door and sold her to us for 500 yuan" and she laughed ...
That same night I had dinner at Bahargiirs. She made petir manta. I asked her
what was the difference between these and the Chinese jiaozi. "I suppose they
are the same thing. Except that the filling is different, both for the meat -
mutton as opposed to pork - and for the spices. Uyghurs mainly use black pepper
and onion". I then asked whether this kind of food was introduced by the
Chinese. "It's hard to tell ... anyway, this kind of foods made with dough are
found almost everywhere, although with local characteristics." However,
unlike the Chinese, we ate with forks. Bahargill said that to eat dumplings
forks are much more convenient than chopsticks.
Uyghurs in tirtimchi are confronted daily with an increasingly large Han presence and
this fact is reflected in most of the conversations I had. People would constantly
compare Uyghur ways with Han ways, often implying or explicitly remarking the
superiority of their own ways. This could be read as a counter-hegemonic discourse to
that of Han superiority implicit in the Communist civilising project (see Harrell 1995).
Food, with all its related practices, is a domain in whichlJyghurs very strongly affirm
their distinctiveness and, often, a sense of superiority vis-à-vis the Han. Some, like
Dilber in the above quotation, are very vocal about this, while other, like Bahargtil,
have a rather moderate attitude while still recognising some difference.
I would like to situate Dilber and Bahargtil's different approaches in a broader
context. Dilber is a very outgoing and informal person, she likes to joke and always
tries to look on the bright side of life. Whereas Bahargtil is shier, as well as younger;
compared to Dilber's straightforward ways, hers are somewhat sophisticated. Apart
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from their very different personalities, their attitude to Han culture also varies
considerably. They both grew up in southern Xinjiang, where their families still live,
and they both have a degree in Chinese and teach Chinese and Uyghur language at the
university. However, Dilber clings firmly to her Uyghur identity, she is extremely
proud of Uyghur culture and, while also appreciating some aspects of Han culture,
does not identify with it in any respect. Her two daughters went to Uyghur schools
and, despite both Dilber and her husband are fluent in Chinese, it is a foreign language
to them and they always speak Uyghur at home. Bahargiil's attitude, on the other
hand, is rather less uncompromising. For her too Uyghur ways are a very important
aspect of her identity, but she is also attracted by Han culture as she recognises its
higher status in Chinese society. Although she was educated in Uyghur schools and
only learnt Chinese when she was at university, her Mandarin is perfect. She makes a
point of speaking to her five year old son in Mandarin, as she wants him to be
educated in Han schools. Her husband, who went himself through a Han education,
was of a different opinion; but she fought fiercely and argued that it was a lot more
difficult to learn Chinese at a later age, as she had to do. She does not seem to worry,
as her husband did, that the boy might "loose" his Uyghur culture, and she clearly
recognises and does not question the importance of mastering the language and culture
of the Han. Eventually it was decided that their son would be educated in Han schools.
In short, while Bahargiil too is proud of her Uyghur culture, I never heard her
dismissing Han ways as inferior when comparing these to Uyghur ones. At the same
time, ironically, I never had ganpan or mifan at Bahargiir s, perhaps because I have
always been formally invited by her and this is usually not a dish that one would offer
to an invited guest.
These sort of remarks, contrasting Uyghur to Han ways, are by no means
confined to actual food. In general, claims that the Han have no manners are extremely
common. During a class devoted to food vocabulary, my teacher Parhat asked how
people in Italy considered eating while standing. I was not sure how to answer his
question, but I remembered that when I was a child they used to tell me that horses eat
while standing whereas people eat while sitting. "Well, he said, for Uyghurs it's the
same: eating while standing is no good, it's a baa habit, one has to sit down to eat.
Whereas the Han don't pay attention to this and eat also while standing." When I
reported this conversation to my other teacher Amangiil she took the opportunity to
launch in a vehement monologue on Chinese bad manners:
My mother used to say even worse, she used to say that donkeys eat while
standing. She referred to people lacking good manners, like the Chinese.
Donkeys make a very unpleasant noise, and they are dirty. Whereas horses
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after all are beautiful animals. If you look at the Chinese, they eat while
standing, even while walking. Moreover, while eating they sniff [she
reproduced the noise], they clean their nose, they spit. When we eat we don't
even speak, both because it could go down the wrong way and to avoid spitting
some food inadvertently. So we keep silent and concentrate on our food. When
we have finished, we drink some tea, we clear the table and then we chat.
She often voiced her rather strong opinions concerning the superiority of Uyghur
manners when compared to the Han, who she thought totally lacked manners. I found
this was a very common stereotype among Uyghurs, although most people would not
phrase it in such extreme terms as she did. Often the Han would be blamed for having
a bad influence and corrupting Uyghur ways, not only as far as manners were
concerned. For instance, Dilber declared on more than one occasion that she makes her
own bread since, she said, nowadays the bread you buy in bakeries is not good
anymore. "It's not Uyghur bread, it's Han bread! Because they have learnt from the
Han, they use artificial yeast like for momo. The tonur [oven] is Uyghur, but the
dough is Chinese. Moreover, they use kneading machines." She was mildly
disappointed when I told her that in Europe too they use baking powder.
6.2.1. Chinese food on Uyghur tables?
While Uyghurs in tirnmchi tend to construct their identity in opposition to the Han
Chinese, Uyghur foodways have inevitably been influenced by increasing contact with
the Han. However, despite a certain degree of exchange and borrowings, I would
definitely make a clear distinction between the core of Uyghur and Chinese cuisine.
Differences can be identified in terms of typical meal structure and patterns, ingredients
(especially as far as meat, vegetables, and spices are concerned), and taste in general.
Very roughly, the structure of a Chinese meal is normally conceived as a combination
of fan, typically an individual bowl of rice, and a number of cai (dishes) shared with
the other participants. Whereas a Uyghur meal usually consists of a single main
course, where dough - as opposed to rice - normally plays a predominant role. 9 This
could be for instance leightnein, gosh nan, polo, or some kind of suyuq ash.
Moreover, with the exception of polo, the main course is always served in and eaten
off individual plates.
9 On Chinese food see Anderson (1988).
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However, this divide between cuisines can be bridged. Recent years have seen
innovative forms of borrowing and synthesis, exemplified in dishes such as ganpan or
dapanji. Ganpan, a Uyghur word derived from the Chinese ganfan (lit. "dry rice"), is
a typical example of a Chinese dish that has been adapted and incorporated into
Uyghur diet, if not cuisine. A single dish of boiled rice topped with stir-fried
vegetables and meat, it is basically a rice version of leighman. This is what Dilber, in
the above account, referred to as so say and mifan. Her remarks on her daughter's
appreciation of this dish implied a recognition of its Chinese origin, if not status. At
the same time, though, she treated it as a Uyghur dish when contrasting "our ways" to
the Chinese. In fact, the introduction of ganpan into urban Uyghur daily diet is fairly
recent. I remember Bahargtil remarking how women from rural areas of southern
Xinjiang cannot boil rice. Once she asked one of her students, who was at her house,
to help her with lunch and cook some rice. "She couldn't do it! Such a simple thing as
boiling rice, she had never done it, since she was from a village in Aksu county". In
eriimchi ganpan is rather popular, especially among working women, as it is much
easier and quicker than any other dish. As already pointed out by the authors of
Uyghur Orp-addtliri, sc7yllir (stir-fried dishes) are also penetrating Uyghurs' daily as
well as formal meals, as I shall discuss more in detail.
In the mid- to late 1990s dapanji, a truly inter-ethnic Xinjiang dish, gained
increasing popularity in the region. It is a spicy hot chicken stew, which is served in a
big plate shared by a number of people. After the chicken has been eaten, wide flat
hand-pulled noodles are poured into the gravy. The story goes that it was invented in
Sayan, northern Xinjiang, by a homesick migrant from Sichuan who randomly mixed
hot chillies, reportedly the staple in Sichuan cuisine, with chicken and potatoes, in an
attempt to reproduce a homey taste. This dish combines elements of both Chinese and
Uyghur/Turkic cuisine, both in terms of ingredients, for example chillies and flat
hand-pulled noodles, and in terms of pattern: it can be eaten as a single main course,
following a Uyghur meal pattern, or it can be incorporated in a set of dishes (cai) for a
Chinese-style meal. In fact, rather than having a specific ethnic identification, it has
become a regional dish equally popular among Uyghurs and Han. It is important to
stress that there are no distinct ethnic variants; it is the same dish, be it in a Han, Hui,
or Uyghur restaurant.
Despite some emerging 'hybrid' forms, such as dapanji and ganpan, in daily
life Uyghur cuisine is usually predominant, both in terms of dishes and of meal
structures. However, on special occasions this pattern seems to be reversed, at least in
tirtimchi. Today for urban Uyghurs a prestigious meal, including a wedding banquet,
usually consists of what they call so say, or simply say (from the Chinese chao cai,
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stir-fried dishes). 10 Nevertheless, they would not define such a meal as Chinese.
Firstly because it is prepared by a Uyghur cook and is therefore truly qingzhen, as we
shall discuss in the next section. But also because these dishes still have "a particular
Uyghur flavour" (Raldunan et al. 1996:27). Only once did I hear a Uyghur refer to so
say as "Chinese".
Eli invited me for lunch and he asked whether I preferred to eat Uyghur or
Chinese food. He noticed my surprise and explained "We can choose betwen two
restaurants, they are both run by Uyghurs. One is very good but they only serve
eUyghur food, like liighman or polo, while in the other Uyghur food is not so
special, but they make excellent so say.
Indeed, the methods of preparation and the structure of these dishes are characteristic
of Chinese cuisine, as outlined above, and their origin is acknowledged in the term that
Uyghurs use, so say, a calque from Chinese. In short, if nan with tea or fruit
represents the most informal Uyghur meal, on the other hand stlyltir often mark a
rather formal occasion. My experience suggests that they may be even competing with
polo as a 'guest food'. However, while their presence on Uyghur tables is
acknowledged by Ralchman et al. (1996), they do not appear in their list of foods,
perhaps because they are a recent phenomenon and are not considered as traditional
food - which is regarded as the appropriate object of ethnographic research.
Nevertheless, I would not be surprised if, perhaps in a few decades, sdyllir became
part of 'traditional' Uyghur cuisine, just like manta or llighmlin did in the past.
• It is intriguing that Uyghurs in Oriimchi should mark special occasions by
choosing what in many respects can be seen as a Chinese meal. As already discussed
in chapter 4, at weddings and similar celebrations, 'traditional' Uyghur food, such as
samsa, manta, qordaq, etc., is incorporated in the meal structure as a starter. But the
meal mainly consists of three or four hang say (in Chinese hang cai, cold dishes)
accompanied by a number of issiq say (in Chinese re cai, hot dishes) placed at the
centre so that everybody eats from the same plate, in the Chinese manner. The latter
usually include at least three or four meat and/or vegetables dishes, mostly stir-fried,
and fish. More Uyghur food can be included in the meal, provided that it is 'formatted'
as a say and incorporated in the relevant set of dishes (cold or hot). For example, the
menu at one wedding banquet I attended included: ash manta (polo and manta),
qordaq (a beef stew normally served at weddings), and peirmudti (small baked
dumplings) as 'starters': then four 'cold dishes': fried peanuts, cucumber salad, and
10 Some Uyghur restaurants divide their menus into sayleir (dishes) and tamaqlar (lit. "foods", these
include Uyghur dishes that constitute main courses, such as laghmlin, or suyuq ash).
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two kinds of cold soya and rice noodles; finally, a large number of hot dishes, among
which meat was predominant: tripe, sheep feet, roasted chicken, green peppers, mini-
kawap, and others. In fact, a process of transformation is clearly evident, where both
dishes and meal structures are manipulated and combined to create a new synthesis.
This however occurs within a distinctive Uyghur framework, not only as far as
ingredients and taste are concerned, but also in terms of manners, rules of
commensality, norms of hospitality, as well as notions of contamination revolving
around the concept of qingzhen, as we shall discuss later.
6.2.2. Uyghur or Turkic?
Due to their Chinese origin, ganpan and say occupy an ambiguous position in the
contemporary Uyghur culinary landscape. While such origin is acknowledged,
although often only implicitly, they are subject to a process of reinterpretation which
eventually may transform them into truly Uyghur dishes. In any case, while Chinese
and Uyghur culinary worlds are bridged, they are also simultaneously marked as
different, to make sure that there is no confusion between what is Chinese and what is
Uyghur. This is even more evident when comparing the status of other dishes or foods
which are not 'originally' or exclusively Uyghur. In fact, Uyghur cuisine and food
ways, as defined in opposition to the Chinese, are to a great extent shared by other
Turkic peoples in Xinjiang, as well as across the border in the Central Asian Republics
or even in Afghanistan. As we have seen in the first part of this thesis, within the
Chinese polity boundaries between different Turkic groups are often blurred. For
instance, while Uyghurs today regard themselves as a distinct group, they also have a
strong sense of their Turkic identity and often identify with other Turkic groups,
especially in opposition to the Han Chinese. Naren chop, a dish of short thin noodles
in a meat gravy, provides a good example of the overlap, or rather continuity, between
local Uyghur cuisine and a broader regional Central Asian Turkic tradition.
One night I was invited for dinner with two other foreign students and Tursun by
his friend Adil. Upon our arrival we were informed that we were going to eat
naren chop. One of the foreign students said he liked that dish and that he had
eaten it at his Sibe friend's house. Ttusun and Adil immediately remarked that
Sibe cannot make it because it is a Kazakh - Uyghur - Uzbek dish and only
Kazakhs , Uyghurs, or Uzbeks can make it.
A few months later, I had dinner with a group of Uyghur friends at Kechik
Yulghun, a restaurant which specialises in naren chop. While we were waiting
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to be served, Niyaz said he had never eaten naren before. Nurqiz then recalled
her "grandfather's" birthday two years before when they had a meal at this
same restaurant and he got angry because they told him these were 'Uzbek
naren' when they weren't. According to him, an Uzbek born in Tashkent, there
should also be onions and yoghurt. At this point Niyaz started a heated
discussion arguing - as he had done on other occasions - that Uzbeks and
Uyghurs are the same, and Kazakhs too; and that he was surprised that
someone like her "grandfather", a well known writer whom he respected a lot,
would make such a distinction. Nurqiz replied that nobody was denying a
shared cultural background among Turkic peoples, but as a matter of fact there
are different states called Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and so on, and there are
expressions such as 'Uzbek naren' or 'Kazakh naren' to refer to different 'styles'
of naren,
Today Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and other Turkic groups share many foods and
practices, which are unprobematically perceived as stemming from a common
tradition. In other words, differentiation, where it occurs, is situated within a common
Turkic framework. There is by no means the same urgency to create a distinction
comparable to that between the Han and the Uyghur. Hence naren can be equally
Uzbek, Kazakh, or Uyghur; but definitely not Sibe, a non-Turkic group which in the
ethnic mapping of Xinjiang is often assimilated with the Han. Not only is the sharing
of this dish among diverse Turkic groups perceived as unproblematic, but for someone
like Niyaz there is not even the need to make any further ethnic discrimination.
In some cases, though, among the Uyghur we find foods that are clearly
identified with a specific group. For instance, among the Turkic peoples in Xinjiang,
Tatars have a reputation for making delicious cakes and biscuits, such as baqaliy, qat-
qat, pechinli - pireinik, tort, hellish, etc. In fact, many of these may be of European-
Russian origin. These are among the gezlikleir that are served with tea and dried fruits
when a guest visits a Uyghur home. Abdulla Abbas, himself a Tatar, is a lecturer in
the biology department of Xinjiang University. He learned to bake cakes and biscuits
from his grandmother and he decided to share this riowledge; so in 1990 he published
a recipe book called "Making pechinti-pireinik at home". In the introduction he writes:
As a consequence of improved living conditions among the peoples of Xinjiang,
today it has become a common habit to prepare baqaliy, qat-qat, all sorts of
pechinii piranik, tort, balish, and similar sweet foods to entertain guests
during holidays, parties, and when exchanging visits.
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In hospitable Xinjiang the people of each nationality, in order to warmly
entertain their dear guests, make every effort to prepare their dastikhan with
nourishing, healthy, tasty, and exquisite foods. These are meant to accompany
tea, which is served before or after the meal. In recent years, these kind of
sweet foods, that used to appear on Tatars dastikhan, have been adopted also
by other nationalities. (Abbas 1990:1)
The hybrid and syncretic aspects of Uyghur foodways were succintly put by Dilber.
Once while she was talking about these biscuits and cakes that are offered to guests,
especially during the two main holidays, she commented: "And these are not even
'traditional Uyghur sweets; they're western. We learnt something from the east and
something from the west. We took say from the Orientals and sweets from the
Westerners." However, while vis-à-vis the Orientals, namely the Chinese, Uyghurs
manifest the urgency to differentiate and to mark disruption, when turning westwards,
particularly to other Turkic peoples, there is no such need to differentiate and the stress
is rather on continuity of cultural practices, in most cases supported by a common
linguistic, religious, and historical background.
6.3. Uyghur notions of qingzhen
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in the realm of food Uyghur differentiation vis-à-
vis the Han is also constructed around notions of contamination, which are implicit in
the concept of qingzhen. Indeed, this concept is central to Uyghur attitudes to food (in
China), as well as to their interaction with the Han Chinese. Since the language of this
interaction is Chinese, in order to discuss this notion I prefer to use a Chinese word,
qingzhen, which includes the meanings of 'halal' and 'Muslim'. As a matter of fact
Chinese is the dominant language within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
and it is the lingua franca of most exchanges involving people with different linguistic
backgrounds. For instance, Chinese would be normally spoken not only between a
Uyghur and a Han Chinese but also between, say, a tyghur and a Mongol. Chinese
was also the language used in some of my interviews and in many conversations I
recorded on the subject. Therefore it is less odd than it seems to use the word
qingzhen in order to discuss a concept, or rather an area of belief and behaviour,
which among the Uyghurs of China is often shaped precisely by such interaction.
Moreover, for the purpose of this discussion, the choice of this term - rather than a
Uyghur one - helps to shed some confusion. There is more than one Uyghur
equivalent for this term, depending on the context in which it occurs. Furthermore,
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there is no Uyghur equivalent in terms of connotation, that is, which evokes Islam and
China at the same time. Lastly, the word qingzhen, by bridging the Uyghur and the
Chinese 'universe', allows the relevant actors a greater negotiation and manipulation of
meanings, this being precisely the focus of my analysis. In particular, I argue that
Uyghur understandings of such concept are informed by their relations to the Han
Chinese.
The concept of qingzhen - with all its equivalents - is central to Uyghur daily
life, especially in Oriimchi where the great majority of the population is Han. Among
Uyghurs, everybody seems to have very strong ideas about what is qingzhen and
what is not, ideas which guide their food choices. But when directly asked what it
means, very few are able to give a clear and coherent answer. Qingzhen is a Chinese
expression which literally means "pure and true" and is inevitably associated with
Islam, to the extent that, in Chinese, a mosque is called qingzhensi (literally "pure and
true temple") and Islam (yisilanjiao) may also be referred to as qingzhenjiao (literally
"pure and true religion"). Since the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368-1911) the word
qingzhen has been used to describe Islam and its God, and it has slowly become a
synonym for "Islam" (Cihai 1990:1078). n In particular, the concept of qingzhen is
central to Hui (Muslim Chinese) identity (Gillette 2000; Gladney 1991; Pillsbury
1975). There is of course a great deal of overlap between Hui and Uyghur
understanding of this term. However, my intention here is to focus exclusively on its
use and its role in contemporary Xinjiang from a Uyghur perspective.
I shall start by considering some problems of translation between languages
which often epitomise a mismatch between categories and cultures. As earlier noted,
Uyghurs in ertimchi must constantly switch between two languages - their native
language, Uyghur, and Mandarin - and translate concepts which may be lacking,
irrelevant, or have different connotations in the other language and culture. By trying
to discuss the concept of qingzhen in a third language and from yet another cultural
background, I am adding a further level of complexity.
11 See, for instance, the entries "qingzhensi" and "qingzhenjiao" in the Xinjiang Minzu Cidian
(XUAR 1995: 610, 345). In the same dictionary, see also the entry "qingzhen" for the origin and
history of the term (XUAR 1995:337). Mathews glosses "qingzhen" as "used by Mohammedans for
God"; "qingzhenjiao" or "huihuijiao" as "Mohammedanism"; "qingzhensi" as "the Jewish synagogue
formerly at Kaifengfu in Honan" (Mathews 1943). At the entry "qingzhenjiao" in the Ci Hai we find :
"Namely Islam. During the Ming and Qing period, in order to describe the doctrine of Islam, Chinese
Muslim scholars used the following words to praise the 'True Lord" [zhenzhu, i.e. Allah] worshipped
by the above mentioned religion: "uncontaminated peace and quiet" [qingjing wuran], "the true and the
only" [zhennai duyil, "deeply pure and deeply true" [zhiqing zhizhen], and "the True Lord [Allah]
originally has the only respect, this is called pure and true" [zhenzhu yuan you duzun, wei zhe
qingzhen]. Hence the name [qingzhenjiao]." (Cihai 1990:1078, see also the entries: "qingzhenyan"
and "qingzhensi").
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Among Uyghurs in eriimchi, the word "qingzhen" is usually associated with
food, and it refers to what they can eat. They must not eat anything which is not
qingzhen. This word can be translated into Uyghur in different ways, depending on
the context. When describing such food in Uyghur, they would normally use halal
(allowed) as opposed to haram (forbidden). 12 This roughly translates qingzhen and
non-qingzhen as adjectives of food. However, this is usually not an issue for
discussion among Uyghurs, since the food they eat and talk about among themselves
is inevitably halal, or qingzhen, by default. On the other hand, such categories may
become extremely relevant in interactions where non-Uyghur-speakers and non-
Muslims are involved.
Another common context in which qingzhenlnon-qingzhen categories are used
is when describing a restaurant, eating house, or dining hall, in short any premises
where food is sold, served, or distributed. The use of such categories has been
institutionalised by the introduction of qingzhen certificates issued by the Committee
for Minority Affairs to be displayed on the premises (photos 34, 38). In this context
qingzhen is glossed in Uyghur as musulmanchti, which literally means "Muslim
style". Besides the above mentioned certificates, most restaurants include this
information in their signs. Along with their name, one can usually read "qingzhen
fanzhuan" (qingzhen restaurant), "qingzhen canting" (qingzhen dining hall), etc..
For the purposes of this discussion, we can identify three broad categories of
public eating places in Xinjiang: firstly, Han Chinese, which are not qingzhen and are
usually marked by the characters Hancan (Han food); secondly Hui, which are
qingzhen and whose signs are normally written in Chinese and usually include the
characters qingzhen and/or Huimin (Hui people); and finally Uyghur, which are also
qingzhen, although this may not be explicitly stated in their signs, written in Uyghur
and/or in Chinese. In Uyghur signs we may find different words alluding to their
being qingzhen, such as musulmanchd (Muslim style), musulmanlar (of Muslims),
milliy (literally "of a minzu", it may be translated as "ethnic", however in this context
it usually means "Uyghur"; photos 35, 36).
This sounds perfectly straightforward: Uyglturs in China can eat qingzhen
(halal) food in qingzhen (Muslim) restaurants, which are normally marked as such
and include both Hui and Uyghur restaurants. But how is qingzhen defined? What are
12 "Heiram [Arabic]: restricted (chillthIngan). In contemporary Uyghur language 'harane . Things and
activities strictly restricted for Muslims according to the Islamic law (SluIri'd7), like drinks and foods
(ozuq-ta'amlar) that it is forbidden to eat." "Halal [Arabic]: permitted, clean, neat (pakiz, taza). In
contemporary Uyghur language 'halal'. Thing or activity allowed for Muslims, like drinks and food
regarded as clean (taza wei pak hesablanghan)." (Hapiz 1994:178-179)
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Photo 35 (right)
A trilingual sign in Ghulja: milli ashkhana
in Uyghur (top line), musulmanski restoran
in Russian (bottom line), and qingzhen
canting in Chinese (characters on the left).
Photo 36 (left)
Qaynam musulmanlar ashkhani (Driimchi).
Photo 34 - Preparing lcawap outside an ashkhana in Kashgar.
Note the qingzhen certificate on the door.
the criteria, if any, for deciding what is qingzhen and what is not? And for whom? The
most obvious reference here is the Qur'an and the dietary rules contained in it.
[These] rules are based on the categories of pure (tahir) and impure (rijs, najis)
and of lawful (halal) and unlawful (haram). ... Muslims are expressly
forbidden from consuming carrion, spurting blood, pork, and food that has been
consecrated to any being other than God himself. ... Each prohibited substance
is declared to be extremely defiling, with wine being further distinguished as
an instrument of Satan for sowing discord among the faithful. ... Transgression
of dietary prohibitions temporarily invalidates acts of worship such as prayer,
fasting, and pilgrimage. Mere physical contact with pork, carrion, or wine
makes a person or object impure. (Campo 1995:375-6).13
There has been some disagreement on whether wine includes all intoxicating
beverages, but all schools agree that consuming it is unlawful. However, "[t]hrough
the centuries, the Islamic ban on intoxicants has been honoured in the breach."
(Campo 1995:376). If these are the only explicitly forbidden items, some flesh is
preferred to other, for example domestic cattle, sheep, goats, and camels. Moreover,
whether meat is lawful or unlawful largely depends on how it is obtained, that is ritual
slaughtering as opposed to strangling. The Qur'an also provides the guidelines for
deciding who can perform the slaughtering and from whom food can be received.
Here, again, we find a wide range of. different interpretations: "many hold that if there
is doubt about the source of meat, a person need only "mention the name of Allah over
it and eat it" (al-Bukhari). On the other hand, jurists have forbidden food obtained
from known heretics, apostates, idol-worshipers, and atheists." (Campo 1995:376).
In short, very few things are explicitly forbidden for consumption: namely carrion,
blood, pork, and wine, and some of these may be open to interpretation. In other
words, this is a domain which allows some manipulation of rules, be it by legal
schools, religious communities, or individual believers.
13 I am indebted to Mans Boyd Gillette for drawing my attention to this source. Cf. also the Qur'an
as quoted in Merchant (1947): II. 168 "But that which dieth of itself, and blood, and swine's flesh, and
that over which any other name than that of God hath been invoked, is forbidden you. But he who
shall partake of them by constraint [life or death], without lust or wilfulness, no sin shall be upon
him. Verily God is Indulgent, Merciful." (Merchant 1947:101-2).
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6.3.1. Uyghur practical definitions of qingzhen
Let us now move on to Uyghur perceptions and daily practice. I will focus on young
Uyghurs, since it was primarily with them that notions of qingzhen emerged as an
issue. Indeed, while this was never an issue when eating at home, it became often one
when eating out. This was a situation that occurred most often among young people,
be they student or young graduates. So, what does qingzhen mean for them? And
what are the implications in daily practice? I begin with a short dialogue from my field
notes, which illustrates the difficulties in translating between these categories, as well
as in defining them.
As we were entering a small Uyghur restaurant just across the main gate of the
University, I asked Nurqiz how is "qingzhen" translated into Uyghur.
"Musulman", she said. I remarked that Hui do not say that. "It's because their
mother tongue is Chinese", she replied. "What about haram?" I asked.
"Haram means something else. For instance, dog is haram." "Is haram the
contrary of musulman?" "No." "What is its contrary then?" She hesitated and
then said she did not know. I suggested that perhaps the contrary of qingzhen is
Hancan (Chinese food). She nodded.
In daily practice, however, definitions of qingzhen often transcend linguistic
boundaries to encroach on ethnic categories and stereotypes.
Anwar is a young university graduate from Yarkand, where his family still
lives. He studied at Xinjiang University and, after he obtained his degree in
Chinese, he was offered a job in a research institute and he stayed in eramchi.
Like many other educated young people, he is studying English and dreams of
going abroad. Nevertheless, unlike some of his contemporaries, he is reluctant
to adopt western lifestyles and values, very selective to say the least. He clings
firmly to his Uyghur identity, which he invests with a strong religious content.
Once he asked me about my research and we ended up discussing the concept of
qingzhen. He told me that when he was in Beijing with the university they
went on a day trip to Tianjin. Before leaving Beijing, in the morning, he had nan
and tea for breakfast in one of the many restaurants of the Uyghur village.
Since in Tianjin there are no Uyghur eating places, at lunch time they stopped
in a Hui restaurant. But he and two or three of his classmates did not eat. In
fact, he did not even walk into the restaurant but waited outside, and stayed on
an empty stomach until late in the evening when they returned to Beijing. I
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asked him why he refused to eat. He said that, although Hui restaurants are
qingzhen, he does not trust them because historically Hui people have been
deceivers. So he prefers to fast than eat in a Hui place.
I then asked whether he would eat in a qingzhen French restaurant; in other
words, whether he would trust the French more than the Hui. He said yes, to
broaden his horizon. He then added that eating habits change as society
evolves, therefore if they opened a French restaurant in Criimchi, as a result of
modernisation, he would try it.
When I asked how can one know what meat is haram, 14 he said that all
dietary rules can be found in the Qur'an. "For example, donkey, dog, and cat are
haram, whereas horse is allowed; crow is haram, while duck is not. But this
doesn't mean that all Uyghurs go and read the Qur'an to know what they can
and cannot eat. One knows from other people." "But why Uyghurs don't eat
anything which is not qingzhen?" "Otherwise one becomes a kapir [which he
glossed as a "non-Muslim"]. Today some Uyghurs breach the Islamic law but
they don't let other people know and keep calling themselves Muslims".
Although I rarely came across such strongly expressed mistrust towards Hui
restaurants, I found that many other Uyghurs showed reluctance if not refusal when
invited to eat in a Hui place. Most of the people I knew would eat there although,
given a choice, they would rather choose a Uyghur eating place. What is striking in the
above conversation is that Anwar seems to have strong beliefs about Muslim dietary
rules and the consequences of transgressing them, beliefs that he claims are derived
from Queanic prescriptions. Yet he admits that usually this is not first-hand
knowledge. I noticed that when Uyghurs list forbidden foods, they would normally
concentrate on meat and include items not explicitly mentioned as forbidden in the
Qur'an, such as for example donkey, dog, or cat. 15 In practice, however, there seem
to be a shift from a focus on "qingzhen" as a quality intrinsic to food items, to an
association of food with people, whereby categories of forbidden/allowed are defined
according to what people the food is associated with, and how these people are
situated in relation to the Han. In other words, it seemis that for Uyghurs qingzhen,
particularly when referred to a restaurant, is not so much about categories of food as
about categories of people, the reference group being the Han. Hui, despite their
notoriously rigid qingzhen standards, are inevitably associated with the Han. As one
14 By that time I had engaged in several - elicited and not - conversations on that topic. I had noticed
that people would almost invariably concentrate on meat.
15 For an extensive list of forbidden items as well as direct quotations from the Qur'an see for instance
Merchant (194'7), in particular pp. 99-109, and Azimabadi (1994).
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Uyghur put it, "We don't trust them, after all they're Chinese. Muslim, but
Chinese." 16 In short, more than any tangible criteria, the notion of trust plays an
extremely important role in Uyghur food-related choices, as we see in the following
account:
On a late-September afternoon Tursun and I were walking on campus. We
stopped by a pedlar selling all sorts of biscuits and cakes, including moon-cakes,
the characteristic round pastries stuffed with fruit preserve or red bean paste
which are eaten during the Chinese Moon Festival. 17 I asked Tursun if Uyghurs
eat them too. "Of course not, they are not qingzhen." "What do you mean by
qingzhen?" "Apart from pig, the meat of any animal that has been killed
according to the Muslim method, i.e. that had its throat cut with a knife, is
qingzhen. We must not eat anything which we know, or suspect, is not qingzhen,
that is, unclean. In theory this indudes anything which has been contaminated
by pork, for instance that has been cooked in a pan where pork had been
previously cooked, no matter how well you wash it. However, if we
unknowingly eat unclean food, we don't commit a sin. Anyway, we never eat
anything that has been touched by the Han because we don't trust them.
Sometimes we're not sure about the Hui either." "What about the food I cook?"
I asked "I can eat that because I know that it's clean."
It was true, I would have never wittingly fed him pork or food that had been
contaminated by it. But how would he know, since he never asked? I wonder if he
really believed that I was "clean" and never had anything to do with pork, or if he
chose to overlook this issue for the sake of our friendship. Maybe he chose not to
know because, in this way, he would not, to use his own words, "commit a sin". As
in Anwar's case, who would eat in a French but not in a Hui restaurant, what strikes
one most is the issue of trust applied to practical definitions of qingzhen. The shift
between categories of food and categories of people is exemplified here: while Tursun
16 With few exceptions, Uyghurs' attitude towards the Hui is generally one of mistrust A very
common term used by Uyghurs to describe the Hui is "traitors", When I asked to elaborate, I was
refened to an incident occurred in 1989, during some Muslim - both Hui and Unhuri Turkic -
demonstration in Xinjiang: "When the police arrived, the Hui took their white cap off and dispersed
among the Han, while the Uyghur were arrested". This remark points to the Hui's ambiguous position
as both Muslim and Chinese. A position which can be seen as advantageous but which is also
vulnerable, resulting often in general mistrust on the part of both the Han and other Muslim
minorities (especially in north west China).
17 Chinese celebrate the Moon or Mid-Autumn Festival (Zhongqiujie), on the 15th day of the 8th
lunar month, roughly at the end of September. "[It] is when people observe the biggest and brightest
full moon of the year, the harvest moon. The Festival is marked by family reunions, moongazing, and
the eating of moon cakes - round pastries stuffed with red bean paste and an egg yolk, or fruit
preserves." (Dillon 1998:323)
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refuses to eat the moon cakes on the grounds that they are not qingzhen, his definition
at first mentions only meat, which was not even contained in the cakes. 18 It is when he
introduces the notions of contamination, of "clean" and "unclean", that this shift
occurs.
Some Uyghurs seem to be obsessed with pigs. Paradoxically, while there is a
very strong taboo concerning this animal, at the same time they often talk about it. I
have collected a number of anecdotes and stories revolving around the same theme:
Uyghurs' utter disgust for this animal and their fear that Han would contaminate their
food and drinks with it. This fear may have its roots in the Cultural Revolution, a
period renowned for the repression of any expression of difference and during which,
reportedly, Muslims were forced to eat pork and the water of their wells was
intentionally contaminated by pigs. Bakhtiyar was particularly keen on this subject.
One of the stories he told me concerns tea. "Before, we all used Uyghur tea, you
know, that which looks like a brick. Then, about four or five years ago, a Uyghur
businessman went "in the mouth" [in China proper], where they produced it, and
discovered that they let pigs walk over the tea leaves and that the place was very dirty.
He decided to document this with photos and a video, which he then broadcast in
Xinjiang several times. Since then people don't use that tea anymore but buy the one
from India, which has been available only in the last few years [since the early
1990s.]" I suggested that it might have been just a marketing strategy, but Bakhtiyar
was adamant, "there is a video to prove that it is all true". "A video that could have
been shot anywhere ..." I thought to myself. In any case, what is interesting here is
not whether the video and the story are true, but rather the assumptions and the
implications that surface in this anecdote, which are in line with what has been
discussed so far.19
6.3.2. What is a qingzhen restaurant?
It follows from their obsession with "unclean" food, that some people would rather eat
in a filthy place, provided that it is run by Uyghurs and therefore ritually "clean", than
in a possibly more hygienic Hui place. 20 Regardless of signs and certificates, when
eating out with Uyghurs choosing where to eat is often problematic.
18 Incidentally, there are also qingzhen moon cakes, those produced by the Hui.
19 Cf. Smith (forthcoming), where the same anecdote is reported.
20 In private, Uyghurs have very high hygienic standards, however, as they themselves admit, many
public eating places are in a state that I would not hesitate to describe as filthy. In fact, this is true of
the great majority of such places in Xinjiang, regardless of who is running them, the exception being
Hui places, which are often much cleaner.
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One night I met Abdurehim with one of his friends and we decided to have
dinner together. We went to Beimen market where, as in most markets, one can
find lots of small restaurants and food stalls, and we started shopping around in
order to decide what to eat and where. We had finally made our choice and
walked into a place to eat Iiighmtin, when suddenly Abdurehim changed his
mind and went out. We followed him and asked what was wrong with that
place. "It's not qingzhen" he said. I objected that it was, and pointed to the
qingzhen certificate hanging on the door. "Yes, but I think I saw some Chinese
working inside".
Such episodes are very frequent when eating out with Uyghurs. Unless they are
already familiar with a place, most Uyghurs are extremely suspicious when entering a
restaurant which does not look one hundred percent Uyghur or, to put it in another
way, which they think might be contaminated by a Han presence, regardless of the
qingzhen certificate. According to the Xinjiang Minorities Dictionary definition, the
"qingzhen plate" is a sign normally hanging outside Hui restaurants, "mainly to
distinguish them from Han places" (XUAR 1995:337). In theory, the issue of such
certificate is strictly regulated by law. Only catering businesses which comply with a
number of requisites may apply for it to the issuing office, the local Committee for
Minority Affairs (XUAR 1991:423). In daily practice, however, Uyghur perceptions
of what is and is not qingzhen seem inextricably linked to the Han Chinese. This is
further illustrated by Uyghur classifications of public eating places.
Once Bakhtiyar and I were on the bus and we passed by a new fancy restaurant.
Bakhtiyar told me that it was owned by his (Uyghur) teacher's daughter.
Remembering the conversation I had with Eli on the subject (cf. 6.2.1.), I asked if it
was a Chinese restaurant, meaning that they offered Chinese style dishes, that is say.
Balchtiyar replied bluntly "No, it's not Chinese, it's qingzhen!". In Uyghur practical
definitions of appropriate food and restaurants, qingzhen effectively equals non-
Chinese (Han), and Chinese equals "unclean", that is, non-qingzhen. In this context,
the phrase "Chinese food" is normally understood as "unclean food" rather than as
"Chinese-style food items, dishes, meal pattern ete..". Hence a Chinese restaurant is
not a place where one can taste Chinese-style cuisine but a restaurant where one eats
"unclean" food. It is also evident from the above examples and discussion that the
notion of trust plays a paramount role in Uyghur food choices. These choices, while
being rationalised in terms of Muslim dietary prescriptions, are in fact often ethnically
informed. Indeed, while I do not intend to dismiss the religious dimension, it must be
noted that many of the Uyghurs who are so conscientious about qingzhen are not
religious at all. As we have seen, the classification behind these choices seems to
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concern categories of people more than merely food. We find a further example of this
by looking at what we may call 'western diners'.
With the increasing popularity of the Silk Road among 'Lonely Planet tourists',
a number of western-style cafés have appeared along this route, from Lanzhou to
Kashgar. In ernmchi there were two such places, John's Information Café and Tom's
Café, both at walking distance from the newly built Holiday Inn and opposite the
Hongshan Hotel - the backpackers' equivalent - defining the 'western quarter' of the
city. Both John's and Tom's café were run by Han entrepreneurs. They addressed
primarily a western public, providing a bilingual - English and Chinese - menu which
ranged from Chinese to an ill-defined "western" cuisine (xican). However, they
inevitably ended up catering for local residents as well: mostly youth, who wanted to
associate with "the foreigners", and possibly have a chance to practice their English.
Hence these cafés acquired a special status because of their association with the west,
and became a meeting place also among local young people. Many of the Uyghur
young men I knew used to go there often, usually for a drink, but sometimes also for a
mea1.21 For instance, Balchtiyar once told me very enthusiastically that he had been to
Tom's Café and had tasted Italian spaghetti for the first time in his life. These cafés
were definitely not qingzhen, they did not have a certificate, they were run by Han
Chinese, and they also served pork. Yet for these young Uyghurs they seemed to fall
into the "western" category and did not provoke the same suspicion that other officially
- and perhaps also actually, that is, by Muslim standards - qingzhen places did.
6.4. "We don't eat Chinese!"
In the realm of food, as elsewhere, Uyghur attitudes towards the Han can be
ambiguous. Indeed we observe a complex spectrum of strategies, varying from strict
refusal to adaptation and almost full adoption. In actual practice boundaries are
constantly shifting and blurred, despite government - and social scientists' - attempts
to define and control them. Hence Uyghur attitudes to food and to the Han may appear
occasionally ambivalent if not contradictory. On the one hand, Uyghurs show
complete refusal of Chinese food, which they justify mainly on religious grounds. In
fact, their fear of eating "unclean food" is also and perhaps primarily a fear of cultural
and identity contamination. Somehow eating pork, the 'substance' that epitomises the
Han and their food in Uyghur imaginary, symbolises a loss of Uyghur identity to that
21 It is interesting that, when discussing what is qingzhen and what is not with Uyghurs, there is no
mention of alcoholic beverages. This is an issue that I do not address here, but certainly an area
deserving further research.
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of the Han. Bakhtiyar told me on more than one occasion the story of one of his room-
mates at the medical college who was always hanging out with Han students, and
therefore was also eating with them. "One day they went to a Chinese restaurant.
When he came back we teased him, insisting that he had eaten pork. He kept denying
it, but the next day when he woke up his face was covered with red blisters and he had
to admit that he had actually eaten pork." Both Bakhtiyar and Abdurehim, who had in
fact asked him to tell me the story the first time, insisted that it could not just be a
coincidence. They were ready to provide a 'scientific' explanation, but would not
question in any way the cause: "Surely it was an allergic reaction to pork. Since
Uyghurs haven't eaten pork for generations, they probably lack the enzymes to digest
it and therefore cannot metabolise it." Whether Bakhtiyar's room-mate had actually
eaten pork or not, it is clear that here food is perceived as the ultimate boundary vis-à-
vis the Han.
Duara makes a distinction between hard and soft boundaries. "Hard boundaries"
are those cultural practices that prevent the sharing or adoption of another group's
practices, whereas "soft boundaries", while identifying a group, do not prevent it from
sharing or adopting another group's practices. These, however, are far from static
since "boundaries between communities exist along a spectrum between hard and soft
poles and are always in flux." (Duara 1993:20-21). In other words, soft boundaries
may harden and hard ones may soften. If, on the one hand, Uyghur refusal to eat
Chinese food functions as a "hard boundary", on the other hand, we can also observe
the adoption of certain Chinese food practices, particularly on public occasions and
celebrations, such as weddings or circumcision parties, which are central to Uyghur
identity. Here culinary habits seem to work as a "soft boundary".
As in most societies, there is a tension between what people say they do and
what they actually do; between norm, or belief, and practice. In the first case the
refusal, although rationalised in religious terms, seems to be addressed to the people,
namely the Han Chinese, rather than simply to the food. We can situate this refusal in
the realm of belief and charge it with metaphorical and symbolic meaning. In the social
and political context of contemporary Xinjiang, I suggest that this can be seen as a
form of resistance, though not explicitly articulated as such. Uyghur refusal to be fed
by the Han Chinese can be read as an attempt to exercise control over their dominators,
an attempt at empowerment, to insist that they are not the Han' s guests. As we have
seen in chapter 4, the metaphor of the guest is a very powerful one among Uyghurs in
contemporary Xinjiang. Drawing on a native as well as Chinese discourse - or
stereotypes - of Uyghur hospitality, people would refer to the Han as "guests who
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came and never left", to the extent that roles are now being reversed: the Han are
becoming the "hosts" and the Uyghur their "guests".
On the other hand, at the level of everyday practice, the adoption of selected
items and habits of Chinese origin seems less problematic, and is sometimes openly
acknowledged. In any case, here Uyghur agency is exercised, in the sense that the
process of selective adoption is controlled by the Uyghur themselves. It is perceived as
a matter of choice and not as an attempt at assimilation on the part of the Chinese, as it
often is, for instance, with language. Indeed food, at least in its cultural and social
aspects, is one of the few domains of Uyghur life in which the Chinese state does not
, exercise its totalitarian control. A great deal of agency is exercised by the Uyghur with
respect to food choices, and if the role of state institutions in the 'standardisation' of
food culture is not completely absent, it certainly is limited. While the production of
books and articles defining and describing Uyghur food, along with that of the other
minzu, is part of a Chinese hegemonic discourse on minorities, this may also result in
a Uyghur counter-hegemonic discourse. Moreover, in this case there is no
identification of the food with the people. As we have seen, Uyghurs normally would
not call this food "Chinese", nor do they perceive it as Chinese. Despite the undeniable
Chinese origin of certain food items and practices, these are being transformed into
"Uyghur food" and incorporated within a distinctively Uyghur structure, not only in
terms of taste and ingredients, but also in terms of elaboration.
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CHAPTER 7
FOOD IN PUBLIC: ETHNOGRAPHIC VIGNETTES OF EATING OUT
Abdurehim met me at the bus stop in Dashizi. "Let's have dinner" he said, then
waved at a taxi and dragged me into it. I had arrived in "Griimchi a week before
and everything was new to me. It was hard to imagine that in a month or two I
would have felt comfortably at home in the unfamiliar roads and alleys
through which our taxi was driving. Abdurehim, this stranger whom I had just
met and who was now sitting next to me in the car, was to become one of my
closest friends. During our short taxi journey we passed what then seemed like
an endless array of restaurants. Some had big promising signs and a fancy look,
others had smoking kebab braziers and huge bamboo steamers on the pavement
just before the entrance. While I was wondering what our destination would be
and why we were not having dinner in any one of these restaurants, the car
turned into an alley and stopped. We were in the "Consulate Lane", once the
Russian headquarters in eriiinchi. We walked into a medium size restaurant
and sat at a table. This place was somewhere in between those greasy places
where one often shares a table with other patrons and the fancier restaurants
where banquets are usually held. I asked Abdurehim why we had to come here
and could not stop closer to where we had met. "You see, I run the office by
myself. I can't afford to get sick; there's no one else to do the job. That's why it
is so important for me to eat well. I know all the restaurants in this part of
town, I know where you can get the best polo, or the best bight-ruin, or attic/Lard
... In this place they make great naren chop, one of my favourite dishes. That's
why we came here, I hope you'll like it."
This was just the beginning of a long series of meals shared with Abdurehim in one of
the many restaurants or eateries that crowd the streets of eriimchi. I felt fortunate to
have met someone who, like myself, had to eat out daily, apparently of necessity. His
family background was rather unusual: his parents were divorced and he lived with his
father and his older brother. He did not seem to spend much of his waking time at
home. This was partly due to his job, which often required him to entertain visitors
from Beijing beyond office hours. But he also claimed to have always been very
independent, since he was a teenager. Later, with a mixture of fascination and
incredulity, his best friend Bakhtiyar would often remark how different their two
families were. In Abdurehim's family everybody was independent and looked after
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themselves, somehow subverting those common rules of mutual obligation which, on
the other hand, seemed to exert a particularly strong influence on Bakhtiyar.
However, it was not just necessity which lay at the origin of all this eating out.
To an extent, it was a choice too, a choice made available by a relatively good salary
and by the existence of a wide range of restaurants. As we have seen, for many other
people who, for various reasons, did not have the opportunity to eat a cooked meal at
home, it was not unusual to dine simply on nan and tea or fruit. In any case,
Abdurehim was certainly not the only one in his age group to make use of restaurants
and similar public places. Eating out was common among young Uyghurs in
ertimchi. A good part of my fieldwork was conducted at the dining table of a
restaurant, and this was not only due to the nature of my research. Nearly on a daily
basis, I would share a meal with one or more Uyghur friends in a small restaurant near
the university or in Erdaoqiao, the heart of the Uyghur town. Indeed, if among all
Uyghurs socialising is usually connected with eating and drinking, among young
Uyghurs in Oriimchi this would happen very often in some kind of public place. In
short, eating out was an increasingly common activity in late 1990s Oriimchi. There is
however a great deal of variation in terms of establishments, clientele, occasions,
modes and motivations. In this chapter I propose a number of ethnographic vignettes
of eating out set in different kinds of restaurants. This will give us the opportunity to
follow some of the themes that have emerged so far, by looking at these in context.
7.1. Restoran and ashkhana
As far as Uyghur restaurants are concerned, a preliminary distinction should be made
between restoran - the Chinese equivalent of which could be dajiudian - and
ashkhana - in Chinese canting. Ashkhana is a word of Persian origin, composed by
ash (food) and the suffix -khana, indicating a room or premise (cf. kitabkhana
bookstore). In modern Uyghur ashkhana means "kitchen", but it is also used for
"canteen" (of a school, or factory) and "restaurant" or, perhaps more precisely, "eating
house".' By contrast, restoran is a loanword from Russian - and, in turn, from
French - suggesting that its use in Uyghur probably is much more recent. 2 Restoran
refers to a more formal venue than an ashkhana. As its etymology indicates, a
restoran is something closer to a modern European "restaurant", in the sense that it is
1 Uyghur ... (1990); Shiyong ... (1995).
2 Uyghur ... (1992).
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primarily the venue of a leisure activity. In other words, filling one's stomach is not
the main motivation for going to a restoran.
These two kinds of eating place appear as different already from the exterior. An
ashkhana normally has a hand painted sign hanging at the entrance, as opposed to the
usually more sophisticated neon sign of a restoran. However, often the sign of an
ashkhana is superfluous and one can easily identify such places from the cooking
activities carried out on the pavement just outside the premises: kebab braziers, tonur
(oven) where samsa or peirmudei are baked, big bamboo steamers for manta or
khoshein, a huge qazan where a man is preparing polo, or a boy chopping kilos of
onions in a big plastic basin (photo 39). In the unlikely event that one would not notice
all this when walking past, one cannot miss the insistent invitation to eat at their place
that one of the waiters shouts at passers-by. Some streets are literally lined with such
restaurants, one next to the other; it seems as if each were competing with the others
for potential patrons. On the other hand, while trying to conquer each other's clientele,
there is also an ongoing exchange of ingredients between neighbours. More than once
I have walked into an ashkhana after being told that they served, say, leighmein, only
to discover that they had in fact finished the dough and that they were buying it from
the restaurant nextdoor.
When eating in an ashkhana one would usually ask at the entrance what food
they serve and then place one's order. The actual dining room is small and the decor is
quite basic: square or rectangular tables with stalls or cheap chairs, whitewashed walls
sometimes adorned with a poster, typically a Swiss Alpine landscape, or a picture of a
breakfast table laid in Western style, even featuring eggs and bacon (photos 37, 38). It
is quite surprising to see such an image on the walls of a halal restaurant, but both
patrons and personnel do not seem to realise its association with pork, as it became
clear on a couple of occasions when I tactfully tried to hint at it and they could not
understand what my comment was all about.
By contrast, a restoran is bigger and smarter; more of a professional business.
The dining room is usually spacious and, unlike most ashkhana, does not offer a view
of the kitchen. The tables are typically round, with matching chairs around them. The
decor is usually the work of an interior designer, no matter how dubious the taste
might seem to a European eye. But the most substantial difference between a restoran
and an ashkhana lies in their menus: while the latter only offers a limited choice of
tamaqlar ("main courses") and does not even have a food list, when eating in a
restoran one can choose from a long list of sayleir. This implies another important
difference: unlike the sometimes solitary experience of eating in an ashkhana, eating in
a restoran is always a social activity. When entering a restoran, a waitress in a
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Photo 38
An ashkhana in triimchi. Note
the qingzhen certificate on the left
door.
Photo 39- A typical scene
. outside an ashkhana: freshly
slaughtered mutton hanging at the
entrance, steaming manta on the
left, and cooking polo in the big
qazan to the right.
Photo 37 - Posters on the wall of an ashkhana. Note the pictures of Uyghur
popstars stuck on the poster in the middle, featuring a breakfast table laid with
eggs and bacon.
Photo 40- Making kawap
outside the "polo place".
Photo 41 - Inside the "polo place".
Note the eggs and bacon (in the
poster on the wall) right behind
freshly slaughtered mutton.
Photo 42 - Eating say in an
upmarket restaurant
(Uriimchi).
uniform ushers the party to a table. Once they are seated, the waitress serves tea, gives
each person a menu and waits to take the order. A meal in a restoran requires plenty of
time and usually involves more or less heavy drinking among the men. In short, it
marks a special occasion, be it a celebration, a reunion, or a business meeting, and is
not perceived as an ordinary activity (photo 42).
According to Patigtil "eating out" ( i.e. in a restoran) is a relatively recent habit
which has become increasingly popular in the late 1990s. She remembers that in 1995,
when she left Ortimchi to study in Europe, there were very few fancy restaurants and
eating there was an experience unknown to most. Two years later, when she went
back to visit her family during the summer holidays, she was stunned by the number
of restaurants that had been growing like mushrooms, and by how popular eating out
had become, especially among younger people. More and more often, formal meals
were now moving from private homes to the hall of a restoran.
This is certainly an area that would deserve further empirical investigation.
Unfortunately it was only towards the end of my fieldwork that I began to realise how
critical that period was in terms of changing habits, as well as changing urban
landscape. Here I only propose a tentative framework for future research. As far as
upmarket Uyghur restaurants are concerned, their clientele could be divided along
gender and generational lines: on a continuum, I would put younger men - mostly
between twenty-five and thirty-five - at the most frequent end and older women - over
forty - as least frequent. The attendance of younger women and older men seemed to
vary more in terms of occasion, such as for instance women's revolving chay parties,
as opposed to business meetings.
Below I propose a sort of personal survey of (mostly Uyghur) restaurants in
Ortimchi and specific eating-out situations, through which I address and illustrate
broader themes. Far from being an exhaustive survey, the intention here is to provide
a "live" description, where real people are represented in context.
7.2 The Pink House (hancan): youe minzu and the you-are-what-you-
eat philosophy
It is lunch-time on a late winter day; the Pink House is full and we have to share a table
- with two young women. A man sitting at a table next to ours complains that he has
been waiting for over half an hour. The two women at our table, who are already
eating from a plate in front of them, join his protest and tell the waiter to cancel the
three other dishes that they had ordered. Not a good start ...
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The "Pink House" is a small Chinese restaurant (hancan) just outside the main
gate of Xinjiang University. Despite its filthy look, it has become a favourite among
the foreign students community, thanks to the excellent quality of the food and the
friendly atmosphere. Since they painted the door and windows pink, some time during
the summer of 1996, it has been referred to as the "Pink House" among the English-
speaking members of that community, although its actual name is Furong Chuanwei
(Lotus Sichuan-style restaurant). Most of the time it is very quiet and foreign patrons
are usually ushered to the "private room" at the back, which has led us to speculate
jokingly that it might be bugged. However, one should avoid the lunch peak hour,
when it gets very crowded with Chinese patrons from the neighbouring work units.
This time we have come too late, but the anticipation of a selection of vegetable dishes,
so rare in the ürlimchi winter, is mouth-watering and we are prepared to wait.
Minding other people's business is a great way to kill the time. It is also the
favourite national sport in China. So I turn to my two companions, who are also
foreign students, and start speculating on how those two women could possibly eat
four full dishes - they had not even ordered half portions! Soon the question is passed
to the women themselves and the language of our conversation switches from English
to Mandarin. One of them, whose "deep" eyes had caught my attention earlier, replies
that they eat a bit of everything. "What about what is left?", presses one of my
companions. She hesitates, lingering in an almost embarrassed silence before the
conversation moves on. She is . surprised and at the same time very interested in the
fact that two of us are studying Uyghur. I am even more surprised than she is, since it
is the first time that I encounter such a positive reaction by a Chinese. But I am
shocked when she declares that although she is Uyghur she does not speak the
language at all. Instinctively, I am horrified, but also intrigued, at the thought of a
Uyghur eating in a Chinese restaurant. My horror stems from what I have experienced
so far as a socially accepted normative behaviour among the Uyghur, which is now
being challenged by this encounter. Once again, I am painfully aware of the gulf
separating Uyghurs and Han, and of how this could shrink if there were more
tolerance and understanding on both sides, as this woman seems to prove. As if
reading my mind, the woman clarifies her statement: "My mother is Uyghur, my father
is Han. When people ask me what is my minzu I say youyi minzu ("friendship
nationality"). My ID says "Han", but I want to change it and become Uyghur because
of the advantages. 3 It's a rather complicated procedure, among other things I have to
go through the Bureau of Religious Affairs. Not that I must convert to Islam ... I am
3 She is referring to a sort of affirmative action policy, which, for instance, allows non-Han minzu to
have an extra child.
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free not to believe. Even if - she adds - Uyghurs would insult me if I'm not a Muslim
and, above all, if I eat Chinese food (hancan)."
7.3 Lamb, leighmiin and Bollywood: being "abroad within China"
Right opposite the University main gate - and across the road from the Pink House -
there was an array of small Uyghur and Hui restaurants, mainly catering to minzu
(non-Han/Muslim) students. With the exception of a Hui restaurant which also offered
jiaozi (dumplings), the menu was standard: laghman, ugra, suyuq ash, sondin, that
is various kinds of noodles, boiled, stir fried, or in a soup. Despite the fact that the
Hui places were ostensibly cleaner, my favourite place was a small Uyghur restaurant:
it was filthy, the food was terrible - well, their iigrd was not so bad - but it had a great
atmosphere. 4 It was impossible not to notice it in contrast with the tiny size of the
door, two big speakers were hanging on either side of it, loudly announcing to
passers-by and potential patrons what film (typically Bollywood) or entertainment
program they were showing inside by broadcasting the soundtrack.
I often ate there when I had dinner with Uyghur friends from the university. It
was one of those places — not at all rare in Xinjiang — walking into which felt like
stepping outside China. From the entrance door few steps led down to an L-shaped
room, slightly below the street level, crowded with wooden tables and benches. One
was immediately hit by the warm smell of fat mutton and the clamour of dozens of
students overlapping the soundtrack of the video being shown on a small TV set
hanging in the corner of the room. Once I went there with Xiao Li, a Han friend who
was from the Chinese north-east, in local terms a neidi ren (a person from the
interior). He was temporarily in Oriimchi to attend some personal matter and stayed at
the University guest house, where he had befriended a Uyghur student. Xiao Li was a
very special and unusual person and would certainly deserve more than such a sketchy
introduction. In particular, he seemed to be totally unaware, or rather unconcerned
with the social gap existing between local Han and Uyghur people. That night we had
decided to eat in this restaurant out of respect for `his Uyghur friend, who did not feel
very comfortable about eating in a Hui place. The restaurant was crowded with
Uyghur youth watching a film in Uyghur on television: it was clearly a new experience
for Xiao Li, who kept staring around repeating "this is being abroad within China!"
Xiao Li's comment reminded me of how unusual, if not exotic, such an ordinary
Uyghur restaurant appeared to the eyes of an outsider, that is someone from outside
4 Ogrei is a kind of suyaq tamaq ("soup") with thin noodles (cf end of 6.1.3).
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Xinjiang. Even more importantly, the experience of eating there with him lead me to
consider how exceptional it was that a Han ate in such a place and how such an
ordinary experience was alien to the great majority of the Han population in thiimchi.
Despite the filthy look of the kitchen, I found this restaurant cosy and
welcoming, perhaps because of the collective ritual of TV watching. They usually
showed videos, most often Bollywood films subtitled in Uyghur, but also
entertainment programs recorded from the Uyghur television, which typically featured
Central Asian singers and dancers. One night I was there with Nurqiz and Misha, a
Russian student from Kazakhstan. While we were waiting for our iigrii, Nurqiz
pointed at some dancers they were showing on television and said "this is a Turkish
style dance". Then she saw Misha's disapproving look, and she added "but the song is
Uzbek"; Misha nodded. I was rather puzzled: I could not tell that neither dance nor
song were Uyghur! The entertainment program went on with an Indian male singer.
Misha knew absolutely everything about him, from his name to the Indian language in
which he sung. He said that this singer was extremely popular in Kazakhstan, just like
Bollywood films. This time Nurqiz nodded "so they are in Xinjiang" she said, and the
two of them started discussing Indian film stars. Although they both said they did not
like these films because once you have seen one you have seen all of them,
nevertheless, they knew absolutely everything about them.
Once again I was faced with the evidence that peoples across the border shared a
lot more, for instance in terms of taste and popular culture, than those within the
Chinese "motherland". Even more fascinating was the complexity of cultural
encounters: a Russian from Kazakhstan, who studied Chinese in a Turkish University
in Turkestan,5 discussing Bollywood films and Turkish dance with a Uyghur woman,
in Mandarin.
7.4. Hui restaurants: a good compromise?
Hui restaurants - musulman and Chinese at once - lie somewhere in between Chinese
and Uyghur ones, both in terms of menu and food variety and in terms of the ethnic
composition of their clientele. However, as already discussed, this hybridity can be an
advantage as well as a disadvantage. I have heard Uyghurs complain that the leighmlin
5 Turkestan is a small but historically important town in southern Kazakhstan (not far from the
Uzbek border) where in the 12th C lived the Sufi saint and poet Khoja Ahmed Yasawi. Two centuries
after his death, Timur (Tamerlane) built there a magnificent mausoleum, which has become an
important site of pilgrimage. According to some, three visits to it were equal to a trip to Mecca. In
recent years the mausoleum has been restored with Turkish money.
192
or suyuq ash one eats in a Hui place do not taste like the Uyghur ones. Similarly some
Han find that their chao cal (stir-fries) taste too Hui. In other words Hui food is
regarded as equally "inauthentic" by both the Uyghur and the Han - just as Hui people,
rather than being regarded as a trait d'union, are alienated by both the Muslim Uyghur
and by the Chinese Han. In short, while Hui restaurants are the best if not the only
option to reconcile Han and Uyghur food preferences (and, for the latter, taboos) in
fact they do not entirely satisfy either of them.
Despite the fact that part of their clientele seemed more resigned than
enthusiastic, the Hui places in and around campus were doing very well. They were
clean and, above all, they offered a great deal of variety. They ranged from those
where customers could choose from a menu which, to the eyes of a lay person,
resembled very closely that of a Han Chinese restaurant (hancan), to those offering
what many regarded as the standard Uyghur canteen menu (llighnidn, Ügrä, suyuq
ash, somdn, etc.). The fact that many of these food items were possibly common
among the Hui before they became popular among the Uyghur was irrelevant or, more
likely, simply ignored by those complaining that Hui cannot make 'proper' Uyghur
food. Likewise, their stir-fries were regarded as a bad imitation of Han food, rather
than being considered simply Hui food.
Throughout my fieldwork eating was never an easy business. It often involved a
delicate diplomatic action and sometimes a difficult mediation between different tastes
and ethnic sentiment. Since our guest house had no cooking facilities and the students
canteen's opening hours were ludicrous, I had no choice but to eat out, unless I was
invited at someone's house. Of course this was true for other foreign students and,
sometimes, for local students too. This meant that I always had company during my
meals, but at the same time it was necessary to accommodate very different needs, to
the extent that sometimes I had to hide from prospective companions whose needs did
not fit the restaurant where I had decided to eat. While Uyghur and Hui restaurants
were, in theory, accessible to everyone, be they Muslim or not, some did not like
Uyghur food while others did not like, or rather trust, Hui restaurants.
One night Misha and I decided to have dinner at a Hui restaurant in the university
bazar. On our way out I proposed to invite Misha's room-mate and his friend Yasin,
who was visiting him. Misha was reluctant; he thought that Yasin would not eat in that
Hui restaurant because "they really look Han!". Incidentally, were it not for the white
hat, I could not tell the difference between a Hui and a Han anyway. I decided to go
and ask all the same, if anything to be polite. At first Yasin accepted, but he was
hesitant. Eventually he admitted that he would have been happier if we had gone to a
Uyghur restaurant. But Misha wanted to eat chao cal (stir-fries) and therefore was not
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happy about a Uyghur restaurant. After a lengthy discussion we returned to our
original plan and Misha and I went to the Hui place, while we left his room-mate with
the unpromising prospect of a Uyghur meal, which he hated.
7.5. Eating in Erdaoqiao: a place for every taste
Fast-food in the heart of the Uyghur town
Erdaoqiao market, the heart of the Uyghur town, lay at walking distance from the
University. This is where one would go to eat something "special" - although I must
say the best Uyghur food I have eaten was always homemade. In fact, coming down
from the University, the food-fair already started at Yan'an lu, more precisely along
"Consulate lane", and culminated with the bazar in Erdaoqiao.6 What was really
special about this place was the choice available. Not only in terms of the status of the
restaurant, ranging from the market stall or the cheapest ashkhana to the fanciest
restoran, but also in terms of different foods and dishes. Here each ashkhana
specialised in a particular dish, to the extent that there were places that only offered that
dish, as for instance the "king of polo and kawap" right next to the mosque.
In the market, after the fruit and vegetable stalls, there was a long row of
kawapchi (kebab sellers) with their smoking braziers and a pile of skewers of raw
meat ready to be sprinkled with ground zirei (cumin) and /aza (chilli) before being
grilled.7 One could compare the meat of different kawapchi before choosing where to
have one's kebab. These were usually served on a 'wheel' of nan, which was
particularly tasty after having absorbed the warm mutton fat leaking from the grilled
meat. Besides the kawapchi, which certainly were the most conspicuous presence,
there was a large number of other food stalls where one could stop for a snack while
shopping. These offered a wide range of 'fast foods': from steamed manta and
khoshtin to baked samsa and ptirmudei, or cold ltingpung. 8 Due to its location, as well
as to the wide range of food choice available, Erdaoqiao was the ideal place to meet
friends for a meal, be it a quick snack in between errands or a slightly more formal
lunch or dinner. Alternatively, one could easily walk there from the University to
satisfy a sudden crave for a particular dish.
The "polo and kawap place" - as the sign in Uyghur read - or "king of polo and
kawap?' - in Mandarin - was a small ashkhana consisting of a narrow room, not
6 Cf. chapter 3 on the Uyghur town.
7 The stalls in this market were not exclusively Uyghur, but these were certainly in the majority.
8 Liingpung are bean-flour noodles seasoned with a sauce made of vinegar, chopped garlic and chilli
powder; also known as ... liang fen (a Chinese cold dish)!
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bigger than a few square feet. Outside, on the pavement before the shop, there was a
table laid with skewers of raw meat and a big brazier. At the entrance, on the right, a
white-tiled block with a big qazan in the middle full of polo, leaving just enough space
to walk in without bumping into the dead sheep hanging from a hook on the left.
Further down, two long wooden tables covered with a colourful plastic cloth and two
wooden benches on each side of them, where little more than a dozen people could sit.
Over the glossy green walls were two big posters, one on each side. On the left wall a
still life photograph featured a straw basket full of different varieties of grapes and,
slightly in the background, a bottle of champagne emerging from an ice-bucket with a
full glass in front, and a colourful composition of bananas, carrots, and red and yellow
peppers (species unknown in Xinjiang). The poster on the other wall looked definitely
blander, but in fact was even more striking. It portrayed a corner of a presumably
American house with a white round table laid with breakfast for two, consisting of two
plates full of scrambled eggs with bacon, complete with forks and knives, a jug of
fresh milk, and a centrepiece of fresh roses and daisies; in the background a bright
window was surrounded by green house-plants. Needless to say, to an European eye
the picture was in stark contrast with the surrounding environment, but it was not
perceived as such by the locals (photos 40, 41).
This was one of the first ashkhana I visited in Erdaoqiao, shortly after my
arrival in Ortimchi, and it soon became a favourite, not only because of the atmosphere
but also for the food. It was one of the few places where I truly enjoyed eating.
Although their polo could not compete with some of those I have eaten in private
homes, it was above average. Besides the polo, what made this place attractive were
their qiyma kawap. 9 Patrons would place their order on entering, to a man standing
by the big qazan, who seemed to be in charge of the polo. As in every ashkhana, they
would then take a seat and, while waiting for the food, would be presented with a
teapot full of fresh black tea and a small bowl to drink it. One could chose between a
full or a half portion of polo, with or without meat, and a number of skewers of gosh
or qiyma kawap. Before long, I was addicted to qiyma kawap with polo and became
a regular of the "polo place".
This place was relatively popular also among the Han. In fact it was the only
Uyghur place where I have regularly seen Han patrons, perhaps due to the lack of
Chinese restaurants (hancan) in the area. Perhaps this was the most accessible place,
in terms of food choice, for those Han who happened to be in that part of town. In
fact, polo has become quite popular among the Han of Xinjiang, who have gradually
got used to the taste of mutton. However, the view of Uyghurs and Han strangers
9 For a description of qiyma kawap see 6.1.3..
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eating around the same table was very unusual. Even more so on a late-February night
in 1997, after not only the city of Ghulja but most of Xinjiang had been swept by
ethnic conflict. Reportedly, during the Spring festival, while in Ghulja hundreds of
Uyghurs were arrested and several were killed, in many areas of southern Xinjiang
Han citizens were murdered by angry Uyghurs. According to rumour such murders
had also occurred in Ortimchi. It was really hard to tell what had actually been going
on, but one thing was sure: fear and suspicion had spread among both the Han and the
Uyghur.10
That February night, when I walked into the "polo place" with Tursun, the
owner recognised me and started to chat with us. He told us that his family had been in
Oriimchi for four or five generations, that is, over one hundred years. Then he went
on commenting on how Uyghurs have a natural bent for foreign languages, and how
they even look like foreigners. At this point Tursun stated: "For them we are
foreigners!" "For whom?" I asked. "Buyaqlar" he replied, pointing at the table next to
ours where five adults and two children, all Han, were eating." Shortly after, a young
Han woman walked in and sat next to me, behind her a young Uyghur couple. At first
I thought they were one party, but that was not the case. The Uyghur man sat next to
Tursun and soon we began to chat, in Uyghur. Suddenly he declared, in English,
"everybody hates the Chinese!". I felt very embarrassed because I was sure that the
Han woman sitting next to me could understand. Tursun did not seem to share my
embarrassment at all; on the contrary, he reasserted the concept, this time in Uyghur,
"See? Everybody hates them." In the background one could hear a TV program
commemorating comrade Deng Xiaoping, who had just died. A big Uyghur man who
was sitting at the other table commented "Mao Zedong was better". A few days later,
during Deng Xiaoping funeral, four bombs were left on public buses by Uyghur pro-
independence activists. Three of them exploded, killing about twenty people and
causing injuries to more than fifty people. The victims were both Han and Uyghur.
That was a particularly tense period and many Uyghurs could not refrain from
expressing vehemently their anger, fear, or frustration. However, even before, when
eating in a Uyghur ashkhana in Erdaoqiao it was not unusual to hear hostile or
mocking comments about the Han, just like in private homes. The area around the
Erdaoqiao market, even if its Chinese name had become more popular than the Uyghur
clOng kdriik, was still considered a Uyghur territory, despite being threatened by the
encroaching Han modernising city planning. Perhaps making ostentatiously disdainful
comments about the Han, even in their presence, was a way to emphasise Uyghur
1 ° Cf. 1.2. To understand the context in which the "Ghulja incident" took place, see Roberts (1998a).
11 Buythilar, literally meaning "those ones", is a derogatory term used by some Uyghurs to refer to
the Han. Cf. 3.2.
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ownership of that territory and to stress that the Han were undesired guests. Uyghur
ashkhana like the "polo place", as well as restoran such as those where wedding
banquets were held, were the only public space in Oriimchi where I have seen the Han
shed their confident superior attitude towards the Uyghur, as if they were out of their
depth.
7.6. Affordable eating-out: middle-range restoran
Somewhere in between the cheapest ashkhana and the most expensive upmarket
restoran one could find a number of middle-range restaurants that offered both tamaq
and say where one could go for a semi-formal meal. Kechik Yolghan (literally little
Yolghan) was one of these. Everybody called it this way, because it stood right
nextdoor to a famous upmarket restaurant called Yolghan; and its actual name was
probably unknown to most people. Kechik Yolghan owed its reputation primarily to
the fact that it was possibly the only restaurant in town where one could eat naren
chOp. This was the very place where I had my first meal with Abdurehim. Later I went
there a few more times with other friends, always to have naren as the main course,
accompanied by a few cold and hot say. It was a modest restaurant which occupied
two floors in one of the low rise buildings that lined Consulate Lane. The main dining
room, on the ground floor, was not too different from that of an ordinary ashkhana,
while the first floor was divided into three or four private dining rooms for bigger
parties.
A similar restaurant was opened during the autumn of 1996 not far from the
"polo place", next to the mosque in Erdaoqiao. The bilingual sign read Chimbulaq
ashkhanisi in Uyghur, which was "translated" in Chinese as Qingbulake canguan.
Interestingly, it was advertised as an ashkhana, although in many ways it could also
have been defined a restoran. According to Dilmurat, who knew and occasionally
helped the manager, this restaurant was owned by a Muslim association, which owned
also a guest house and a travel agency. This might explain the label "ashkhana"; that
is, it was meant to serve as a canteen for MAslim travellers, while also offering the
possibility of a more formal meal. Their menu, which included both tamaqlar and
saylar, would confirm this multiple function.
- Like Kechik Yolghan, this place too had a main dining room and two or three
private rooms. However, these were all at ground level and there was less contrast in
terms of style and decor. The entrance door opened on the main room, which was
rectangular. A big mirror, covering most of the right wall, made it look rather
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spacious, although it was not very big. A few rectangular tables were neatly arranged
along the wall, with nice matching chairs around them. The overall impression was
that of a pleasantly clean and tidy room. Perhaps, the fact that the restaurant was newly
opened helped to convey this impression.
Once I found out that Dilmurat sometimes worked in that restaurant, I went there
on a number of occasions, be it a birthday, a farewell party, or a casual reunion. We
could thus enjoy a special treatment as well as Dilmurat's entertaining company. He
had spent a few years in Russia and in Kazakhstan and, according to Misha, he spoke
not only fluent but very colloquial Russian. Dilmurat was Abdurehim's older brother
and therefore knew some of the friends I had met through Abdurehim. Each time we
went to this restaurant, he would entertain us with his amusing anecdotes. These often
revolved around Han Chinese linguistic incompetence and usually played on the
ambiguity of him being a (reluctant) Chinese citizen but not a Han, and therefore
credible as a "foreigner". His Mandarin was excellent but he made a point of only
speaking Uyghur and, when Misha was with us, he preferred to translate into Russian
for him rather than speaking Mandarin, which was the language that everybody
understood.
Dilmurat was an endless source of not very politically correct but extremely
funny stories, possibly a good mix of facts and creative imagination, which
nevertheless highlighted real and serious identity issues. One night he produced a
series of stories set in Almaty, which he said he had witnessed while he was there for
work. "Once, while I was walking in the street, I saw some Han Chinese who were
trying to communicate with a taxi driver: they wanted to go to Lenin Square and they
kept repeating "Niening Niening!", because they could not even speak proper
Mandarin. I2 Since the taxi driver was helplessly staring at them, they started touching
their heads and their bums, as to say "His head is like my bum", that is, he is bold. I
watched them for a while, then I decided to intervene. "Qingwen, wo xueguo yidian
Hanyu ..." [Excuse me, I have studied a little Chinese] I said, pretending to speak
very poor Chinese. "Tai hao le! Ni dong guoyu!" [Fantastic, you can speak the
"national language"!] they were delighted to have found a "local" who spoke their
language!" The story ended with Dilmurat helpihg the Chinese with his translation, but
recommending the driver to charge them double fares.
Why would he, like many other Uyghurs I have met, not miss a chance to claim
Uyghur superiority over the Han? Perhaps because they have been systematically
taught over the past fifty years that Uyghurs are inferior and need to be "civilised" by
12 In Mandarin Lenin is Liening; however, in some local variant, as in the north-west, '1' is
pronounced 'n'.
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the superior Han. Or, perhaps, because his father spent ten years in prison -
throughout Dilmurat's childhood - for being a "counter-revolutionary"... There may be
many reasons behind this kind of attitude, and they all contribute to a sense of
frustration and anger, of wounded dignity, which some people repressed while other
expressed, more or less vehemently. If one went to Oriimchi between 1996 and 1997
and talked to some Uyghur, one was left under the impression that there was not and
never had been any contact between Han and Uyghur, that the two groups had nothing
to do with each other and never would, that anything the Uyghur were the Han were
not, and vice versa. In short, one had a picture of Han/Uyghur inter ethnic relations
that was highly determined by the political context of that period. It was certainly a
period in which many Uyghurs felt culturally, politically, and numerically threatened
by the Han, both as a group and as individuals. Hence their need to constantly reaffirm
their uniqueness and their very existence as a group, particularly vis-a-vis the Han.
Their dichotomic distinctions between them and the Han at times sounded almost
caricatural. However, this was not an exclusively Uyghur discourse, rather, it could
also be traced back to the Chinese state's systematic classification of typical traits
characteristic of each minzu that we have discussed in earlier chapters. Of course there
was and there had been contact, especially in a place like Ortimchi. It was precisely
those who were most exposed to contact that felt the need to state their difference.
Hence those situations that, at a first glance, might seem paradoxical to an outsider. As
for instance Dilmurat discussing the Han cultural incompetence while eating "say" in
a Uyghur restaurant, where the menu itself seemed to contradict his assumptions about
the Uyghur and the Han as two discrete groups that have nothing in common.
A look at the Chimbulaq ashkhanisi menu might shed some light on the
complex weave of cultural encounters that lies behind such statements. Like the sign
on the door, the menu is also bilingual, Uyghur and Chinese. The food is listed
according to a classification which is characteristic of Chinese restaurants, with some
adaptation: soghuq say I liangcai (cold dishes), kala, qoy goshlllq siiyleir 1 niu, yang
rou lei (beef and mutton), tokhu tiirliri I ji lei (chicken), alahida sayleir / tesecai
(special dishes), gashsiz sdykir / sucai (vegetables; in Uyghur literally "dishes
without meat"), beliq 1 yu lei (fish), dingiz boyumliri I haixian lei (seafood), shorpa
fiang lei (soups), tiz tamaq tiirliri / kuaican lei (fast food). At a first superficial
glance, the menu in Chinese does not look very different from that of a hancan. It
even includes some typically Chinese - at least in the name - dishes, such as yuxiang
rousi, gongbaojiding, or mala doufu. However, at a closer look the great majority of
dishes are based on meat and very few include also vegetables, mostly onions and
potatoes - the predominance of meat and the scarce use of vegetables being a feature
199
typical of Uyghur cuisine. Moreover, despite some beef and chicken dishes, meat is
mutton by default. The "fast food" section, on the other hand, looks definitely
Uyghur. Not only does it list all the Uyghur dishes usually served in an ashkhana,
from ltighmein, to polo, cheichUra, samsa, manta, 'Agra, etc., but it also includes
breakfast items typically found among the Uyghur, such as milk tea, honey, butter,
and jam. In short, as discussed in chapter 6, while Chinese influence is obvious, this
has been manipulated and incorporated into a clearly Uyghur structure of eating.
7.7. Folklore and business: Uyghur meet Han in an upmarket restaurant
On a warm spring afternoon I was sitting at my desk tidying up my field notes, when a
loud banging on my door informed me that there was someone on the phone who
wanted to talk to me. It was my friend Tursun. In his somewhat charming bossy way
he invited me and a couple of other friends from the university (both Uyghur and
foreign students) to a meal in a fancy restaurant. "Be ready at six! - he said - I'll come
and meet you there" and, without further explanation, he hung up. By six o'clock we
were all ready, waiting for Tursun and wondering where exactly he was taking us. At
six-thirty still no sign of him. Perhaps we should not have taken his instructions too
literally... Finally, he turned up at about seven with his friend Adil and we all set out.
Outside the main gate he stopped two taxis and we learned that our destination was
Yengisar restorani (Yanjisa dajiudian), the restaurant of a new luxury hotel, where
two Han "friends" of his were already waiting for us. When I first met him, Tursun
had a lot of spare time, which he often spent with me and a group of other Uyghur
friends. At that time he was working as a judge in the criminal section of the regional
law court, but it sounded as it was just a token appointment, to respect the Uyghur
quota in the administration. However, since he had been moved to the office dealing
with financial crimes, he had become extremely busy. Moreover, in his spare time he
had started meeting socially a number of Han "friends" on a regular basis, possibly
people he had met through his work. This was thefirst time that he was taking me to
one of these meetings.
Once we got to the hotel, we were ushered to the lift by an attendant: the
restaurant was on the second floor and the stairs were out of question ... noblesse
oblige/The dining hall was very big. Some thirty round tables were neatly arranged
and laid with proper white cotton tablecloths and luxury tableware - a rare view in
Xinjiang, even in upmarket restaurants. One end of the hall was occupied by a stage in
front of which a table-free space served as a dance floor. We were shown to our table,
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only two rows from the stage, where a Han couple was sitting, clearly waiting for us.
As we sat down, we hardly had time to say hello before a procession of dishes started
landing on our table, as if our arrival had unblocked a jammed production line
(obviously, jammed by our delay). Service was impeccable, almost asphyxiating - the
contrast with all the discomfort, rudeness, inefficiency that prevailed in daily life was
striking. This was so different from the small - and often not too clean - ashkhana
where we normally used to meet.
Once our table was covered with a variety of cold dishes (U. soghuq say, Ch.
hang cai), Tursun decided that we were ready for introductions and started
announcing our names and nationality. Then he warmly introduced his Han "friend"
Xiao Wang, who was accompanied by his partner Xiao Lii. I was still not clear what
the relationship between Tursun and this man was and why exactly we were sitting
there. All I had gathered was that Xiao Wang was going to pick up the bill. I cynically
thought that Tursun was earning face on two sides: on the one hand he was parading
his foreign friends to Xiao Wang, on the other he was displaying his prestige - or
power? - by inviting us to this meal, having himself been invited by Xiao Wang. Well,
maybe he was also having some fun after all.
Meanwhile, Tursun and Xiao Wang were playing old mates. "I often come to
places like this - remarked Xiao Wang - where one can have a taste of Uyghur culture
... the waitresses are all Uyghur, and they are all very beautiful." - Any stereotyping? -
On the stage a man was singing a traditional style Uyghur song, while a woman was
dancing professional Uyghur usul. They were accompanied by a synthesiser and an
electric guitar. The tables around us were mostly occupied by mixed Han and Uyghur
parties. I imagined this place as some sort of "neutral" ground, where Han and
Uyghurs would meet for business meals, given that normally Uyghurs would never
eat in a Han home, nor would they be happy if a Han ate in their homes. On the one
hand, this restaurant seemed to be packaged for Han consumption, apparently
reproducing Han discourse on the Uyghur with all its clichés - they sing and dance,
and their women are beautiful. On the other hand, here Uyghurs played at home.
Before we started eating, Tursun asked the men what they wanted to drink and
smoke. They eventually agreed on "Sanwu" (Triple five) cigarettes and Yili tequ, the
most famous brand of local baijiu (spirit). They adopted a Han drinking style: each
man had his small glass and they all drank together - as opposed to the Uyghur way,
where- the same rice bowl is emptied in turns by one man at a time, while the others
keep drinking beer or tea. As the toasts proceeded, more dishes were being brought to
our table. It was overwhelming, the menu must have included some two dozens
different sayllir. It was a mixture of traditional Uyghur food and some more or less
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Chinese dish. The "cold dishes" included peanuts, cucumbers, cold beef, tripe,
samsa, gosh nan. These were followed by predominantly meat dishes: roast chicken,
kawap, sheep feet, tonur kawap (a whole roasted sheep), more chicken, etc., green
beans being the only vegetable dish. Finally, a wonderful steamed fish with ginger and
a big plate of fresh fruit. No doubt, the food was excellent. It was a shame that most
of it would have probably ended up in the rubbish bin.
Once all the food had been served, the floor was opened to anyone who wanted
to dance. Uyghur usul alternated to tangsa, as in all respectable Uyghur upmarket
restaurants. From most tables, couples started moving to the floor. Unlike at
weddings, there were no invitations across tables. Quite a few Han were joining the
Uyghur dancing usul. However, despite their admirable efforts their performance was
rather hilarious. In between dances Xiao Wang handed me his name card. He was the
head of the advertising department in a local economic daily. Both he and his partner
were born in Ortimchi, their parents had come to Xinjiang from inner China in the
1950s. Unfortunately, we had to be back to the University before they locked the gate
to our building, at ten Xinjiang time. As we left, the band was playing a tango. A
Uyghur man, who was dancing with a Han woman, stood out for his skill, as well as
for the rose in his mouth. We were told he was an actor and, apparently, the Han
sitting at his table came from Beijing. Was he part of their entertainment program?
7.8. Drawing the line
In this chapter we have seen a number of eating-out situations set in late 1990s
Driimchi where the protagonists are mainly young educated Uyghurs. The theme that
emerges most clearly is that of identity creation and maintenance, which as we have
seen implies above all differentiation vis-a-vis the Han. In this context, that is 'public'
meals among young educated Uyghurs who are at the forefront of assimilation and at
the same time differentiation, the "Uyghur intellectuals' paradox" is exemplified at its
best.
The first episode in our journey through different kinds of restaurants in
Ortimchi is set in a hancan, that is a Chinese restaurant. It is a world alien to the
Uyghur, among whom there is a very strong taboo on Chinese restaurants. During my
fieldwork-this was so compelling that I usually tried to tactfully avoid the topic. On a
number of occasions, being directly asked, I found myself in the embarrassing
situation of having to 'confess' to some Uyghur friend or acquaintance that I
occasionally ate in Chinese restaurants. Indeed, eating Chinese food is the ultimate
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taboo, as the woman we met at the Pink House plainly put it. No matter what her ID
says, she will not be regarded as a Uyghur as long as she eats Chinese food, that is the
food of the Chinese.
At the other extreme, and somewhat symmetrical, is the situation we find in the
Bollywood' restaurant, literally across the road from the Pink House. This time it is a
Han who, regardless of his open attitude, finds himself in a surprisingly alien context.
What is most striking is the innocent discovery of a totally unknown world within
one's backyard. It is the realisation that, regardless of all the efforts made by the
Communist state in researching, defining, and describing each minzu, identity cannot
be reduced to a number of characteristic traits, and that there is a whole world to which
the great majority of the Han do not participate and which is precluded to them, above
all because of cultural and linguistic incompetence. In Orninchi, particularly as far as
food is concerned, despite physical proximity, the Han and the Uyghur tend to be two
separate worlds. They may share some food items or practices, but they are largely
alien to the culture that revolves around food in each other's community. More than the
food, what makes this restaurant distinctively Uyghur is the context in which it is eaten
and the community that eats it. What emerges most effectively in this second episode is
the disruption with the 'eastern motherland', namely China, in contrast to the
continuity - exemplified by a shared popular culture - with the 'foreign west', that is
central Asia and the Turkic world.
It is clear, then, that Uyghur food taboos need to be situated within the process
of differentiation against the Han. Beyond religious prescriptions, food taboos operate
as strategies of boundary maintenance. We have seen how among Uyghurs the notion
of qingzhen is as much an ethnic as a religious category. Hence Muslim Hui
restaurants, far from representing an ideal compromise where Han and Uyghur may
meet, are equally the object of Uyghur mistrust. However, it is not only a question of
qingzhen. When they agree to eat in a Hui restaurant, in any case Uyghurs perceive
that cuisine as distinctively Hui, even where they serve seemingly the'same dishes as
those of a Uyghur restaurant.
In Ortimchi, food production and consumption largely defines Uyghur urban
space. The heart of the Uyghur town, Erdaoqiao, is characterised by a concentration of
Uyghur restaurants. One of these, the 'Polo Place', is also popular among the Han,
thus becoming an inverted microcosm in which rules of dominance are subverted.
Here not only is Uyghur the dominant language, but the Han become an effectively
excluded minority. Even more striking is the paradoxical situation whereby Uyghurs
assert their distinctive identity in opposition to the Han, while sharing food at the same
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table. In this case corrunensality, far from expressing or creating bonds, becomes a
way to underscore difference.
The Uyghur district of Erdaoqiao provides a good sample of Uyghur food
culture, not only in terms of dishes but also in its different kinds of restaurants and
eating situations. There are various degrees of elaboration, ranging from the most
basic food stalls selling only one kind of 'fast-food' - such as kawap or samsa - to
ashkhana serving a limited selection of tamarilar - most typically ltighmtin - and to
more or less fancy restoran where one can chose from among a variety of tamaqlar
and saylar, depending on the formality of the occasion. A clear trend can be observed,
whereby the elaboration of meals is indexed by the number of say appearing in the
menu, as in the episode set in the Chimbulaq restaurant. While this is an issue that
certainly deserves further research, we can tentatively speculate that this might be
because the model for eating out as a leisure activity, which we have seen is a fairly
recent phenomenon in priimchi, comes from Han China, especially from the coastal
provinces. In any case, most relevant to our discussion is that it is precisely in this
kind of occasions that the "Uyghur intellectuals' paradox" becomes particularly
evident.
The same paradox of being at the vanguard of combined assimilation and
differentiation emerges also during a meal in an upmarket restaurant, such as the one at
Yen gisar Restorani, and even more so if this episode is contrasted to the one set in the
"Polo place". Indeed Tursun, the protagonist in both episodes, possibly is the person
that best incarnates this paradox. A place like the Yen gisar Restorani provides an
opportunity for the Uyghur to interact with the Han on their own terms. Regardless of
who pays the bill, here Tursun acts as the host. In short, the food realm is a Uyghur
world, where Uyghur rules operate and where the Han still are the guests.
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CONCLUSION
Uyghur say: an oxymoron to encapsulate the paradox which has been a key issue in
our discussion; that is, the simultaneous borrowing and drawing boundaries vis-à-vis
the Han in the realm of food. A riddle that we may begin to solve above all by raising
our gaze from the dining table of an upmarket restaurant laid with a meal of say to
encompass the cultural, social, and political context in which such a meal is consumed.
Today, Uyghur urban intellectuals find themselves at the vanguard of a process
of assimilation and, at the same time, differentiation. A process which needs to be
situated in the context of contemporary Xinjiang, where the re-emergence of a Turkic
Central Asian region, combined with increasing Han migration from China proper, has
resulted in a strengthening of Uyghur self-identification. The discoursive framework
for the negotiation of Uyghur identity by urban intellectuals is determined by the
"Communist civilising project" (Harrell 1995) which informs Chinese minority
policies. The 'intellectuals' paradox' stems from the same paradox inherent in such
policies, which promote assimilation and at the same time differentiation. In particular,
in order to be developed, or "civilised", the civilisees are constituted as both civilisable
and inferior. Hence the portrayal of "authentic" Uyghurs as traditional and backward.
By inscribing Uyghur history within a Han-dominated linear evolution, this discourse
traps Uyghur intellectuals in a dilemma: to stay Uyghur but backward or to modernise
but become like the Han? This dilemma however can be deconstructed by revealing the
"civilising project" behind it.
By exploring the various and changing ways in which Uyghur intellectuals draw
a line with the Han in the food domain, I have shown that Uyghurs too can change,
while retaining their distinctive identity. In other words, this dilemma is in fact
overcome in food practices, where Uyghur intellectuals construct their difference
despite a certain degree of contamination. Food, as an arena for the negotiation of
identity which is largely outside the state control, can be a source of empowerment.
Indeed, in the realm of food Uyghurs are agents of change and not merely passive
recipients; they act - and interact with the Han - on their own terms. Moreover, change
occurs within a pattern that guarantees continuity.
We may begin to analyse the broader context that makes this food Uyghur by
considering hospitality, as a value which should be performed according to shared
rules dictated by social hierarchies, or age and gender relations. Adhering to this value
involves the knowledge of the appropriate degree of elaboration, depending on the
occasion and the social distance between host and guest. Among the most elaborate
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forms of hospitality is that prescribed during major Uyghur festivals (Roza and
Qurban) and ceremonies, like weddings. These, in particular, seem to dominate
Uyghur social life.
In Oriimchi weddings are celebrated more and more often in restaurants with a
banquet consisting of a meal of say. This would seem to imply a sharp departure from
'traditional' weddings. However, these 'modern' celebrations are inscribed - and are
meaningful - within the whole wedding process, which starts with the chong chay and
the maslikat chay, to continue with the nikah, and end with salam and chillaq. In
each of these events the exchange and the consumption of food is situated within
specific age, gender, and affinal relations which regulate time, space, and modes of
participation of the relevant actors. Hence, for instance, men in the same age-set as the
groom take part in his maslihat chay, while the bride's parents and women relatives
of their generation visit the groom's family during the chong chay. Participation to the
toy (wedding party) is also regulated, in terms of time and space, according to age,
gender, and affinal status. Even in the last stage, when the party is united, women and
men's space is separated and within each of these spaces guests sit with members of
their age set. Despite a certain degree of variation, which is precisely where change
may occur, this recognisable pattern - e.g. who should take part in what event, how,
and when - guarantees continuity with Uyghur 'tradition' while, at the same time,
slowly changing. Thus what makes Uyghur a meal of say served at a wedding
banquet is also the set of values, norms, and customs shared by the participants, and
by the community at large, in which the consumption of such a meal is inscribed.
If values are largely shared, at the same time practices present a certain degree of
variation. It is in this 'grey area' that we can observe change without disruption. This
productive tension between value and practice is further exemplified in the definition
and management of gender roles in relation to food among Uyghur urban intellectuals.
On the whole, women are still considered responsible for the production of food
within the household, in line with 'traditional' values. At the same time though, it is
not rare that men participate in women's work, if not occasionally substitute them
altogether. Changing practices, while not necessarily acknowledged at a discoursive
level, nevertheless contribute to a gradual redefinition of ideal models.
The same sort of dialectic tension between values and practices - which
characterises the gendered modes of food production in urban intellectual households -
is also- found when looking at the actual food that is consumed. Change in food
practices has been influenced by daily interaction with the Han. Hence, for instance, a
dish of Chinese origin like ganpan has entered Uyghur households. Such a dish,
however, is made Uyghur with reference to a notion of what constitutes Uyghur diet
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and cuisine. Even in these urban intellectual households, 'dough' still dominates
Uyghur diet. In particular, the staple food is non (leavened bread baked in a tonur), as
opposed to rice, which can be identified as the staple in most of Han China.
Another fundamental element in Uyghur diet which, together with nan,
constitutes the most basic meal among Uyghurs is fruit. Both its nutritional and its
symbolic importance may be underestimated due to a perception of this food as a
complement in a meal, or a diet, rather than as the core of it. In fact, among Uyghurs
fruit is the food that is consumed in largest quantities, besides dough. Moreover, it is
not just any fruit but 'their' fruit; that is, locally produced by Uyghur peasants and
consumed either fresh according to the season, or processed (typically dried or as
preserve). The consumption of fruit imported from other parts of China - mostly
tangerines and bananas - is very limited, compared to the consumption of what can be
defined as "Uyghur" fruit, such as Turpan grapes, Qumul melons, Kashgar
pomegranates, or Kucha apricots, to mention but some. As we have seen, each oasis
is identified with one particular fruit and, conversely, each fruit is associated with a
specific oasis, thus establishing a powerful symbolic link with 'the land'.
A third element which characterises Uyghur diet, at least ideally, is meat. If for
the Han meat by default is pork, among the Uyghur it is mutton. This meat is obtained
through ritual slaughtering. Besides the obvious implications in terms of belief, this
involves the draining of all the blood, thus affecting also taste. In the preparation of
dishes, such a distinctive taste is further defined by flavours such as onion, cumin,
and black pepper, which are dominant in Uyghur cuisine.
Thus, a rice-based dish like ganpan occupies a somewhat marginal position
within the broader pattern of Uyghur diet, compared for instance to the role that rice
may have in Chinese diet. Moreover, it 'tastes' Uyghur. Not only due to the
combination of halal mutton with specific flavours used in the topping of stir-fried
say, but also in the use of vegetables, which marks the dish as Uyghur in contrast to a
Chinese dish. These are mixed - in terms of taste, texture, colour, and size - in ways
different from the Chinese. Even the rice, which is cooked according to Chinese
methods - as opposed to a Uyghur rice dish like polo - is made Uyghur through the
addition of salt.
The use of eating implements too contribute to characterise the consumption of
certain foods as Uyghur. While today chopsticks - which were introduced by the
Chinese are widely spread throughout the Uyghur population of Xinjiang, the use of
spoons and forks - introduced most likely by the Russian - is not rare either. In
particular, unlike the Han, Uyghurs do not eat rice with chopsticks but with 'western-
style' spoons (i.e. different from the china spoons that the Chinese use for soups).
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Similarly, tea is usually drunk from bowls rather than from glasses or mugs, be it at
home or in a restaurant.
In short, a dish of Chinese origin like ganpan, while introducing an element of
change in Uyghur eating habits, at the same time is incorporated within a pattern that
can clearly be identified as Uyghur. Not only in terms of ingredients, taste, position
within Uyghur diet, or the use of eating/drinking implements, but also, for instance, as
far as notions and rules of hospitality are concerned (e.g. it is not considered the
appropriate food for an invited guest).
This process of differentiation within assimilation, in which Uyghurs are agents
of change, can be further analysed by looking at restaurants and public eating in
general. Here the boundary is drawn first and foremost through the notion of
qingzhen. As we have seen, among the Uyghur practical definitions of qingzhen are
largely predicated on the notion of trust and need to be situated in the context of inter
ethnic relations in contemporary Xinjiang. As far as public eating is concerned, it
follows that restaurants which are officially classified as qingzhen are not necessarily
perceived as such by the Uyghur. For some, only restaurants run by Uyghurs provide
sufficient guarantees. In this case, categories of qingzheninon-qingzhen are
manipulated to function as ethnic boundaries.
This fundamental distinction serves as a first preliminary demarcation of Uyghur
space in public eating. Within this space are situated ashkhanas and restorans, where
more or less elaborate meals are consumed. Ashkhanas serve Uyghur food; that is, a
limited selection of dishes which are regarded as typically Uyghur and are eaten as a
main course, according to a Uyghur meal structure. Besides food, other elements
contribute to define a meal consumed in an ashkhana as Uyghur; from drinking and
eating implements (e.g. bowls for tea, or spoons for polo), to dominant language or
entertainment programs shown on TV.
While in most ashkhana Uyghur identification - and differentiation from the
Han - is very straightforward, it is in restoran, where more formal meals are
consumed, that Uyghur management of change within the tension
differentiation/assimilation can be best analysed. As we have seen, restaurant banquets
usually consist of a meal of say. Here borrowings from the Han can be clearly
identified, as the word itself suggests. In particular, both the meal structure - a set of
cold and hot dishes served simultaneously and shared by all the participants - and
many of the dishes evidently are of Chinese origin. A meal of say, however, is made
Uyghur in various ways.
First of all, it is prepared by a Uyghur cook, which makes it truly qingzhen by
Uyghur standards. Secondly, it is made Uyghur by the inclusion of 'traditional'
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Uyghur dishes (e.g. kawap, manta, etc.). In wedding banquets, the meal is also
inscribed within a Uyghur pattern in that it is preceded by the serving of tea with
gezeikleir, according to rules of Uyghur hospitality. Moreover, as already discussed
with reference to ganpan, what makes these say Uyghur is the use - and the distinctive
combination - of ingredients and flavours which are at the core of Uyghur diet and
cuisine. Finally, these meals are made Uyghur by the context in which they are
consumed. Here too a number of elements, from dominant language to accompanying
entertainment (including Uyghur 'traditional' music as well as pop songs, or the
dancing of Uyghur usul and tangsa), define this context as unquestionably Uyghur. In
short, it is by situating a dish, or a meal, in an ever broader context that its Uyghur
identity becomes more and more meaningful.
In conclusion, an analysis of the ways in which food, despite borrowings, is
kept Uyghur suggests a positive solution to what is perceived as a dilemma by many
Uyghur urban intellectuals. We have seen that this dilemma is largely predicated on
Chinese hegemonic discourse on minzu, which constitutes Uyghur 'tradition' and Han
'modernity' as two excluding alternatives, whereby change seem to inevitably imply a
loss of identity. In the realm of food, however, Uyghurs are agents of change while at
the same time constantly drawing lines to differentiate from the Han and to assert their
distinctive identity, which can thus be consumed without being consuming.
In other words, food is a source of empowerment. Besides cultural and social
aspects, its political dimension is at least as important, as I have shown in previous
chapters. In the context of contemporary Xinjiang, food is an arena where Uyghurs
articulate a discourse of resistance. Indeed, in the domain of food there is a reversal of
power relations between the Han colonisers and the Uyghur colonised. This is
epitomised by those situations where Uyghurs are hosts to their Chinese guests. We
have seen how Uyghur intellectuals resort to both native and Chinese discourses of
hospitality, and to the manipulation of Muslim dietary prescriptions, in order to operate
this reversal.
Moreover, in their notions of qingzhen, not only do Uyghurs establish the
impossibility for their Chinese guests to reciprocate their hospitality, but they also
reverse the Communist civilising project. In considering the Chinese as unclean in
food, that is not qingzhen, Uyghurs constitute them as uncivilised. The civilising
project is further diverted by Uyghur references to other trajectories of modernity
available to them across Chinese borders, as well as by emphasising continuity with
the west, thus implying a more direct access to what ultimately is the source of Han
modernity.
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In conclusion, in this thesis I have shown food not just to be a medium for the
constant redrawing of ethnic boundaries. In symbolic practice, food is also the field
for a restoration of pride and a reversal of the political trap into which Uyghur
intellectuals are thrust by the Han modernising project. In short, I have shown food to
be a code of political discourse.
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